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Abstract 
The aim of the studies undertaken for this thesis was to explore relations 
between adult attachment and autobiographical memory. Study One investigated how 
a self-report measure o f adult attachment style related to young adults' (N = 211) 
recall o f their earliest memories. 
Dismissing individuals reported fewer negatively valenced memories than their 
counterparts in the secure and preoccupied groups. No attachment-related differences 
were found in the total number o f memories (positive, neutral, negative) recalled, or 
individuals' ratings o f the phenomenological properties of the memories. A l l three 
groups tended to rate negative memories more highly than neutral/positive memories 
on the phenomenological characteristics, although preoccupied individuals tended to 
show least differentiation on the basis o f emotional valence. 
Study Two investigated how attachment state o f mind as assessed using the 
Adult Attachment Interview (George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985) related to 
autobiographical memory in a separate sample (N = 65) o f young adults. 
Autobiographical memory was assessed in terms o f recall (a) o f one's earliest 
memory, and (b) o f childhood memories in response to attachment-related and non-
attachment cues, and this study also controlled for concurrent depressive symptoms 
and previous experience o f trauma. As in Study One, the earliest memory and the cued 
memories were rated for their phenomenological properties, but data were also 
collected on latency o f recall. No relation was found between A . A . I , classification and 
any characteristic o f the earliest memory. For the cued recall of attachment-related 
memories, A . A . I , classification independently predicted vividness, emotional intensity 
at encoding and emotional intensity at recall, with dismissing individuals scoring 
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lowest and preoccupied highest. A . A . I , classification also predicted certain aspects o f 
recall for non-attachment material. In particular, dismissing individuals rated non-
attachment memories as less specific and less vivid than did individuals in the secure 
and preoccupied groups. A . A . I , classification has little impact on individuals' 
responses to the attachment-related and non-attachment memories. The only effect o f 
A . A . I , classification was seen on ratings o f specificity; somewhat surprisingly, 
dismissing individuals rated attachment memories as more specific than non-
attachment memories, whereas secure and preoccupied individuals did not differ in 
their ratings o f the two types o f memory. 
Study Three investigated how A . A . I , classification related to imagined future 
events in response to attachment-related and non-attachment cues in the same sample 
of participants who had taken part in Study Two. Controlling for gender, depressive 
symptoms and previous trauma (as in Study Two), the results o f Study Three showed 
that A . A . I . classification predicted the reported vividness and self-relevance o f 
attachment-related imagined future events. Compared with secure and preoccupied 
individuals, those in the dismissing group reported that future attachment-related 
events were less vivid. There was also a marginally significant trend for dismissing 
individuals to rate attachment-related future events as less self-relevant. 
Comparing recall o f previous past events with future imagined events, 
individuals across all A . A . I , categories were slowing at recounting future events than 
at recalling past events, and rated past events as more vivid and emotionally intense. 
However, it was future events that were rated as more self-relevant than past events. 
Study Three also found that there was greater concordance between ratings o f past and 
future events with respect to specific phenomenological properties for insecure 
individuals than for secure individuals. 
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The results o f the three studies reported in this thesis are discussed with 
reference to theoretical positions regarding the employment of pre-emptive and post-
emptive defences against negatively valenced and attachment-related material in 
dismissing individuals. 
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Chapter 1: Approaches to Understanding Adults' 
Autobiographical Recall 
1.1 Introduction 
The empirical investigation o f autobiographical memory, which can be broadly 
defined as memory for personally experienced events, can be traced back to Galton's (1879) 
and Ebbinghaus' (1885/1964) experiments in which individuals were asked to recall a 
memory in response to various cue words. Freud's approach to autobiographical recall 
defined as 'biographical' (Robinson, 1986), implicated the recall o f memories in personality 
development, as well as in conscious and unconscious motivation. On the basis o f his classic 
experiments highlighting how one's pre-existing cognitive representational systems dictate 
the way in which novel material is recalled, Bartlett (1932) proposed a constructive rather 
than reproductive concept o f memory. As Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) first pointed out, the 
study o f memory structure in Ebbinghaus' laboratory experiments reflects the storehouse 
metaphor o f memory, while Bartlett's influence echoes in the functional approach to 
memory which investigates how past information interacts with the present. Given its long 
history, and the numerous ways in which it has been studied, including neuroimaging 
procedures to investigate potential neurofunctional correlates, it is surprising that there is so 
little consensus on the ontogenesis o f autobiographical memory, its structure, and its relation 
with other representational systems. 
1.2 From a Unitary Conception of Memory to Memory Systems: Memory Taxonomies 
Currently, memory is considered to be composed o f several systems, the first o f 
which was introduced by Hebb's (1949) suggestion that there is a difference between short -
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term memory responsible for the temporary storage o f information and a more enduring 
long-term memory. The study o f amnesia during the 1960s and 1970s, and the possible 
dissociation in the impairment o f short-term and long-term memory, further confirmed this 
distinction (Baddeley & Warrington, 1970; Shallice & Warrington, 1970). On the basis o f 
incongruent results emerging within neuropsychological studies, a further division o f short-
term memory was proposed by Baddeley and Hitch in 1974 with the introduction of their 
tripartite working memory model. 
A parallel development occurred in the field o f long-term memory research. Tulving 
(1972) proposed that two long-term memory systems could be distinguished on the basis o f 
being functionally separable in terms o f the source and type o f information that was stored: 
episodic memories are personally experienced events, whereas semantic memories deal with 
general facts that cannot be linked to specific events and dates in the rememberer's past. A 
further distinction in long-term memory is between declarative and procedural memory 
(Squire, 1987). The latter comprises learning as reflected by enhanced performance without 
awareness, such as priming, habituation, simple classical conditioning and the acquisition o f 
motor skills or 'learning how'. These learning mechanisms are difficult to verbalise 
(Tulving, 1985), and are essentially perceptually driven. In contrast, declarative memory 
refers to conscious recall o f both semantic and episodic memories and can be thought o f as 
representational, implying that declarative memories can be independent of the current 
perceptual context. A final difference between the two forms o f memory is that procedural 
memory does not preserve the distinction between recalling information and acting upon it 
(Hoerl, 1999). 
In 1983, Tulving revised his original distinction. Tulving proposed that episodic and 
semantic memories could be distinguished in terms o f the rememberer's ability to 
contextualise the memory in terms o f it being an event which occurred in a particular space 
and at a specific time. Tulving argued that only episodic memories were contextualised in 
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this way, leading to the further elaboration (Tulving, 1983) that the semantic-episodic 
distinction involved differences in the coupling o f memories to the conscious experiencing 
of recollection and a sense of self. Thus, episodic memory is accompanied by autonoetic 
awareness, which involves the ability to project one's sense of self into the past while 
remembering, and into the future while imagining plausible scenarios. Semantic memory on 
the other hand, entails noetic awareness, that is, the awareness of the existence o f 
regularities, objects or entities in the absence o f direct references to self. Finally, the 
procedural memory involves anoetic awareness, a consciousness which is limited spatially 
and temporally to the present. Tulving's (2000) current view thus highlights how episodic 
memory, unlike autobiographical memory, is not only defined by its content but by the 
rememberer's awareness of their own personal involvement in the event at the time of 
encoding. The assumption is that episodic memory is linked to the phenomenological re-
experiencing o f the past in the present (Baddeley, 2001). 
1.3 Defining Features of Autobiographical Memory 
More recently, others have proposed additional classificatory systems within 
autobiographical memory research. Brewer (1986) argued that autobiographical memory 
consisted o f (a) single personal memories, (b) generic personal memories, (c) 
autobiographical facts, and (d) the self-schema. The specificity o f a memory is here 
associated with the frequency o f the to be remembered event and to the presence of imagery. 
An experienced autobiographical memory refers to a single episode which is recollected 
with imagery, while an autobiographical fact is a memory o f a single event, in the absence 
of imagery. When an event was repeated, it wi l l either yield a 'generic personal memory' i f 
accompanied by imagery, or wi l l become part o f self-schemata, in the absence of images. 
This account, as with most definitions o f autobiographical memory, highlights the 
importance o f imagery and memory specificity. 
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More recently, Brewer (1995) and Rubin (1986; Rubin & Siegler, 2004) proposed 
that the principle defining feature o f autobiographical memory is the re-living o f the past 
event in the present. The extent to which a personally experienced event is being re-
experienced is generally investigated by examining the phenomenological qualities that are 
associated with recalling an autobiographical memory. As Rubin (1986) noted, 
autobiographical memory studies rely "heavily on phenomenological reports...it is not recall 
but what is reported about the process o f recalling that is considered as primary data" (p. 3). 
The phenomenological characteristics investigated tend to reflect hypothesised components 
of the proposed theoretical models of autobiographical memory as in Rubin's multi-
componential framework (1995b). 
Regarding the structure o f autobiographical memory with respect to the semantic-
episodic distinction proposed by Tulving, Conway and Rubin (1993) distinguished between 
levels o f specificity o f autobiographical memory knowledge. The content ranges from the 
most general and abstract "lifetime periods", which reflect a motivational theme (for 
instance early childhood, or relationship to mother), to the more specific "general events" 
which are limited to relatively brief temporal categories, linked to changes in goals (e.g., a 
separations from one's caregivers). Finally, a more recent component introduced by Conway 
et al. (2004) is the Life Story Schema, which is a generalisation o f one's autobiographical 
history formed in relation to one's identity in a cultural context. In this model, a memory is 
therefore composed of'episodic memories' intermingled with semantic knowledge. 
Nelson (1977, 1986, 1999) and Fivush (2006) have proposed a model o f 
autobiographical memory development from a social-cultural framework Although, as 
Fivush (2006) has argued, it may seem plausible that generalised representations (semantic 
knowledge) build on episodic event memories, recent research findings seem, on the 
contrary, to support Tulving's hypothesis (Bauer, 1997; Fivush, 1997). Children create a 
script on the basis o f single events and tend to assume that similar future events wi l l 
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conform to this skeletal generalised knowledge category, to the point that they focus their 
attention on the common elements across similar situations, ignoring possible differences 
(Farrar & Goodman, 1990). Pre-school children thus do not seem to have autobiographical 
memories (Nelson, 1986). This developmental trajectory o f representation, although 
counterintuitive, seems adaptive both from an ontogenetic and a phylogenetic perspective, 
allowing children to rapidly create predictions concerning their social and inanimate 
environments (Fivush, 2006). It may be argued, however, that in the case o f life-threatening 
events, and perhaps for all dangerous situations which are linked to the activation o f the 
attachment system, remembering relevant single episodes would also be functional. In fact, 
from a different perspective and on the basis o f schema theory, it has been argued that 
distinctive events are more accessible and vivid. 
The model further postulates, that the complexity o f the content of scripts increases 
with age and experience due to emerging capacities, including theory o f mind (Fonagy, 
2001), language, narrative abilities, and a sense of self. The scripts also seem to become 
more flexible, allowing for variations on basic event themes and outcomes (Fivush, 1984). 
Once again a hierarchical representational structure is posited with the highest levels 
containing abstract knowledge concerning the most likely participants and interactions and 
possible discrepancies, and the lowest levels consisting o f specific episodic events. The 
precise constituents o f autobiographical memory are therefore still debated, although all 
authors concur that the elements from which autobiographical memories are assembled 
consist o f components organised at different levels o f abstraction. 
1.4 Constructivist Approaches to Memory Retrieval 
The changes leading to the proposal o f multiple memory systems led to a renewed 
interest in the encoding and retrieval processes and their interrelatedness. In 1983, Tulving 
proposed the encoding specificity principle, stating that the recall o f an event is a function o f 
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the degree o f similarity between the encoding and retrieval conditions. Encoding and 
retrieval processes thus both determine explicit remembering. This implies that 
remembering wi l l depend on the capacity o f the recall cue to recreate the subjective 
perceptual experience o f an event, "including whatever thoughts, fantasies, or inferences 
occurred at the time of encoding" (Schacter, 1996, p. 61). One instantiation of the encoding 
specificity principle is that memory wil l be state-dependent (for a review see, Eich, 1989), 
with recall depending on the establishment of an isomorphism between the state o f mind at 
encoding and at retrieval. 
It is now widely accepted that the retrieval cue does not simply activate stored 
components o f memories, but rather recombines with an engram to create a recollective 
conscious experience which can be considered to be "an emergent entity" (Schacter, 1996, 
p. 70). As Tulving (2001) argued, "a good part o f the activity o f memory consists not in 
reproduction, or even in reconstruction, but in sheer construction. And constructed 
memories do not always correspond to reality" (p. 1507). 
Schacter, Norman, and Koustall (1998) also suggested a memory framework on the 
basis o f constructive processes whereby the features that compose a memory are not 
identifiable in a "literal trace or engram that corresponds to a specific experience" (p. 774.). 
As Schacter and Addis (2007) note, the constructive nature o f memory also implies memory 
errors, which are arguably adaptive, allowing an individual to 'forget" unnecessary details 
(Bjork & Bjork, 1988; Anderson & Schooler, 1991). 
In fact, the view of memory processes as constructive can be traced back to Bartlett's 
(1932) proposal that "remembering is not the re-excitation o f innumerable fixed, lifeless, 
and fragmentary forms. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out o f the 
relation o f our attitude towards a whole active mass o f organised past reactions or 
experience..." (p. 213). It should be noted that the leading theories o f autobiographical 
memory consider that memories are composed o f elements derived from the original 
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phenomenal experience which in time are recreated on the basis o f schema-based 
information (Brewer, 1986), and that the memories recalled through narratives introduce a 
further constructive element ensuring cultural and personal coherence (Barclay, 1996), the 
latter construct being further elaborated in Conway's model of autobiographical memory 
(see section, 1.5). In other terms, memory processes are reconstructions based on the 
condensation o f perceptual elements, motives and assumptions which were active at the time 
the event occurred. At recall, the current contexts (internal and external) selectively 
modulate the reconstruction process (Johnson & Raye, 2000). The ability to recall and the 
content o f recalled memories is necessarily linked to top-down knowledge about the world 
and is therefore assumed to be a constructive process. As Schacter and Scarry (2000) write: 
"Just as memories are shaped by beliefs, so too are beliefs shaped by memories" (p. 3). 
7.5 "Memory" for the past and for the future 
That the notion that autobiographical memory, is as much a process o f construction 
as o f recall, has led several researchers to argue that it should be conceived as mental time 
travel (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997)1. Tulving (1983) suggested that the same system o f 
episodic memory underlies the ability both to recall the past vividly and to imagine one's 
future, coining the term 'chronesthesia' (Tulving, 2002) for this kind o f mental activity. 
Similarly, Damasio (1999), on the basis o f neuropsychological evidence, distinguished 
between core consciousness and extended consciousness, the latter being a characteristic o f 
human adults which not only allows autobiographical memories to be recalled, but grounds 
the sense of oneself as enduring throughout time. Edelman and Tononi (2000) also 
distinguished between two forms of consciousness, primary and symbolic. These authors 
link symbolic consciousness to self-concept development as well as to a sense of the past 
and future and consider the role o f language and socialisation as being crucial. Schacter and 
1 The distinction between imagination and memory can be reconducted to Hume's (1739/1978) proposal that 
memories are limited by the original event while imagination is not. 
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Addis (2007) also argued that the constructive nature o f episodic memory implies that a 
function o f this memory system is to simulate the future. Moreover, it has been proposed 
that this ability to plan for demands that may be encountered in the future on the basis o f 
what has occurred in the past yields a selective evolutionary advantage (Schacter & Addis, 
2007) that is likely to have played a key role in human evolution (Suddendorf & Corballis, 
in press). It is hypothesised that remembering the past and imagining the future draw on 
similar information stored within episodic memory, associating elements o f a past 
experience flexibly to create novel scenarios that may occur in the future. 
During the past decade a number o f investigations have explored the symmetrical 
nature or continuity of remembering past events and imagining the future. D'Argembeau 
and van der Linden (2004) investigated the phenomenology o f recalled memories and 
imagined events in the future, associated with positive and negative events. In particular, as 
in previous studies on past versus imagined events (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 
1988), past events in general tended to be more detailed and rich in imagery than future 
events. Further, these authors found that the subjective experience o f experiencing the past 
and future was a function o f the emotional valence o f the event. A subjective sense of 're-
experiencing' the past or 'pie-experiencing' the future was greater for positive events than 
for negatively valenced events. The link between past and future has also been demonstrated 
in studies with amnesic patients, whose amnesia for past autobiographical events was 
associated with an inability to envisage the near future (Tulving, 1985; Klein, Loftus & 
Khilstrom, 2002). In the clinical literature, it has been repeatedly found that patients 
diagnosed with depression recall over-general memories (for a recent review see Williams et 
al., 2007). A similar dysfluence was observed in this clinical group when they were asked to 
imagine specific future personal events (Williams et al., 1996). 
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As D'Argembeau and van der Linden (2007) argue, mental representations referring 
to the past and future are composed o f selectively encoded and recalled constituent 
elements. The selection processes are constrained by relevant motivations, beliefs and 
emotions which may have a signalling function as to the importance o f the information. 
These authors further hypothesise that by simulating possible emotional situations, mental 
time travel promotes adaptation to the environment by indicating the situations which 
should be either avoided or approached (also see, Conway, et al., 2004). D'Argembeau and 
van der Linden (2007) also underline that mental imagery may mediate adaptive responses, 
by modulating emotional responses and thus regulating affect. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that recalling positive past events is a strategy through which negative mood can 
be regulated (McFarland & Buchler, 1998). Alternatively, negative events may be recalled 
to achieve a positive affective state (Sanna, 2000). 
Finally, a further potential function o f projection into the past and future is to 
maintain a positive sense of self over time (Baumeister, 1998). Support for this proposal 
comes from research indicating that, when asked to imagine future events, individuals tend 
to imagine more positively valenced events than those recalled from the past and that the 
time-latency for the generation o f negative events, both past and future, was greater than for 
positively valenced events (Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003). Recent neuroimaging studies have 
also provided evidence for the temporal overlap, indicating that regions previously 
associated with episodic remembering (Okuda, Fuj i i , Ohtake, et al., 2003) show increasing 
activity when individuals are asked to imagine future events (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 
2007; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007). 
In summary, research on episodic memory tends to support the hypothesis that 
mental representations linked to conceiving oneself in the past and future are 
interdependent. However, the extent o f this interdependence and the mechanisms 
responsible for it are still debated. For example, the fact that there is concordance between 
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the processes involved in autobiographical recall and in imagining event in the future does 
not to deny the inherent "causal asymmetry" (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007, p. 302) o f past 
and future; that is, that conjecture about the future can never be equivalent to knowledge o f 
a previously experienced event. This difference was also discussed by Hoerl (1999), who 
stated that " in imagination, the subject's grip on the causal constraints governing the project 
she is engaged in may be quite minimal. Specifically, the particular circumstances in virtue 
of which her project meets these constraints may be quite opaque to her" (p. 331). 
According to Schacter and Addis (2007), it is precisely the overlap between memories and 
imagining future events that can account for errors and distortions. These authors argue that 
since remembering and imagining both involve constructive processes, the memory system 
is intrinsically "prone to error" (p. 774). 
In a previous review paper, Schacter (1999) described various kinds of "memory 
transgressions" which can lead to either 'forgetting' due to a lack o f memory-accessibility or 
distortions of memories (p .2) 2. One o f the sources o f memory inaccessibility indicated by 
Schacter is 'absent-mindedness' (also see Reason & Mycielska, 1982). This entails a lack o f 
attention during encoding 3 or retrieval process. A recently demonstrated phenomenon which 
exemplifies a superficial encoding process is so-called 'change-blindness' (Simons & Levin, 
1997), which indicates that individuals do not tend to detect changes, recalling only general 
ideas or schematic information, but ignoring details. Schacter (1999) suggests that this 
aspect is essentially adaptive, since schemata are essential in the organisation o f cognition 
(Mandler, 1979) and affect (Bucci, 1996; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005), as well as 
modulating memory retrieval and allowing the development o f accurate expectations in 
novel context on the basis o f past experiences. 
: Schacter (1999, 2000) described 'seven sins of memory'. However, only those sources of memory error 
which are relevant to attachment-related issues shall be considered. 
' The literature on divided attention is relevant to this issue (see, Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin & Anderson, 
1996). 
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Schacter also indicates the role o f suggestibility, by means o f which experiences 
suggested by others are construed as memories. The work o f Loftus (Loftus, 1993; Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995) on the role o f misleading information was confirmed in a series o f 
investigations carried out by Hyman and colleagues (Hyman & Billings, 1998; Hyman & 
Pentlands, 1996). In these studies, undergraduates were asked about a number o f actually 
experienced or false childhood events on the basis o f a questionnaire completed by their 
parents. Although participants generally remembered 80-90 % of actual events, on average 
20-30 % described a false event in later sessions. Over half (56%) of the participants 
reported specific details o f false events in the later sessions, and 44% described less vivid 
false memories. In a further study, Hyman and Billings (1998) found a positive correlation 
between the tendency to recall false memories and scores on the Dissociative Experiences 
Scale (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) and on the Creative Imagination Scale (Wilson & Barber, 
1978), which is a measure o f the vividness o f mental imagery. A l l o f these studies indicate 
that suggestions made at the time o f memory retrieval, but not at encoding, can lead to the 
construction o f false memories. Another source of error is the retrospective 'bias' through 
which previous knowledge or schemas influence both memory encoding and retrieval. One 
aspect involves a consistency bias, the tendency to create a coherence between past and 
present, which was supported by a study o f Scharfe and Bartholomew (1998) on temporal 
stability in couples' attachment security. In this study, most participants recalled their initial 
attachment evaluation in accordance with the current one. Similar effects were observed in 
studies regarding specific incidents rather than beliefs (Spiro, 1980), at the same time 
suggesting that the bias occurs when an event violates schema-based expectations. 
Another type o f bias refers to the influence of implicit or 'non-conscious' 
knowledge, also known as 'conceptual priming' (Schacter, 1996), on memory encoding and 
recall as well as behaviour. The evidence is based on neuropsychological data from amnesic 
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patients (Hamann, 1990; Mc Andrews, Glisky, & Schacter, 1987) or studies on stereotypes 
in the field o f social cognition (for a review see, Banaji & Bhaskar, 2000). 
Finally, Schacter (1999) indicates an aberration which is generally discussed in 
clinical literature, the persistence o f memories, as for instance in the intrusive flashbacks o f 
traumatic memory or rumination over negative experiences, which in his interpretation 
indicate the loss o f control processes during the encoding o f negative events. In this context, 
the investigations by Wegner and colleagues (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992) are relevant, 
which indicated that when subjects are asked to suppress thinking about a particular item, a 
rebound effect is produced. Rumination in individuals with a depressed mood has also been 
found to enhance the persistence of negatively-valenced memories. In a study, depressed 
and non-depressed participants were asked to ruminate on their current emotional state or to 
engage in a distraction task (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). Subsequently, all subjects performed 
an autobiographical memory task which required the recall o f specific memories. The 
rumination increased access to negatively-valenced memories for depressed participants. In 
animals, it has been demonstrated that the amygdala is involved in the persistence o f fear 
and that stress hormones which influence its functioning modulate the effect (LeDoux, 
1996). Neuropsychological studies on patients with lesions in the amygdala have also 
suggested a selectively impaired recall of emotional aspects o f stories (Cahill, Babinsky, 
Markowitsch, & McGaugh, 1995). Memory persistence is, however, also essentially 
adaptive in allowing the recall o f potentially threatening events, as previously discussed. 
In Schacter's (1999) view, following Schooler and Anderson (1997). these 
distortions or omissions are variations on adaptive features o f the memory system. In fact, 
the latter authors maintain that "memory's sensitivity to statistical structure in the 
environment allows it to optimally estimate the odds that a memory trace wi l l be needed " 
(Schooler & Anderson, 1997, p. 219). This suggests that information which is not likely to 
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be needed in a particular environment should be 'forgotten*. In contrast, more recent and 
more frequently recalled events are more likely to be recalled (Schacter, 1999). 
1.6 Autobiographical memory, motivation and the self* 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) introduced a model o f autobiographical memory 
which focuses on the interrelatedness o f access to personal memories, self-representations 
and motivation or goals (also see, Barclay, 1996) which may be used as a theoretically more 
coherent framework for considering attachment-related findings. By definition, and in 
contrast to other forms of long-term knowledge, autobiographical memories are intrinsically 
linked to the construct o f a ' se l f (Brewer, 1986). It has also been argued that this kind o f 
memory validates the idea o f self-continuity (Robinson, 1986). From the perspective o f 
developmental psychology, Howe and Courage (1997) suggested that autobiographical 
memory requires an emerging sense of self (cf. Sutton, 2002). Conway & Pleydell-Pearce 
(2000) argue that current self-representations and goals influence memory construction, for 
instance by inhibiting memories that are in conflict with the self-representations. An 
autobiographical memory is here defined as a sensorially rich time-specific episodic 
memory embedded in a semantic context. These memories are considered to be transitory 
and dynamic mental representations, created from an underlying cue-sensitive knowledge 
base. It is suggested that activation arises and dissipates and only give rise to memories o f 
which one becomes aware when the individual enters into a retrieval mode (Tulving, 1983), 
inducing a past-oriented state o f mind. 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) elaborated on this idea by introducing the 
concept o f the working self (derived from the concept o f working memory), which 
supervises retrieval processes and evaluates potential events to be recalled. The working self 
in this model is believed to consist o f goal-related processes. In its supervisory role, the 
4 This section refers to a paper co-written with Martin Conway and Jefferson Singer (Conway, Singer. & 
Tagini, 2004). 
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working self has a two-fold function: Firstly, goals are fonnulated according to pre-existent 
autobiographical memories; secondly, autobiographical material is constantly revised on the 
basis o f the achievement o f goals. In addition, the working self can inhibit the recall o f 
knowledge which conflicts with a goal or motivation. The model can thus account for 
specific memory dysfluencies that have been observed in clinical groups (Conway et al., 
2000; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway & Fthenaki, 2000) by referring to 
inhibitory processes that may be active (or fail) at different stages o f the retrieval process, 
according to the degree o f goal-compatibility. Conway (2001) has also hypothesised that the 
persistent inhibition o f goal-incompatible knowledge may lead to a permanent inhibition o f 
the knowledge or o f the direct access to goal-neutral or goal-positive knowledge. Persistent 
inhibition may also influence accessibility, but not the availability o f knowledge, the 
inhibited knowledge may therefore continue to influence both cognitive-affective processes 
and behaviour. 
Conway Pleydell-Pearce's (2000) Self Memory System model has been further 
elaborated by Conway, et al. (2004). The Self Memory System is considered to emerge from 
the interaction o f an episodic memory system a working self and a long-term self. The long-
term self is linked to more abstract self-related knowledge organised in the autobiographical 
knowledge base and a conceptual self. In this elaboration, goals are seen to "drive 
cognition" (p.494), and emotions have a signalling function in assessing goal attainment. In 
this work, episodic memories are also redefined, and in contrast with Tulving's previously 
discussed model, are considered to be short-term experience-near records o f ongoing 
activities, generally represented by sensorial imagery. When these components are active, 
they induce autonoetic consciousness and the re-experiencing o f the past, involving a 
disengagement from the present. These components can undergo rapid degradation or be 
integrated in long-term autobiographical knowledge. The long-term self is thought to be 
composed o f an autobiographical knowledge base and a conceptual self structure. The 
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knowledge base is structured hierarchically, with specific events being embedded in more 
abstract general knowledge previously discussed (Conway, 1993). 
A new component o f the Self-Memory System includes the conceptual self, a 
semantic memory structure, consisting o f socially constructed abstract knowledge about the 
self. It is defined as consisting of "non-temporally specified conceptual self-structures'" 
(p.500) o f which internal working models may be an instantiation. The conceptual self 
knowledge and autobiographical knowledge base information interact reciprocally, 
modulating each other's content and are in turn, connected to specific episodic memories. 
Changes in the conceptual self may influence access to the content o f the autobiographical 
knowledge base, episodic memories and the long-tenn self. In this further extension o f 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce's model (2000), it is suggested that the creative use o f 
autobiographical memories in imagination is constrained by a dialectic relation between two 
needs: "adaptive correspondence" and "self-coherence". The first is that a memory system 
needs to 'correspond' to a certain degree to experienced reality in order to be functional. The 
correspondence is guaranteed by the experience-near knowledge o f the episodic system, 
with its sensory-perceptual information. On the other hand, memories need to be coherent 
with the more conceptual knowledge contained in the Long-Term Self in order to be 
meaningful. As Conway et al. (2004) specify, affective arousal may induce "a merging o f 
the psychological present and 'remembered reality"' (p. 511), distorting the relatively 
accurate interpretation o f current events. This second function has been invoked by the 
formulations regarding the functions o f Internal Working Models, in particular as 
reformulated by Main in attachment theory, with its emphasis on narrative and 
representational coherence rather than on memory accuracy. 
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/ . 7 Rubin 's model of autobiographical memory 
In Rubin's model, (Rubin, 1995b, 1998; Rubin & Greenberg, 1998: Schrauf & 
Rubin, 2000) autobiographical memories are assembled from several component processes, 
attributed to separate cognitive systems. The suggested components are imagery, language, 
narrative reasoning and emotions. 
As in Conway & Pleydell-Pearce's theory, and in Tulving's (1983) definition of 
autonoetic consciousness, a first fundamental component is imagery. Sensorial material is 
considered a defining feature o f re-experiencing a specific, unique autobiographical 
memory. In fact, individuals tend to believe that their memories are more accurate when 
imagery is included in remembering5 (Pillemer, 1992; Pillemer, Desrochers, & Ebanks, 
1998), although this is not necessarily the case (Winograd & Neisser, 1992). 
Two further components of autobiographical memory proposed by Rubin's model 
are language and narrative structure. Although few studies have investigated the interaction 
between memory, narrative coherence and emotion., fragmented narratives have been 
described in studies on traumatic memories (for a review see Dagleish, 2004). However, 
contradictory evidence has recently emerged (see for eg., Berntsen, Willert & Rubin, 2003). 
In fact, Berntsen and Rubin (2006) suggested that traumas, being unusual events, deviate 
significantly from schemata, and thus from expectations and would therefore probably be 
more easily recalled. 
Several authors have argued that autobiographical memories are structured and 
perhaps stored in narrative forms, and in particular as stories (Robinson, 1996; Barclay, 
1986, 1996). Schank and Abelson (1995) also postulated that "the content o f story memories 
form the basis of an individual's remembered s e l f (p . l ) . Rubin (2003) claims that 
narratives organise autobiographical memories, structuring them temporally and providing 
goals (also see Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Habermas and Bluck (2000) have observed that 
5 Historically, the distinction between perception and memory was made on the basis of the intensity of the 
imagery, or vividness (Brewer, 1995). 
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narrative reasoning, creates an overarching coherent life-story, relating autobiographical 
memories to a self representation. These authors indicate that autobiographical reasoning 
provides (a) temporal coherence by sequencing events in time, (b) causal coherence by 
relating l ife events to personality changes, (c) thematic coherence through the analysis o f 
themes across memories and finally (d) a cultural sense of biography, which constrains the 
events to be included into a life story. As previously discussed, research on autobiographical 
memory development also underlines the importance o f dyadic narratives in structuring the 
content and form of autobiographical memory in children (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Several 
authors (Conway, 2002; Howe & Courage, 1997) claim that language merely allows 
memory content to be expressed, or reflects memory development but does not organise 
memory in children and adults. As Nelson and Fivush (2004) argue, it is difficult to counter 
this viewpoint through empirical evidence "because of the rather obvious dependence on 
verbal reports o f much of the data related to autobiographical memory" (p. 493). Finally, as 
Stern (1985) observed, the emergence o f language and o f a narrative self implies that a 
hiatus is created between self and other, which can also lead to contradictions between the 
behavioural level and the associated explicit communication. Bowlby (1980/1998) 
postulated that the conflicting memories would then be encoded in different memory 
systems as w i l l be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
Another fundamental component of the model is emotion. Language and imagery-
related affects are generally believed to operate independently from cognition and to 
influence the content or the structure o f recalled memories, although the reciprocal 
relationship is unclear. In particular, research findings from eyewitness studies, flashbulb 
memories6 and research on trauma suggest that affect actually favours the recall o f vivid and 
detailed memories (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Christianson, 1992a, 1992b). Similarly, the 
context in which an emotional cue in presented in experimental studies tends to be 
6 Flashbulb memories are vivid memories, defined as "memories for the circumstances in which one first 
learned of a very surprising and consequential (emotionally arousing) event (Brown & Kulik, 1977, p.73). 
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remembered to a greater extent when the cue is emotional rather than non-emotional 
(Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Rubin & Friendly, 1986). A bias in recalling positive events 
rather than negative, named the Pollyana principle has been repeatedly observed (Matlin & 
Stang, 1978). However there is also evidence that negative although non traumatic 
emotional imagery can be recalled in greater detail than positive cues (Ochsner & Schacter, 
2003). 
In contrast, other studies have found that i f an extremely negative event is witnessed, 
details are unlikely to be recalled (Christianson & Safer, 1996). Positive words and images 
have been shown to be more memorable (e.g., Ainsfield & Lambert, 1966). Diary studies 
have usually suggested greater recall for pleasant events (Linton, 1975; Wagenaar, 1986). A 
methodological problem of these studies is that although a valence effect has been 
consistently found, since most studies compared negative or positive memories with neutral 
ones, the results could therefore have been induced by the intensity o f the affect rather than 
the valence (Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004). After reviewing studies on the intensity o f 
emotion on memory recall, Talarico et al. (2004) concluded that the findings on an intensity 
of emotion effect seem more consistent and can account for the contradictions found in the 
valence studies. These authors investigated the effect o f positive and negative memories as 
well as o f affect intensity on various self-rated memory characteristics in a college sample. 
Their findings confirmed that the intensity o f affect, had a greater influence on various 
phenomenological properties o f the memories recalled than memory valence. In particular, 
intensity o f affect accounted for a majority o f phenomenological characteristics including 
memory vividness, the recollective quality o f the memories, their specificity, the amount o f 
rehearsal and narrative, and the associated emotion. However, emotional intensity did not 
account for the subjective sense o f memory accuracy. The authors suggest that emotional 
intensity may actually increase attention to the features o f the event during encoding. 
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1.8 Summary 
Although as Brewer (1986) wrote: "There has been enormous confusion in the 
terminology used in discussions o f autobiographical memory" (p. 32). the above-discussed 
models concur that autobiographical memory requires the binding or coalescing o f various 
components. Although the models reviewed highlight different sub-components, including 
motivations, self-representations, emotions, narrative processes and imagery, however the 
authors agree that an autobiographical memory by definition is accompanied by recollective 
experience and should be specific to a particular episode. The models and theories discussed 
suggest that an autobiographical memory is constructed or reconstructed from its constituent 
elements, in relation to the present context which includes affective states and goals, and 
cues present in the environment. As a result, current theories o f memory, as reviewed by 
Schacter (1999), also imply that, autobiographical memories are inherently vulnerable to 
errors and distortions because o f their constructive nature. 
Regarding the temporal functions o f autobiographical remembering, on the basis o f 
Tulving's hypothesis of multiple memory systems and the correlated forms of awareness, 
autobiographical memory has been widely considered to modulate the interpretation o f 
present experience and to provide the raw material for simulating future events 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). 
. In contrast to Tulving's proposal that semantic memories ontogenetically precede 
episodic memories, most accounts o f the development o f autobiographical memory suggest 
that episodic and semantic memories should be viewed on a continuum, with semantic 
memories constituting abstractions created from episodes (Barsalou, 1985; Conway, 2003). 
An autobiographical memory wi l l thus consist o f recollection-inducing elements (episodic 
memory components) and semantic or abstract knowledge (but see Nelson & Fivush, 2004). 
Various other functions o f autobiographical memory are implied in the accounts 
reviewed in this chapter. Since this kind o f memory is intrinsically linked to the concept o f 
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self, self-coherence or continuity has been repeatedly suggested as a primary function 
(Barclay, 1996; Fivush, 1988; Habermas & Bluck, 2001). On the other hand, various authors 
have also underlined that the self-concept although influenced by the memories recalled, in 
turn restricts both encoding and retrieval o f memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Finally, as discussed, a number o f empirical studies have investigated the dyadic 
construction of autobiographical memory during child development, and it has been claimed 
that the social function of autobiographical remembering is primary (Winograd & Neisser, 
1992; Bluck, 2003). Further, although Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) explicitly refer to 
internal working models as "an important part o f the s e l f , and despite the recent interest for 
individual differences in autobiographical memory (Tulving, 2003) the possible links 
between attachment and memory in adults have as yet remained unexplored in the field o f 
autobiographical memory. Chapter Two, w i l l discuss attachment theory and the construct o f 
'internal working models'. 
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Chapter 2: Adult Attachment and 
Internal Working Models 
2.1 Bowlby's concept of Internal Working Models 
One of the basic tenets o f attachment theory, stemming from Bowlby's 
psychoanalytic heritage (Bretherton, 1999); Fonagy, 1999; 2001; Bretherton, 2006), is that 
individuals construct representations or 'internal working models' o f significant early 
relationships which shape subsequent social interactions. Thus, to a certain extent, internal 
working models provide a sense of continuity between the interpersonal past, present and 
future. 
In the first volume of his attachment trilogy, Bowlby (1969/1997) reformulated the 
psychoanalytic theory o f an internal world in more general terms and in accordance with 
biological principles 7, postulating that human beings elaborate models of their environments 
and of themselves as organisms which allow them to "conduct, as it were small-scale 
experiments with the head" (p. 81). The models are structured to reflect one's "experienced 
world", with Bowlby emphasising the role o f 'actual reality' versus 'fantasy,' although he 
also conceded that the models should be capable o f being "extended imaginatively to cover 
potential realities" (ibid.). In this volume, Bowlby defined the adequacy of the models as a 
function o f their accuracy and thus predictive value, their internal consistency and finally 
their f lexibil i ty or complexity in being applicable to numerous situations. Another adaptive 
aspect o f these models discussed by Bowlby is their openness to revisions in response to 
environmental or organismic changes, which he attributed mainly to conscious processing. 
7 Although the work of Craik (1943) is usually invoked to explain the source of the 'internal working model' 
concept, Bretherton (1999) explains that Bowlby had not read the author. 
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Bowlby also suggested that models could become inadequate when they were partially or 
completely out-dated with respect to current reality, or when they were incoherent 
presenting "inconsistencies and confusions" (p. 82). He defined the function of working 
models in terms o f the processing of "a novel plan to reach a set goal" ( ivi) . In terms o f the 
Piagetian metaphor, it could be argued that the models needed to be relatively stable on the 
one hand, assimilating minor changes, but also capable o f accommodating to high levels o f 
discrepancy from the environment. As Bretherton (1999a) suggests, in this first formulation, 
internal working models were considered to be general representations, and were not 
specifically linked to attachment per se. 
It is in the second volume on attachment that Bowlby (1973/1998) specified that 
internal working models contribute to the perception o f events and predicting the future, and 
that their basic content consists o f complementary relationship representations of attachment 
figures and the self. Therefore, according to Bowlby, models deriving from past interactions 
with caregivers create expectations that in turn influence how novel events are interpreted. 
Bowlby seemed to need to just ify these hypotheses by presenting them as reformulations o f 
the psychoanalytic concepts o f good and bad objects and 'self-images"8. Bowlby further 
suggested that the experiences from which these models were constructed derived from both 
day-to-day experiences with attachment figures as well material that was verbally 
communicated rather than being personally experienced. 
In the final volume of the trilogy, Bowlby (1980/1998) referred to Tulving's (1972) 
distinction between semantic and episodic memory systems. Bowlby underlined that 
episodic memory consists o f autobiographical information based on "personal experience" 
while semantic memory is material stored contributing to "personal knowledge". A 
* In reality, equating 'internal working models' with 'good or bad objects' is somewhat misleading, for 
example, while "internal working models' are essentially cognitive constructs, good and bad objects in most 
psychoanalytic theories, are dynamic-affective constructs. This desire to ground 'internal working models' in 
psychoanalytic theory may have been prompted by the criticism of his work within the British Psychoanalytic 
Society (see Fonagy, 1999). 
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clinically relevant corollary according to Bowlby is that multiple "images of parents and of 
s e l f can co-exist. In this formulation, he seemed to introduce a distinction between 
memories and working models: "Whereas memories o f behaviour engaged in and of words 
spoken on each particular occasion w i l l be stored episodically, the generalizations about 
mother, father and self enshrined in what I am terming working models or representational 
models w i l l be stored semantically" (p. 62, italics added). In other ways, this passage 
suggests that internal working models proper are attributed to the semantic memory system 
in the form of abstractions and generalisations, while single event memories are stored 
separately. Although this formulation anticipated future authors' attempts to attribute 
components o f internal working models to various memory systems, it also generated 
conceptual confusion. As Bretherton (2006) recently commented, "is not clear, however, 
why he [Bowlby] regarded semantic, but not episodic, memory as involved in the 
construction of internal working models" (p. 20). 
According to Bowlby (1980/1998), the different sources o f information in 'episodic 
and semantic storage' can give rise to discrepancies and conflict. One form is discussed in 
the case study o f Geraldine, used to exemplify the existence o f multiple 'selves' which 
resulted from defensive manoeuvres. In this case, memories and feelings associated with 
traumatic experiences induced an almost complete defensive exclusion 9, which created a 
separate and relatively inaccessible representational system. When discussing the case, 
Bowlby suggested that the patient's autobiographical memories (in the episodic system) are 
thus segregated or deactivated and remain unconscious. Bowlby is thus proposing that in 
extreme conditions, when attachment-related experiences are unbearably conflictual or when 
a child becomes aware o f events which the parent wishes to conceal, the internal working 
models can be fragmented into one accessible model and a second which is excluded from 
consciousness. This latter model would be less functional, but adaptive to that particular 
'' A concept that revisits, in information processing terms, Freud's concept of repression in terms of exclusion 
from awareness. 
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relational context. As Bretherton (2006) points out, this contradicts Tulving's (1972, 1983) 
theory, in which episodic or autobiographical memories are by definition accessible to 
consciousness. Bretherton therefore argued that it is more likely that the inaccessible model 
which provides "only fragmentary evidence o f its existence" (Bretherton, 2006, p. 347) may 
be attributed to the procedural memory system. 
In summary, Bowlby (1969, 1970, 1980 /1998) viewed internal working models as 
being composed o f specific contents, aspects o f the caregiver and self and the associated 
affect. In Bowlby's view, internal working models also have process qualities by influencing 
the perception, interpretation and memory o f interpersonal experience, and functionally 
create expectations in the present and o f the future which are isomorphic with the past. 
However, as Grossmann (1999) argued, the concept as formulated in the trilogy needed 
specification and further elaboration, in part due to the limits in conceiving representational 
models at the time (Nelson, 1999; Fivush, 2006). In particular, as Bretherton has repeatedly 
(1991, 1999, 2006) suggested that revisiting the concept o f the internal working models by 
considering relevant memory research, and in particular, the roles o f both the episodic and 
procedural memory systems. 
2.2 Further developments of the concept of internal working models as multiply encoded 
hierarchical structures 
Bretherton (1985, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1999, 2006) further elaborated on the structure 
of internal working models, defining them as a useful "conceptual metaphor" (1985) and 
referring to theories derived from current social and cognitive psychology. Bretherton 
(1992) first referred to the implications o f several memory systems for internal working 
models in terms of the distinction between short-term memory and long-term memory, and 
the role o f prototypical sequences o f events or scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) in storing 
and organising material within long-term memory. Schank (1982) had subsequently 
38 
proposed that scripts, rather than being simple event-representations, were hierarchically 
organised constituents o f long-term memory. He suggested that autobiographical memories 
were processed in terms o f micro-components which differed according to categories such 
as motivations, affective aspects, spatial, temporal, and causal elements. These scripts could 
then be reassembled into vaster scripts based on generalisations across various episodes. 
Thus different levels o f script co-exist in a hierarchical structure ranging from lower 
experience-near interactive scripts to more abstract general scripts. In this view, 
autobiographical events come to include new knowledge by means of constant dynamic 
processing, due to the recombination o f old scripts or their sub-components. A more flexible 
view of autobiographical memory is thus provided, which includes the remodelling o f 
experienced events according to different categories and levels which also take into account 
the current context. 
The distinction between short- and long-term memory and the use o f scripts within 
long-term memory allowed Bretherton to go beyond Bowlby's episodic-semantic memory 
subdivision, and to construe internal working models as hierarchically structured schemata. 
Bretherton (1992) integrated Schank's (1982) script theory with Epstein's (1973, 1980) self-
concept hypothesis to reconceive internal working models. An internal working model o f 
attachment could thus be conceived at a basic level o f specific experienced relationships and 
events concerning significant attachment figures, as well as higher levels o f abstract general 
assumptions relative to attachment which include Bowlby's representations o f the self and 
the caregiver. These different levels are proposed to be interrelated, influencing each other 
reciprocally. In this view, defensive processes would induce interference at the different 
levels o f abstraction during internal working model construction, rather than creating two 
separate contradictory internal working models, each confined to a separate memory 
systems as Bowlby (1980/1998) had postulated. Furthermore, the levels within the internal 
working model can differ in the extent to which they are accessible to consciousness; some 
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may have been processed and therefore organised within the internal working model only at 
a procedural level. As Pazzagli (2002) noted. Bretherton's view of internal working models 
becomes fu l ly compatible with Tulving's concept of memory systems, since both authors 
conceive o f memories as being hierarchically organised and accessible to consciousness to 
various degrees. A memory can be excluded from consciousness because it is incompatible 
with current representations, generating conflict, or because it was processed at a procedural 
level and therefore never became conscious. Bretherton and Munholland (1999) also 
underlined how defensive processes may not only 'exclude' information, but may reinterpret 
events according to current internal representations and contexts. 
In his early work, Stern (1985) had also proposed a model in which experienced episodes o f 
dyadic interactions are "averaged" and generalised to form representations known as RIGs 
(p.97). Stern further suggested that RIGs "can be conceptualised as the basic building block 
from which working models are constructed" (p. 114). The author noted however that RIGs 
are not exclusively bound to attachment-related experiences, but rather concern vaster 
motivational aspects. Interactions experienced between child and caregiver are encoded as 
specific episodes comprising affective, motivational, cognitive, perceptual and motor 
elements. Similar specific episodes are then organised into prototypes, which in turn create 
functional categories or scripts. In his later work, Stem (1994) also describes narrative 
models defined as the history or explanation o f internal working model to self or a 
significant other, implying that non-verbal components o f the internal working model can be 
translated into verbal ones. As such, non-verbal interactions are placed into a broader 
context, since narrative models are socially construed and therefore contain elements not 
derived from personal experience. Incoherence in models can occur either during the 
assembling o f representational moments or scenes, or between the unconscious internal 
working model and the narrative models. For Stern (1992), internal working models are not 
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merely isomorphic with the original experience (as for Bowlby and Bretherton), but a co-
construction of 'object ive reality'. 
Another author who articulated Tulving's (1972/1983) memory systems with the 
concept of internal working models was Crittenden (1990). For Crittenden, a child's 
attachment behaviour reflects procedural knowledge, indexing the infant's actual 
experience. As in Bowlby (1980/1998), semantic memory contains generalisations about the 
attachment relationships derived from actual events and from parental communications. 
Crittenden also postulated that the distortions which Bowlby had discussed in terms o f 
defensive exclusions may be attributed to failures in the encoding and retrieval processes. 
She further acknowledged that in theory, the content of the memory systems may diverge 
due to differences in "ability, willingness, and interest in comparing procedural, semantic, 
and episodic memories and the associated internal representation models" (Crittenden, 1990, 
p. 264). In this case, the models would require processes o f integration, which may be 
assumed to occur consciously possibly resulting in the creation o f a "new meta-model" 
(Crittenden, 1990, p. 265). 
Crittenden (1995) also postulated that the different memory systems are associated 
with different conditions: procedural memories guide preconscious everyday behaviour, 
attachment related problem-solving is linked to semantic memory, while highly arousing 
situations access episodic memories. In secure individuals, there are few discrepancies 
among the memory systems, and internal working models are open to revision and updating 
due to these individuals' high levels of metacognition (Crittenden, 1995). While insecure 
individuals' internal working models may be internally inconsistent and are less able to 
accommodate new information. Finally, Crittenden proposed that, while semantic memory 
may be distorted by a caregiver's misleading interpretation o f events, episodic memory 
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biases could be due to interference from unresolved affects (Crittenden, 1997). Her position 
on this issue is thus in line with Bowlby's (1980 / l 998) position. 
The development o f attachment representations was also extended by Fonagy 
(2001). The constituents o f attachment representations, based on expectations o f interactive 
patterns with the caregiver, develop during the first year of life. These initial schemata are 
assumed to operate at a procedural level. Subsequently, general and specific memories o f 
attachment-related interactions are encoded, which in turn, by coalescing into 
autobiographical memories, become organised in an overarching autobiographical narrative. 
Finally, Fonagy proposed a further representational development o f attachment 
representations which entails the ability to think about one's own mental states and those of 
others and to distinguish between the two. Fonagy thus also highlights the quality and levels 
of processing o f internal working models rather than their content. 
From a cognitivist perspective, Spangler and Zimmermann (1999) also proposed a 
developmental sequence of the ontogenesis o f internal working models. At birth, innately-
endowed basic components o f the attachment system exist, operating on a reflex level. It is 
on the basis o f the interactions with caregivers that the child then develops attachment 
figure-specific internal working models. These models once again are proposed to function 
at procedural level and are thus not accessible to consciousness, guiding behaviour 
implicitly and not on the basis o f representations. It is only in the subsequent phase o f 
internal working model organisation, when newly developed cognitive elements are 
integrated with the behaviour-based models that explicit representations o f the caregiver, 
and o f the self, emerge. The models are believed to increase in complexity and in accuracy 
during further developmental phases. Finally, Spangler and Zimmermann speculated as to 
the interactions between the different levels. As they observed, most research in attachment 
assumes that internal working models emerge and replace the previously constructed 
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behavioural ones during different developmental stages. In this sense behavioural measures 
of attachment such as the Strange Situation (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) 
would tap into the procedural models, whereas representational measures would access the 
more complex declaratively organised internal working models. However, Spangler and 
Zimmermann also suggest two alternative organisational principles for attachment 
representations. Firstly, lower levels may be completely integrated into higher level internal 
working models. Alternatively, the lower level behavioural models could form the basis for 
more sophisticated internal working models, but the two types o f model would continue to 
co-exist as relatively independent systems. Moreover, the less sophisticated or lower-level 
forms could prevail in stressful conditions. This latter proposal contrasts with the generally 
held view that declarative knowledge intervenes when procedural knowledge is insufficient 
to guide behaviour. A possible explanation is that these authors consider that defensively 
excluded emotions are processed in procedural memory. These authors focus on the 
emotion-regulation function o f internal working models , which depends on the fluid 
coordination o f the various levels o f processing, which may fail leading to incoherence in 
the perception (at a procedural level) or the communication o f emotions (at a declarative 
level). 
A l l the authors discussed thus far have proposed a multi-level view of internal 
working models, based on the emergence and co-existence o f internal working model 
components which can be attributed to different memory systems. These views thus diverge 
from the developmental sequence proposed by Tulving (1972/1983), who suggested that 
episodic memory development is subsequent to and dependent on semantic memory (also 
see Nelson, 1999; Bretherton, 2005). In contrast, Crittenden, Stern and Bretherton suggest 
that abstract generalised knowledge evolves from primary specific event memories, with 
bottom-up processes preceding and constraining the top-down processes. 
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2.3 Assessing Internal Working Models: The Adult Attachment Interview 
While the researchers discussed above have made substantial theoretical 
contributions to our understanding o f internal working models and their relation with 
autobiographical memory, Main's major impact on the field has arisen through the design o f 
an instrument capable o f tapping into an individual's internal working models o f attachment 
relationships: the Adult Attachment Interview (A.A. I . ) . 
The A . A . I . (Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985) is a semi-structured interview in which 
individuals are asked to describe their childhood experiences with attachment figures, with 
specific questions relating to early separation, feelings o f rejection and any experiences o f 
loss. Main, et al. (1985) revisited the concept o f internal working models , defining them as 
"a set of conscious and/or unconscious rules for the organization o f information relevant to 
attachment and for obtaining or limiting access to that information...regarding attachment-
related experiences, feelings and ideations" (pp.66-67). This redefinition extends the non-
verbal correlates o f the internal working model to individual differences in representations 
which organise and regulate cognitive and affective processes. It is also implied, similarly to 
the socio-cultural tradition, that since internal working models are structured on the basis o f 
social and emotional interactions with the caregiver, representational processes are in part 
structured in the context o f the dyad. 
The A . A . I , is structured so that different questions tap different memory systems, 
some being designed to cue semantic autobiographical memories, and some episodic 
autobiographical recall. In the A . A . I , coding system, Main and Goldwyn (1998) 
operationalised the criteria for classifying individuals as insecure in terms o f discrepancies 
between the semantic and episodic memory systems. During the A . A . I . , subjects are initially 
required to provide a general description of childhood relationships to parents, and then to 
choose 5 adjectives to describe their childhood relationship with each parent. The adjectives 
are then used as cues for the retrieval o f specific episodes. In part, the interview can 
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therefore be viewed as a form of autobiographical memory test. Subjects generate the cues 
with which to recall memories o f specific incidents, in relation to a certain lifetime period 
(childhood) and a specific theme (attachment relationships). 
Various questions fol low on the subject's behaviour in circumstances in which the 
attachment system is presumed to be particularly active (when the subject was upset, hurt or 
i l l , or separated from attachment figures during childhood). Subsequent questions refer to 
the ability to evaluate one's childhood experiences (e.g. the impact on one's development or 
reasons for parent's behaviour). A series of further questions probe potentially traumatic 
experiences and significant losses. The final part o f the interview concerns present 
relationships to parents and future relationships to the subject's children. 
In order to be analysed, the transcript must be audio-taped and transcribed verbatim. 
Scoring (Main & Goldwyn, 1998) is carried out on 5 nine-point "experience scales" which 
rate the inferred behaviour o f parents during childhood (the degree of loving, rejecting, 
neglecting behaviour as well as role-reversal and pressure to achieve) and on 9 nine-point 
"state o f mind scales" which assess the subject's current "state o f mind" with respect to 
attachment. The state of mind scales include "idealisation", defined as a discrepancy 
between the positive semantic descriptions and the episodic memories recalled; "insistence 
upon inability to recall" childhood experiences, including documenting eventual traumatic 
memory loss; indices o f present "involving anger"; "passivity" or vagueness o f discourse, 
assumed to imply involuntary shifts o f attention; active derogating dismissal o f attachment 
related experiences; "metacognitive monitoring" referring to the ability to reflect on one's 
experiences, to control and monitor one's thought processes; "fear o f loss" which indicates 
an unfounded fear o f loosing one's child; "coherence o f transcript", based on the internal 
consistency o f the narrative and collaboration; and finally "coherence of mind" rating the 
coherence o f thought processes such as belief systems (contradictions and lack o f memory 
are also relevant here). Despite the fact that adult's have disparate experiences with different 
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attachment figures, and thus have different internal working models for each relationship, a 
single classification for an overall state o f mind can be assigned, which reflects the general 
cognitive and motivational organisation of one's experiences reliably to the transcript (Main, 
1995). Judgements are made principally on the basis o f the coherence and plausibility o f the 
narrative rather than on the content o f the retrospective reports or the veridicality o f 
memories (Main and Goldwyn, 1998). The state-of-mind scales are thus more strongly 
related to final classification status than the experience scales (De Haas et al., 1994). 
The classification consists o f 3 main organised categories (each o f which is divided 
into further sub-categories) which indicate a single coherent strategy to the interview task 
(Main et al., 1985). Two additional categories involving a local disorganisation o f discourse 
(Unresolved/U) when discussing traumatic experiences, or failure to maintain a strategy in 
the interview as a whole (Cannot Classify/CC) have been identified (Hesse, 1996). 
Transcripts are classified as Secure-Autonomous (F) when the presentation and 
evaluation o f attachment-related material is coherent and internally consistent. The 
speaker's attention moves flexibly between memory recall and interviewer queries. A 
constructivist position is assumed with respect to the past and its effects on current 
functioning (the subject may for instance indicate that her memories may be inaccurate) 
(Main, 1993). Transcripts are classified as Dismissing (Ds) when discourse is aimed at 
minimizing the importance o f attachment related experiences. The prototypical DS1 sub-
category is characterised by a marked lack o f memory for episodes and/or discrepancies 
between abstract positive descriptions and specific memories. The Ds2 individual may 
access negative childhood memories but these are belittled, the self seems untouched by 
negative attachment related experiences. The Ds4- category has been derived empirically 
and stems from indications o f a fear o f loosing one's (real or imagined) child that cannot be 
accounted for. It has been hypothesised that this category assignment reflects a background 
in which loss has occurred in a subject's family, but has been concealed (Main & Goldwyn, 
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1998). Transcripts are classified as Preoccupied or Entangled (E) when the narratives reveal 
an excessive and confused ( E l ) or angry preoccupation (E2) with attachment figures or 
attachment-related events. The preoccupied individuals' sense o f identity is anchored to the 
family (E1/E2) or to traumatic experiences (E3). The E3 sub-category is assigned when 
repeated descriptions o f traumatic experiences invade the discourse, and there are repeated 
source memory difficulties. The interviewer has the impression that the subject cannot 
control or shift attention from traumatic events or the subject may be overwhelmed by a 
distressing lack o f memory for childhood (Main & Goldwyn, 1998). In general, the 
preoccupied speaker cannot focus on the interview task, seems absorbed by the memories 
recalled and unable to provide "an objective overview at the semantic or abstract level" 
(Main and Goldwyn, 1998, p. 169). Transcripts are additionally classified as Unresolved or 
Disorganised (U) when there are indications o f a brief mental disorganisation during specific 
discussions o f potentially traumatic events (death o f significant persons or abuse). 
Disorganisation is indexed by "lapses in the monitoring of reasoning", such as violations o f 
space and/or time relations or o f physical causality, or attempts to manipulate thought 
processes, and 'lapses in the monitoring of discourse" such as intrusions o f memories or 
imagery. A final Cannot Classify (CC) category has been introduced to indicate transcripts 
that reflect a global or marked disorganisation o f discourse, and which escape other 
classifications. A basic assumption (Main. 1991) o f attachment theory is that the child's 
caregiver-specific internal working models coalesce into a unitary model or "state o f mind", 
which is then reflected in the single discourse strategy adopted during the A . A . I . The CC 
category indicates the simultaneous presence o f two incompatible states o f mind (dismissing 
and preoccupied) or a total breakdown in strategy. 
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2.4 Internal working models and autobiographical memory 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) postulate that l W M may influence memory 
accessibility by inhibiting the retrieval o f memories which are discrepant with the 
representations o f self and other, thus suggesting that the selective remembering o f 
insecurely attached individuals may be due to post-emptive defences. Access to elements o f 
the knowledge base during the search and evaluation processes would thus be facilitated or 
constrained by the I W M . However, it is also possible to assume that the working self and its 
long-term components modulate attention, without requiring conscious processing. 
As previously described, Hesse (1999) indicated that the A . A . I , requires two 
simultaneous processes: the ability to recall specific memories and focusing on the current 
interview-context by narrating a coherent and understandable life-history. This description is 
echoed in Conway et al.'s (2004) proposal that the states o f mind with respect to attachment 
and the associated modes o f recalling memories may reflect different relations between self-
coherence and adaptive correspondence. The secure state o f mind, in analogy with the child-
caregiver interaction as observable in the Strange Situation, and with the flexible 
representational states postulated by Bowlby (1980 /l998) and Bretherton (1999), can 
oscillate between engaging with the past and present. It is expected that the two demands are 
met fluidly The memory recall o f insecure states o f mind may reflect the overriding need to 
maintain self-coherence, by assimilating new experiences to known patterns, thus creating 
as Main (1995) wrote a subjectively experienced "secondary felt security"' (Main, 1995, p. 
452). The conceptual self-structures remain relatively impervious to ongoing experience, 
similarly to Bretherton's view that I W M of the insecure individuals may be less organised 
and updated (Bretherton, 1992). 
In the case o f the preoccupied state o f mind, the lack o f adequate regulation of 
heightened affective states observable in the Strange Situation may have its counterpart in 
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the processing o f memories. The control processes of the working self seem inadequate 
leading to a lack o f constraints on the working self. Conway et al., (2004) suggest that in 
these cases past experience leads to a disengagement from the present, possibly because 
original working self goals are still active. Past experiences overwhelm individuals with a 
preoccupied state o f mind, compromising their ability for adaptive correspondence. 
The dismissing state o f mind, developed in a dyadic context which is assumed to 
have been characterised by the rejection of attachment needs, attention is deflected from 
attachment issues, Conway et al., (2004) postulate the existence o f inhibitory processes o f 
the working self which disrupt access to the autobiographical knowledge base, and this may 
occur at both the encoding and retrieval phases o f events. Episodic memories which are in 
conflict with the abstract representations o f the long-term self may in fact not be encoded 
due to processes similarly described by Sullivan (1953) as 'selective inattention' (Sullivan, 
1953) to attachment-related episodic memories. These memories are lost, not having been 
sufficiently integrated in the knowledge base. On the other hand, as in the case o f depressed 
patients, may be due to inhibitory processes o f the working self, dysfacilitating access to the 
autobiographical knowledge base and to episodic memory during retrieval (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Further, similarly to Bowlby*s (1980/ / l 998 concept o f segregated systems, Conway 
and Pleydell-Pearce's (2000) model endorses a dual-process account o f the relation between 
emotion and memory recall (also see Brewin, Dagleish, & Josephs, 1996) o f traumatic 
memories. In this case, it is postulated that emotional aspects and non-emotional aspects o f 
memories can be represented in separate memory systems, a verbally accessible one, which 
can be accessed voluntarily, and a system which can only be accessed in terms o f imagery 
and is cued unconsciously. 
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2.5 Aims of this study 
It is striking that, while theoretical attention has been focused on the relation 
between autobiographical memory and internal working models o f attachment relationships, 
in the attachment field, this topic has been neglected in terms o f empirical research. Though 
a small number o f studies have addressed links between attachment and autobiographical 
memory in children (Belsky, Spritz, & Crnic, 1996; Etzion-Carasso & Oppenheim, 2000; 
Farrar, Fasig, & Welch-Ross, 1997), all assessed attachment security at the behavioural 
level, meaning that their results are less relevant to the relation between internal working 
models and autobiographical recall. Similarly, as discussed in detail in Chapter Three, the 
vast majority o f the studies involving links between autobiographical memory and 
attachment in adults have assessed security using self-report measures that fail fu l ly to tap 
into the unconscious functioning o f internal working models. 
The main aim of this study is thus to present the first data on the relation between 
internal working models o f attachment relationships and individuals' recall o f various types 
of autobiographical material. In meeting this aim, the thesis addresses a number o f important 
questions. How does the mode o f assessing adult attachment influence the pattern o f results 
observed on autobiographical memory tasks? To what extent does the internal working 
model relate to assessments o f individuals' more general autobiographical recall? Do 
individual differences in adult attachment impact exclusively on recall of emotional material 
or formative early experiences from one's own life, or is their influence more pervasive? Is 
there evidence to suggest that internal working models play a role in our ability to 
conjecture about the future as well as our ability to recall the past? To attempt to answer 
these questions, the thesis reports on two empirical studies on the relation between adult 
attachment and autobiographical memory, the first o f which assessed attachment using a 
self-report measure, while the second employed the A . A . I . . 
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As shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, there is a conceptual difference 
between the construct o f attachment derived from retrospective narratives o f childhood 
experiences with parents as the A . A . I , and the investigation o f attachment security by 
focusing on current adult social relationships as measured by questionnaires (see for 
example, Crowell & Treboux, 1995; Furman & Flanagan, 1997; Stein, Jacobs, Ferguson, 
Allen & Fonagy, 1998). A significant aspect is that the A . A . I , protocol is postulated to 
measure largely unconscious defensive processes while the self-report measures investigate 
conscious beliefs about current relationships. Bowlby himself described defensive processes 
ranging from the unconscious to the conscious, as Crowell, Fraley & Shaver (1999) argued, 
but self-reported beliefs may reflect defensive processes themselves. For instance, a clear 
acknowledgement o f relationship difficulties leading to an insecure classification on the 
self-report instruments would on the contrary be expected of secure participants on the 
A . A . I , with diff icult past experiences. However, although the construct of attachment is held 
to differ, both traditions propose that differing attachment representations modulate 
information-processing and memory encoding and retrieval (Faley, Gamer & Shaver, 2000; 
Hesse, 1999). 
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Chapter 3: Relations Between Early Childhood Memories 
and Self-reported Attachment Style 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the first two chapters, there are principled reasons for expecting 
recall o f autobiographical memories to vary as a function o f adult attachment security. 
Although these security-related differences in autobiographical memory were based on 
classic attachment theory drawing on the concept of internal working models o f attachment 
relationships (e.g., Bowlby, 1969/1982; Main et al., 1985), similar predictions arise from the 
more recent social cognition approach to attachment (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) investigating 
attachment by means o f self-reported descriptions o f current significant relationships. In 
Hazan and Shaver's (1987) original Adult Attachment Questionnaire, individuals were 
required to choose which o f three descriptions best fitted their approach to close 
relationships with peers and romantic partners. The three descriptions were modelled on 
Ainsworth et al.'s (1978) strange situation categories of avoidant, secure and resistant. 
These original categories can be seen to be analogous to the dismissing, secure and 
preoccupied categories o f the A. A. I . . 
More recently, the tripartite self-report measure has been adapted and extended. 
Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991) argued that, on the basis o f positive versus negative 
internal working models o f both self and relationships with others, there should logically be 
four categories o f adult attachment style. Thus, in their Relationship Questionnaire, 
dismissing individuals were characterised as having a positive model o f self, coupled with a 
negative model o f relationships with others; secure individuals have secure models o f both 
self and relationships with others, preoccupied individuals have a negative model of self, but 
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a positive model o f relationships with others, and individuals in the fourth, fearful category 
have negative models o f self and relationships with others. Bartholomew and Horowitz 
therefore distinguished between individuals who avoid forming close relationships because 
they deem them to be unnecessary (dismissing) or due to their fear o f being rejected 
(fearful). 
Self report measures have also been used to obtain continuous assessments o f adult 
attachment style, focusing on the dimensions o f attachment avoidance and anxiety (Gri f f in 
& Bartholomew, 1994), which are regarded to be orthogonal to one another. For example, 
within Bartholomew and Horowitz's (1991) four-category system for assessing attachment 
style, (a) secure individuals are characterised by low scores both for avoidance and anxiety, 
(b) dismissing individuals score high for avoidance but low for anxiety, (c) individuals 
classified as preoccupied have high levels o f anxiety, coupled with low levels o f avoidance, 
and (d) fearful individuals are both highly anxious and highly avoidant. While many 
researchers have recently adopted this dimensional approach to assessing adult attachment, 
comparing results o f studies using dimensional versus categorical assessments o f attachment 
is problematic due to the fact that the two dimensions do not map precisely onto the 
dismissing, secure, and preoccupied groups. For example, it cannot be assumed that all 
individuals who score highly on attachment avoidance can accurately be described as 
dismissing. 
The mental representations o f attachment relationships are believed to regulate the 
processing o f attachment-related information by facilitating or inhibiting attentional 
processes (e.g., Fraley, Garner, & Shaver, 2000) and memory processes (Hesse, 1999) in a 
top-down fashion. Individual differences in adult attachment are therefore presumed to be 
associated with different approaches to information-processing (Dozier & Kobak, 1992). 
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3.2 Empirical research on memory and adult attachment 
From within the social-cognitive tradition, a number of relevant investigations on the 
relation between adult attachment and cognitive and emotional processing have been carried 
out. In one o f the first studies in this area, Mikulincer and Orbach (1995) investigated how 
young adults' attachment style (assessed using Hazan & Shaver's [1987] questionnaire) 
related to their cued recall o f emotional experiences (happy, sad, anxious, and angry) from 
the first 14 years o f life. Across their analyses on relations between attachment style and 
autobiographical memory, Mikulincer and Orbach typically found that dismissing and 
preoccupied individuals were at opposite extremes, with secure individuals falling between 
the two insecure groups. Specifically, compared with the preoccupied group, dismissing 
individuals (a) were older in the emotional memories recalled, (b) were slower at retrieving 
memories relating to sadness and anxiety, and (c) rated sad and anxious memories as less 
intense. Comparing performance within each attachment group across the four different 
emotions, Mikulincer and Orbach reported that the cued emotion had no effect on retrieval 
time for dismissing individuals. In contrast, individuals in the secure group were slower at 
retrieving memories relating to angry and sad events compared with happy and anxious 
memories, whereas preoccupied individuals showed a specific delay in recalling happy 
memories in comparison with the three negative emotional cues. Interestingly, Mikulincer 
and Orbach's findings also suggest that preoccupied individuals are more likely than those 
in the secure and dismissing groups to report multiple emotional responses to specific 
events. For example, in addition to rating each memory for the intensity o f the cued emotion 
(happy, sad, angry or anxious), participants also rated their memories for a range o f 
additional emotions. For the three negative emotions, preoccupied individuals reported 
feeling more intense additional emotions, such as feeling depressed, embarrassed, angry and 
sad in response to the anxious memory cue. 
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The results o f Mikulincer and Orbach's (1995) study thus suggest that dismissing 
individuals experience greater diff iculty in recalling emotional experiences than do 
individuals in the preoccupied group, while the latter appear to have increased access 
specifically to negative emotional experiences, coupled with a tendency to experience 
broad-ranging negative affect in response to a specific negative emotion cue. However, the 
results o f this study cannot address which components o f the memory system may be 
responsible for the observed latencies and deficits in the dismissing group. For example, it 
may be that dismissing individuals ignore or are unaware o f negative emotional experiences 
and thus fail to encode them; alternatively, they might encode these experiences but then 
defend against them in attempting to recall negative events when cued to do so. In a series o f 
studies, Fraley and colleagues have attempted to adjudicate between these two alternative 
explanations. 
Fraley, Garner, and Shaver (2000) proposed two distinct forms of defence that might 
explain the observed lack o f accessibility o f emotional memories in dismissing individuals. 
Pre-emptive defences "minimize attention to events that might activate unwanted feelings or 
thoughts" (Fraley et al., 2000, p. 817), whereas post-emptive defences "deactivate or inhibit 
thoughts that have already been encoded" (Fraley et al., p. 817). In order to establish 
whether pre-emptive or post-emptive defence strategies better explained the pattern o f recall 
observed in dismissing individuals, Fraley et al. chose to assess memory within the context 
o f asking participants to recall specific information from an audio recording o f an interview 
in which a woman described various attachment themes relating to close family 
relationships and loss. Participants were asked to answer questions on the content o f the 
interview after varying periods o f delay, with some being assessed for recall a few minutes 
after hearing the interview, and others recalling its content after a 3-week delay. Rather than 
assessing adult attachment style categorically, Fraley et al. obtained continuous ratings o f 
attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety using Fraley et al. reported that high 
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attachment avoidance was associated with poorer recall for the content o f the attachment 
interview, regardless o f the period o f delay between encoding and recall. Fraley et al. 
therefore concluded that individuals who report high levels o f attachment avoidance appear 
to show deficits at the encoding stage o f the memory process. 
The results o f a more recent study support this conclusion. Fraley and Brumbaugh 
(2007) investigated the relation between self-reported attachment avoidance and memory for 
emotional attachment-related material using both implicit and explicit measures o f recall. 
The implicit test o f memory enabled Fraley and Brumbaugh directly to address whether high 
levels of attachment avoidance are associated with individuals specifically failing to encode 
emotional material. I f deficits are at the encoding stage i.e., pre-emptive defence, avoidance 
should relate to poor recall on implicit memory tests, whereas i f the strategy is post-emptive 
defence, any deficits would only be evident on a test o f explicit recall. Fraley and 
Brumbaugh results clearly suggested a pre-emptive defence strategy, with avoidance being 
negatively associated with recall on both the implicit and explicit tasks. Moreover, in a 
second experiment, Fraley and Brumbaugh found that giving participants a monetary 
incentive for higher rates o f recall did not alter the pattern o f findings, again suggesting that 
attachment avoidance is associated with a pre-emptive strategy that defends against the 
encoding o f attachment-related emotional material. The authors suggest that top-down 
inhibitory processes interfere with the encoding o f emotional material. However, this study 
did not include measures o f memory for non-affective experiences, and it is therefore not 
possible to conclude that avoidant individuals* difficulties are specific to emotional 
experiences. 
Although no study has directly addressed links between adult attachment and 
autobiographical recall for attachment versus non-attachment material, Edelstein (2006) 
investigated this issue in the context o f working memory. In this study, a negative 
association was found between working memory and both positively and negatively 
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valenced attachment-related material, but not for emotional stimuli in general. Since 
working memory tasks are associated with attentive processes (although they do not 
measure attention directly), Edelstein concluded that the study confirmed the role o f pre-
emptive defence as postulated by Fraley and colleagues. It should be noted however that in 
their pioneering study, Dozier and Kx>bak (1992) found that dismissing individuals, 
experienced anxiety as indexed by an increase in skin conductance levels. This finding 
would contradict the hypothesis o f pre-emptive defence. 
However, while the results o f previous studies on links between attachment style and 
autobiographical memory paint a consistent picture regarding deficits in dismissing and 
avoidant individuals, research has not yet considered how attachment relates to individuals' 
more general autobiographical recall. For example, the studies conducted by Fraley and 
colleagues specifically assessed participants' recall for attachment-related material presented 
in an interview, and Mikulincer and Orbach (1995) asked participants to recall early 
experiences only in response to four emotional cue words. Thus, it cannot establish from the 
extant literature whether an attachment style that is characterised by high levels o f 
avoidance relates to deficits in autobiographical memory (a) when individuals are free to 
recall any events o f their choice, and (b) when the events recalled are not negatively 
valenced or do not relate to attachment themes. Addressing these more general relations 
between attachment style and autobiographical memory was the aim of the study reported in 
this chapter. 
3.3 Study 1 
3.3.1 Aims 
This study, w i l l therefore investigate a possible association between adult attachment 
style and freely recalled memories, both in terms o f the number and content, as well as the 
phenomenological properties o f the memories recalled. As discussed in Chapter One, the 
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prevailing autobiographical memory models adhere to a constructivist approach to 
autobiographical memory in which memories are actively assembled on the basis o f current 
motivations and emotions (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Rubin, 1986, 1995). An 
autobiographical memory is therefore a complex formation mediating between past event 
encoding and current representational coherence, which can be explored by considering 
characteristics such as its specificity, vividness and emotional intensity. The decision to 
consider these phenomenological properties in addition to memory content was also 
informed by the observation that early memories are sometimes difficult to retrieve in verbal 
form (Freud, 1916-1917; Pillemer, 1998). The characteristics chosen for the assessment 
were guided by the coding principles o f the Adult Attachment Interview (George et al., 
1985), which define dismissing individuals in terms of (a) finding recall o f early memories 
difficult , (b) downplaying the importance o f early experiences, and (c) lacking specific, 
intense and emotional memories relating to their early experiences. Participants were 
therefore required to rate their freely-recalled early memories for how frequently they had 
been rehearsed, their subjective importance, their specificity, and their emotional valence 
and intensity. The first study reported here, also included gender as an independent variable 
due to the fact that several investigations have reported gender differences in 
autobiographical memory, with women recalling earlier memories than men (Davis, 1999; 
Mullen, 1994; Rubin, 2000), and women tending to recall more negatively valenced 
memories than men (Davis, 1999; Friedman & Pines, 1991; Mullen, 1994; Schwartz, 1984). 
In summary, the study reported in this chapter explored relations between attachment 
style and the free recall o f early memories. I f Fraley and colleagues are correct in 
concluding that attachment avoidance is associated with pre-emptive defence strategies 
resulting in emotional memories not being encoded, dismissing individuals should recall 
fewer negative emotional memories in free recall than their non-dismissing counterparts, but 
58 
the phenomenological properties o f the memories recalled should not differ as a function o f 
attachment style. 
A first hypothesis was that dismissing individuals would differ significantly in the 
number o f earliest memories from the other participants. 
A second hypothesis was that the dismissing individuals would however not differ 
significantly from other participants in their ratings regarding the amount of rehearsal, the 
importance, vividness, emotional intensity at encoding and valence o f emotion o f the 
memories recalled. 
This study also explored whether dismissing individuals had a deficit in recall 
specifically for negatively valenced memories, and whether attachment-related differences 
were seen in the phenomenological properties o f negative versus positive/neutral memories, 
although no directional hypotheses were made due to the lack of previous research on these 
issues. 
A third hypothesis was that dismissing individuals would differ from the other 
participants in the number o f negative memories recalled during a free-recall task o f early 
childhood memories and in the encoding age, proportion o f specific memories, frequency o f 
rehearsal, the importance and vivideness as well as and in the emotional intensity o f the 
negative memories recalled, rather than in the positive or neutral memories recalled. 
Finally, interactions between attachment style and gender in participants' 
autobiographical recall were investigated. 
A fourth hypothesis was that as in previous studies, gender differences could be 
found in the ratings o f the phenomenological properties o f the early memories and the age o f 
encoding. 
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3.3.2 Method 
3.3.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 211 (174 women) first year students attending a psychology lecture 
at Durham University. Data collection took place over two years in two separate lectures. 
The mean age of the participants was 19 years (SD = 2.42, range = 18-37 years). Students 
took part in the study on a voluntary basis and no incentive was offered for participation. 
3.3.2.2 Procedure 
Thirty minutes before the end o f a psychology lecture on memory, attending students 
were asked to stay on i f they were wil l ing to participate in a study on early memories and 
childhood relationships. Students who chose to participate completed a consent form having 
read the project information sheet, and then completed a booklet o f questionnaires 
administered in the order described below. Participants indicated their sex and date o f birth 
on the first page of the booklet. 
3.3.2.3 Adult Attachment Style 
Attachment style was assessed using the revised Hazan and Shaver (1990) Adult 
Attachment Questionnaire (AAQ) developed in the social and personality psychology 
tradition. This questionnaire (see Appendix 5) consists o f three brief prototypical 
descriptions o f each attachment style (secure, dismissing, and preoccupied), with 
participants selecting the style that best describes their feelings about relationships with 
peers. The A A Q was used to assess attachment style using the A A Q rather than the more 
recent dimensional measures because, as discussed above, the aim was to investigate 
whether dismissing individuals recalled autobiographical material in qualitatively different 
ways to secure and preoccupied individuals. The A A Q was also chosen because o f the ease 
of administration in large groups, its brevity and its face validity (Crowell, Fraley, & Shaver, 
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1999). The A A Q has been used with participants between 14 and 82 years of age, from 
varying socio-economic backgrounds (Shaver & Hazan, 1993), and has acceptable test-retest 
reliability (Stein et al., 1998). Participants' self-reported attachment style was used as a 
categorical variable in the analyses. 
3.3.3.4 Autobiographical Memory 
Participants were requested to recall their earliest memories, writing a description o f 
each memory on a separate page o f the booklet in the space provided. Participants were 
allowed 15 minutes to recall as many early memories as they could, and received a 
frequency score for the total number o f memories recalled. 
The characteristics of participants' autobiographical memories were assessed by 
means o f a questionnaire developed for this study based on an adaptation o f the Memory 
Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Suengas, Foley, & Raye, 1988). The MCQ is 
one o f the most widely used measures for evaluating the characteristics o f autobiographical 
memories (Sutin & Robins, 2007). The original MCQ consists of 39 separate dimensions on 
which a recalled memory is rated, each o f which is evaluated using a 7-point Likert scale. 
The dimensions include memory content (e.g., sensory imagery) metacognitive judgements 
(e.g., accuracy), emotion (intensity and valence), rehearsal, and ease of retrieval. 
Briefer versions o f the MCQ have been employed regularly in autobiographical 
memory research, with the Likert scale ratings ranging from 5- to 9- point Likert scales 
(e.g., Lyle & Johnson, 2006; McGinnis & Roberts, 1996; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005). In 
the adaptation o f the MCQ used in the study reported here (Appendix, 4), five dimensions o f 
early memories were selected due to their relevance to individuals' internal working models 
of attachment relationships. Participants were also asked to indicate their age at the encoding 
of each memory as in all autobiographical memory studies and to evaluate whether the 
61 
memory recalled was a specific or general event. Although, this last dimension is also 
included in the MCQ and could be rated on a Likert scale, the dimension was simplified into 
a dichotomous category rating (yes and no) for brevity, and to simplify the data-analysis. 
Participants were provided with instructions on how to rate the memory 
characteristics, and were then requested to rate each o f their early memories using the scales 
printed on each page of the questionnaire beneath the space in which they had written down 
their memories. Participants rated each memory for the following memory characteristics: 
1. Rehearsal: "How often have you thought and/or talked about this memory?" 
(1 = never; 5 = very frequently). 
2. Importance: "How personally important is this memory to you?" (1= not 
important; 5 = very important). 
3. Vividness: "How detailed and clear is your memory?" (1 = very vague; 5 = 
very vivid). 
4. Emotional Intensity: "How intense were your feelings at the time?" (1 = no 
emotion; 5 = very intense). 
5. Valence o f emotion: "Were your feelings at the time negative or positive?" (1 
= very negative; 5 = very positive). 
Participants' ratings o f the emotional valence o f the memory were used to identify 
negatively valenced memories (i.e., scores o f 1 or 2 on valence o f emotion). Participants 
received scores representing the overall frequency o f negative memories and the proportion 
of memories recalled that were rated as negative. For the negative and neutral/positive 
memories, participants received a mean score for each o f the four remaining memory 
dimensions, representing these memory characteristics across all o f the recalled memories o f 
a particular valence. 
Finally, participants were required to write the age at encoding, and rate each 
memory dichotomously as "specific" (an event that happened only once, like being sting by 
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a bee) or "general" (an event that took place regularly, like going to preschool every day). 
Participants' scores for specificity were the proportion of memories recalled that were 
specific, with separate scores calculated for negative and positive/neutral memories. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses 
The distribution o f attachment styles in the sample was similar to that reported in 
equivalent student samples: 73.5% were secure, 16.1% were dismissing, and 10.4% 
preoccupied 1 0. 
The means for the numbers o f memories recalled in 15 minutes, the total number o f 
negative memories, and the proportion o f negative memories are shown in Table 3.1 as a 
function o f adult attachment style and gender. A l l memory variables were normally 
distributed. 
3.4.2. Relations between Attachment Style and the Number and Content of Early 
Memories 
The relation between attachment style and early memory volume was investigated 
using a 3(attachment style) x 2(gender) A N O V A with total number o f memories recalled as 
the dependent variable. There was a main effect o f gender, F ( l , 209) = 8.37, p < .005, r) = 
.038, with women ( M = 9.59, SD = 3.68) recalling more memories than men ( M = 7.22, SD 
= 2.78), but no main effect o f attachment style, F(2, 209) = 0.66, n.s., r| 2 = .006, and no 
attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 209) = 0.11, n.s., r f = .001. 
1 0 Three studies (Collins & Read, 1990); Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994); Feeney & Noller ;1990) carried out on 
similar college samples reported the following mean distribution: 59.67% of secure; 24.34% of dismissing and 
17.67% of preoccupied subjects. 
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The relation between attachment style and early memory content was first explored 
using the chi-square test to establish whether attachment style was related to the inclusion o f 
any negative memories in participants' recall of early experiences. Of the secure group 
individuals, 141 (91.6%) included at least one negative memory, compared with 21 (95.5%) 
preoccupied individuals and 27 (79.4%) dismissing individuals. Dismissing individuals were 
less likely than those in the combined secure and preoccupied groups to include negative 
memories in their free recall o f their earliest memories, %2( 0) = 5.05, p < .025, w = 0.16. 
There were no gender differences in the inclusion o f negative memories, with 159 (91.4%) 
women and 31 (83.8%) men including at least one negative memory, %2( (1) = 1.96, n.s., w = 
0.09. 
Relations between attachment style and the recall o f early memories judged to be 
negative were investigated in a series o f 3(attachment style) x 2(gender) ANOVAs. For 
overall frequency o f memories judged to be negative, there was no main effect o f 
attachment style, F(2, 209) = 0.73, n.s., rp = 007, but a marginally significant main effect 
o f gender, F ( l , 209) = 3.44, p = .065, f\2 2 = .016. The attachment style x gender interaction 
was non-significant, F(2, 209) = 0.60, n.s., r) 2 = .006. A post-hoc t-test showed that women 
( M = 2.74, SD = 1.82) recalled more negative memories than did men ( M = 1.86, SD = 
1.34), t(209) = 2.75, p < .01, d = 0.56. 
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For the proportion o f memories recalled that were judged negative, there was no 
main effect o f attachment style, F(2, 209) = 1.05, n.s.,r|2 = .010, or gender, F ( l , 209) = 0.12, 
n.s., n = .001, but there was a significant attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 209) = 
3.53, p < .05. n ' = .033. Figure 3.1 shows the interaction. Post-hoc t tests comparing scores 
for men and women in each of the three attachment groups showed that (a) the proportion o f 
negative memories recalled was higher for secure women ( M = 0.29, SD = 0.17) than for 
secure men ( M = 0.22, SD = 0.13), t( 152) = 1.98, p < .05, d = 0.47; (b) a non-significant 
trend for dismissing men ( M = 0.38, SD = 0.23) to recall proportionately more negative 
memories than dismissing women ( M = 0.25, SD = 0.18), t(32) = 1.74, p = .096, d = 0.63; 
and (c) no difference in scores for proportion o f negative memories for men (M = 0.28, SD 
= 0.24) and women (M = 0.3 1, SD = 0.14) in the preoccupied group, t(20) = 0.26, n.s., d = 
0.16. 
Figure 3.1: Mean Scores for Proportion o f Negative Memories Recalled as a 
Function o f Attachment Style and Gender 
• male 
• - female 
dismissing secure preoccupied 
A t t a c h m e n t Style 
0.6 
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3.4.3. Relations between Attachment Style and the Characteristics of Early 
Negatively Valenced Memories 
Table 3.2 shows the characteristics o f the memories reported to be negative 
with respect to attachment style and gender. A l l o f the memory characteristics variables 
were normally distributed. 
Relations between attachment style and the characteristics o f negative 
memories were investigated in a series o f 3(attachment style) x 2(gender) A N O V A s " . The 
alpha value was adjusted to .01. 
" Running the separate A N O V A s as a single M A N O V A which included the four phenomenological properties 
(rehearsal, importance, vividness, emotional intensity) resulted in the same finding, with no main effect of 
attachment style, F{2, 177) = 1.55, n.s., or gender, F{ 1, 177) = 1.70, n.s. 
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For mean age at encoding, there was no main effect o f attachment style, F(2, 186) = 
1.12, n.s., r f = .001, or gender, F ( l , 186) = 0.06, n.s., f | 2 = .000, and no attachment style x 
gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 0.58, n.s., i f = .006. 
For the proportion o f negative memories judged to be specific, there was no main 
effect o f attachment style, F(2, 186) = 2.34, n.s., i f = .026, or gender, F( l , 186) = 0.02, n.s., 
r| = .000, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 1.17, n.s., r f = .013. 
For the mean number o f times negative memories had been rehearsed, there was no 
main effect o f attachment style, F(2, 186)= 1.80, n.s., i f = .019, or gender, F ( l , 186) = 0.08, 
n.s., i f = 000, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 2.40, n.s., i f = 
.025. 
For the mean importance o f negative memories, there was no main effect o f 
attachment style, F(2, 186) = 2.23, n.s., f = .023, or gender, F ( l , 186) = 0.81, n.s., f\2 = 
.004, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 2.19, n.s., i f = .023. 
For the mean vividness of negative memories, there was no main effect o f 
attachment style, F(2, 186) = 1.60, n.s., i f = 017, or gender, F ( l , 186) = 0.52, n.s., i f = 
.003, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 1.76, n.s., i f = .019. 
Finally, for the mean emotional intensity o f negative memories, there was no main 
effect o f attachment style, F(2, 186) = 2.63, n.s., i f = .027, or gender, F( l , 186) = 0.23, n.s., 
i f = .001, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 0.64, n.s., i f = 007. 
There were thus no differences between the three attachment groups or between men 
and women in their reported characteristics o f early memories judged to be negative. 
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3.4.4. Relations between Attachment Style and the Characteristics of Early 
Neutral/Positive Valenced Memories 
Table 3.3 shows the characteristics o f the memories reported to be neutral or positive 
with respect to attachment style and gender. A l l of the memory characteristics variables 
were normally distributed. 
Relations between attachment style and the characteristics o f neutral/positive 
memories were investigated in a series o f 3(attachment style) x 2(gender) A N O V A s 1 2 . 
Alpha was adjusted to .01. 
For mean age at encoding, there was no main effect o f attachment style, F(2, 186) = 
0.42, n.s., r) 2 = .005, or gender, F ( l , 186) = 0.22, n.s., r| 2 = .001, and no attachment style x 
gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 0.001, n.s., h,2 = .000. 
For the proportion o f neutral/positive memories judged to be specific, there was no 
main effect o f attachment style, F(2, 186) = 1.67, n.s., i f = .017, or gender, F ( l , 186) = 0.31, 
n.s., r) = .002, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 2.00, n.s., rp = 
.020. 
For the mean number o f times neutral/positive memories had been rehearsed, there 
was no main effect o f attachment style, F(2, 186) = 0.20, n.s., r| 2 = 003, or gender, F ( l , 186) 
= 2.90, n.s., r| = .016, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 0.14, n.s., 
n 2 = .001. 
For the mean importance o f neutral/positive memories, there was no main effect o f 
attachment style, F(2, 186) = 2.44, n.s., f\2 = .026, or gender, F ( l , 186) = 0.04, n.s., i f = 
.000, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 2.20, n.s., r) 2 = .023. 
1 2 Running the separate A N O V A s as a single M A N O V A which included the four phenomenological properties 
(rehearsal, importance, vividness, emotional intensity) resulted in the same finding, with no main effect of 
attachment style, F (2 , 177) = 2.34, n.s., or gender, F{ 1, 177) = 0.02, n.s. 
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For the mean vividness of neutral/positive memories, there was no main effect o f 
attachment style, F(2, 186) = 1.15, n.s., f]2 = .012, or gender, F ( l , 186) = 0.46, n.s., f]2 = 
.002, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 0.32, n.s., r) 2 = .003. 
Finally, for the mean emotional intensity o f neutral/positive memories, there was no 
main effect o f attachment style, F(2, 186) = 0.45, n.s., r f = .005, or gender, F ( l , 186) = 4.37, 
n.s., ri,2 = 023, and no attachment style x gender interaction, F(2, 186) = 0.96, n.s., f\2 = 
.010. 
There were thus no differences between the three attachment groups or between men 
and women in their reported characteristics o f early memories judged to be neutral or 
positive. 
3.4.5. Differences in the Reported Characteristics of Negative Versus 
Neutral/Positive Mem ories 
Differences between the characteristics o f memories judged to be negative or 
neutral/positive were investigated in a series o f paired t tests, with relations reported as a 
function o f either attachment style or gender. The relevant descriptive statistics are shown in 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Alpha was adjusted to .01. 
Individuals in the dismissing group did not differ in (a) the age o f encoding of 
negative versus neutral/positive memories, t(26) = 0.72, n.s., d = 0.13; or (b) mean scores 
for rehearsal o f negative versus neutral/positive memories, t(26) = 1.60, n.s., d = 0.39. 
Compared with neutral/positive memories, dismissing individuals rated negative memories 
as (a) more specific, t(22) = 5.64, p < .001, d = 2.00; (b) more important, t(26) = 3.87, p < 
.001, d = 0.78; (c) more vivid, , t(26) = 3.87, p < .001, d = 0.66; and (d) more emotionally 
intense, t(26) = 7.43, p < .001, d = 1.81. 
Individuals in the secure group did not differ in (a) the age o f encoding of 
negative versus neutral/positive memories, t(138) = 0.98, n.s., d = 0.09; or (b) the 
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importance o f negative versus neutral/positive memories, t( 140) = 0.47, n.s., d = 0.07. 
Compared with neutral/positive memories, secure individuals rated negative memories as (a) 
more specific, t( 133) = 9.25, p < .001, d = 1.14; (b) more frequently rehearsed, t( 139) = 
4.46, p < .001, d = 0.42; (c) more vivid, t( 140) = 4.76, p < .001, d = 0.48; and (d) more 
emotionally intense, t( 140) = 11.10, p < .001, d = 1.30. 
Individuals in the preoccupied group did not differ in (a) the age o f encoding 
of negative versus neutral/positive memories, t(17) = 0.53, n.s., d = 0.13; (b) the proportion 
of negative versus neutral/positive memories reported to be specific, t(20) = 1.86, n.s., d = 
0.56; (c) the importance of negative versus neutral/positive memories, t(20) = 0.49, n.s., d = 
0.11; or (d) the frequency with which negative versus neutral/positive memories had been 
rehearsed, t(20) = 0.92, n.s., d = 0.23. Compared with neutral/positive memories, 
preoccupied individuals rated negative memories as more vivid, t(20) = 3.35, p < .005, d = 
0.81, and more intense, t(20) = 6.52, p < .005, d = 1.85. 
With respect to gender differences in ratings o f negative versus 
neutral/positive memories, women did not differ in age o f encoding, t( 154) = 1.63, n.s., d = 
0.15, or the reported importance o f the memory, t(158) = 1.57, n.s., d = 0.16. Compared 
with neutral/positive memories, women rated negative memories as (a) more specific, t( 149) 
= 8.99, p < .001, d = 1.02; (b) more frequently rehearsed, t(157) = 3.64, p < .001, d = 0.32; 
(c) more vivid, t( 158) = 6.13, p < .001, d = 0.55; and (d) more emotionally intense, t( 157) = 
13.68, p < .001, d = 1.45. 
In men, there were no differences between ratings o f negative and 
neutral/positive memories for (a) age o f encoding, t(29) = 0.94, n.s., d = 0.17 ; (b) 
importance, t(30) = 1.15, n.s., d = 0.25 ; and (c) vividness, t(30) = 2.19, n.s., d = 0.50. 
Compared with neutral/positive memories, men rated negative memories as (a) more 
specific, t(28) = 5.23, p < .001, d = 1.36; (b) more frequently rehearsed, t(30) = 3.54, p < 
.001, d = 0.72; and (c) more emotionally intense, t(30) = 4.91, p < .001, d = 1.32. 
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3.5 Discussion 
The results o f the study reported in this chapter showed that, although there were no 
attachment-related differences in the overall volume of recall, individuals who reported a 
dismissing attachment style in their current close relationships were less likely than those in 
the secure and preoccupied groups to report a negative event when freely recalling as many 
early memories as they could within 15 minutes. A significant interaction was found 
between attachment style and gender for the proportion o f early memories recalled that were 
negatively valenced. This interaction was accounted for by secure group women recalling 
proportionately more negative early memories than secure group men and a non-significant 
trend in the opposite direction for individuals in the dismissing group. 
In contrast to the effect o f attachment style on the emotional content o f early 
memories, attachment was unrelated to all measures o f the phenomenological properties o f 
the early memories recalled both when the memory was negative or neutral/positive in 
emotional tone. 
Finally, comparing each phenomenological property across negative versus 
neutral/positive memories, individuals in the preoccupied group showed the least 
differentiation in their ratings o f the phenomenological properties of memories. While 
dismissing and secure group individuals reported higher scores for negative memories than 
for neutral/positive memories on four out o f six scales, preoccupied individuals only 
reported differences as a function o f emotional valence for vividness and emotional 
intensity, with negative emotions being reported as more vivid and intense. Both dismissing 
and secure group individuals also reported negative memories to be more vivid and intense 
than neutral/positive memories. In addition, dismissing individuals reported negative events 
as more specific and more important than neutral/positive memories, while individuals in 
the secure group reported greater specificity and more frequent rehearsal o f negative 
memories than o f neutral/positive memories. 
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With respect to gender differences, women recalled more early memories than did 
men, and women also recalled more early negative memories, replicating the findings o f 
previous studies (Davis, 1999; Friedman & Pines, 1991; Mullen, 1994; Schwartz, 1984). 
Men and women did not differ in their reports o f the phenomenological properties o f the 
recalled memories either for negative or for neutral/positive early memories. Women 
reported that negative memories were more specific, more frequently rehearsed, more vivid 
and more emotionally intense than neutral/positive memories; men reported negative 
memories as being more specific and intense and more frequently rehearsed than 
neutral/positive memories. The gender differences found may however be due to unequal 
sample sizes o f males (N=37) and females (N=174). 
The fact that dismissing individuals were found to be less likely than their secure or 
preoccupied counterparts to report a negative event in their free recall o f early memories is 
in line with previous findings that dismissing or avoidant individuals showed deficits in 
recall either in response to emotional cues for autobiographical memories (Mikulincer & 
Orbach (1995) or implicit or explicit recall o f interview material relating to attachment 
themes (Fraley et al., 2000; Fraley & Brumbaugh, 2007). However, the present findings 
extend previous research by highlighting differences in the emotional content o f memories 
in dismissing group individuals when they are free to recall any events from early 
childhood. This suggests that the differences previously observed on laboratory-based 
measures of recall generalise to freely recalled early childhood experiences. 
The fact that no attachment-related differences were found in the properties of the 
memories recalled is in line with Fraley and colleagues' (Fraley et al., 2000; Fraley & 
Brumbaugh, 2007) conclusion that attachment avoidance is associated with a pre-emptive 
rather than post-emptive defence strategy, whereby negative emotional or attachment-related 
material is not initially encoded. For those negative memories that were recalled, dismissing 
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individuals did not differ from their counterparts in the secure and preoccupied groups in 
their ratings for specificity, importance, frequency o f rehearsal, vividness, emotional 
intensity or age at encoding. Thus, the deficits seen in dismissing individuals' reporting of 
negative emotional memories can be considered to be linked to memory dysfluences rather 
than to a negative evaluation o f the memories recalled. 
However, while the results reported in this chapter as well as those o f previous 
research on relations between attachment style and recall o f emotional or attachment-related 
suggest that dismissing individuals process such material in the same way as secure and 
preoccupied individuals, once it has been encoded, this conclusion may only hold for 
conscious appraisals o f one's attachment style. The difference between the conscious 
interpretation o f relationships required to complete measures such as the A A Q and the 
relatively inaccessible internal working models o f attachment relationships assessed via 
means of discourse-based measures of adult attachment has been widely discussed (see 
Crowell & Treboux, 1995; Furman & Flanagan, 1997; Stein, Jacobs, Ferguson, Allen, & 
Fonagy, 1998). In particular, individuals who are classified as dismissing on the A A Q 
acknowledge relationship difficulties and anticipate rejection, while on the contrary, 
dismissing A . A . I , transcripts are characterised by the minimising o f relationship difficulties, 
and an idealisation and normalisation o f relationship experiences. Thus, by asking subjects 
to choose a prototype according to their current close relationships, the A A Q differs from 
the theoretical underpinnings o f attachment theory as developed by Bowlby (1979), who 
underlined the activation of the attachment system in asymmetric relationships. The fact that 
several studies have found little evidence for strong concordance between self-reported 
attachment style and A . A . I , classifications (Roisman et al., 2007) underlines the difference 
between conscious appraisals o f relationships versus unconscious influences o f attachment 
representations on individuals' characterisations o f close relationships. It may be that 
assessing adult attachment using the A . A . I , w i l l result in attachment-related differences 
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becoming evident in the process o f memory recall rather than merely in terms o f memory 
encoding. I f such differences were observed when attachment was assessed in terms o f 
underlying internal working models, then concluding that dismissing individuals adopt a 
pre-emptive defence strategy would appear to be premature. The second study reported in 
this thesis thus aimed to investigate whether a different pattern of findings to that reported in 
this chapter was seen when adult attachment was assessed using the A . A . I , rather than a self-
report measure. 
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Chapter 4: Relations between Autobiographical 
Memory and Attachment State of Mind 
4.1 Introduction 
The results o f the study reported in Chapter Three suggested that the effects o f adult 
attachment on autobiographical recall are specific to how negative emotional memories are 
encoded rather than processed or recalled. In order to investigate this possibility in greater 
detail, and to establish whether the observed effect was confounded by attachment being 
assessed purely in terms o f individuals' conscious appraisal of their attachment style, the 
study reported in this chapter focused on relations between autobiographical recall and 
attachment state o f mind as measured using the A . A . I . (George et al., 1985). The first aim o f 
the second study was thus to explore how individual differences in internal working models 
of attachment relate to early childhood memories. 
I f the insistence o f lack o f recall o f early memories or the inability to generate 
specific autobiographical memories that characterise a dismissing state o f mind on the 
A . A . I , are indeed products o f a failure to encode emotional and attachment-related material, 
then we should expect to see no attachment-related differences in individuals' ratings o f 
their early memories. Thus, i f a dismissing style is associated with a pre-emptive defence 
strategy that minimises attention to attachment-related material due its potential to activate 
negative thoughts and feelings, dismissing individuals should find recalling memories 
specifically in response to attachment-related cues difficult . Difficulties in recall could be 
manifested as a basic inability to report a memory in response to attachment cues or taking 
longer to access memories associated with the attachment cues. The underlying reasoning is 
that the time necessary to recall information from long-term memory indicates the fluency 
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with which a memory is accessed according to spreading activation theory (Anderson, 
1983) 1 3. In order to explore these possibilities, the study reported in this chapter assessed 
recall in one-to-one sessions with participants in which latency o f recall data could be 
collected in addition to information on volume and content o f recall. 
Alternatively, i f a dismissing state o f mind is associated with a post-emptive defence 
strategy, whereby access to attachment-related material is inhibited after it has been 
encoded, one would predict a somewhat different pattern o f results as a function o f A . A . I , 
classification. While a post-emptive strategy is also likely to result in greater latency in 
recalling memories in response to attachment cues, this type o f strategy is more likely to 
impact on individuals' ratings of the phenomenological properties o f attachment-related 
memories than on basic volume of recall. For example, it seems reasonable to predict that a 
post-emptive strategy w i l l result in individuals reporting attachment-related memories as 
less vivid, specific and emotionally intense and less frequently rehearsed than memories 
unrelated to attachment themes. 
This highlights the importance o f assessing individuals' recall of both attachment-
related and non-attachment material. Although the studies discussed in Chapter Three that 
investigated autobiographical memory and self-reported attachment style attempted to 
investigate security-related differences in recall o f attachment material, no study with adults 
has yet adopted a methodology of using specific attachment versus non-attachment cues for 
autobiographical memory recall. Mikulincer and Orbach (1995) used emotional terms 
(happy, sad, angry, anxious) as cues to recall autobiographical memories, which meant that 
participants could recall events unrelated to attachment relationships. Fraley et al. (2000) 
and Fraley and Brumbaugh (2007) assessed recall o f material from an interview in which a 
woman discussed attachment issues, but did not assess participants' recall o f their own 
attachment experiences. Edelstein (2006) used attachment and non-attachment cues but 
1 3 Reaction or retrieval time measures have been an integral part of autobiographical memory research since 
Galton(1883). 
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assessed only working memory, and not autobiographical memory. The second aim of the 
study reported in this chapter was thus to explore how attachment state o f mind related to 
recall (a) when retrieval cues were designed to access attachment-related memories, and (b) 
when the cues were unconnected to attachment themes. A basic tenet o f attachment theory is 
that disruptions o f attention and memory processes are specific to attachment-relevant 
information, and attachment-related differences should therefore only be seen when the 
attachment systems are activated during recall. Given that the results o f Study One showed 
attachment-related effects specifically for negatively valenced early memories, Study Two 
also investigated how the valence o f the attachment cue word related to both basic recall and 
the reported characteristics o f the memories. 
Only four previous studies have addressed links between attachment state o f mind 
and autobiographical recall. In the earliest o f these studies, Dozier and Kobak (1992) 
obtained measures of skin conductance during the A . A . I . . The A . A . I , was rated in this study 
using the Attachment Interview Q-Set (Kobak, 1989), which yielded continuous measures 
on deactivation-hyperactivation strategy. Dozier and Kobak reported that scores on 
deactivation were positively correlated with skin conductance during the A . A . I . , whereas no 
significant correlation was found between scores for hyperactivation and skin conductance. 
Two studies have reported on associations between A . A . I , classification and 
autobiographical recall in the context o f investigating the discriminant validity o f the A. A . I . . 
Bakermans-Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn (1993) assessed autobiographical memory for 
non-attachment material using both a self-report instrument which was derived from several 
meta-memory questionnaires, and an interview. Dismissing A . A . I , classification was not 
associated with poorer recall on any o f the measures o f non-attachment related 
autobiographical material; indeed, they were faster than their counterparts in the secure and 
preoccupied groups in recalling childhood memories during the interview task. Bakennans-
Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn therefore concluded that the deficits in memory that 
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characterise dismissing state o f mind are specific to recall o f attachment-related material. 
These results were replicated by Sagi et al. (1994), when non-attachment autobiographical 
memory was assessed in terms o f number o f memories and age at encoding obtained from a 
cued recall procedure. 
A further study was earned out examining links between information processing and 
A . A . I , classification. Zeijmans van Emmichoven, van IJzendoorn, de Ruiter, and Brosschot 
(2003) investigated attentional bias for threatening, neutral and positive stimuli with an 
emotional Stroop task 1 4 as well as on a free recall memory task. The study was carried out 
with a group of anxiety disordered patients and a non-clinical control group. In the clinical 
sample, the securely attached participants showed greater interference for threatening words 
on the Stroop test, and better recall for all types of stimuli on the free recall task than the 
insecure individuals. In the non-clinical group, however, the insecure individuals had the 
larger interference effects on the Stroop test (regardless o f nature of the stimuli). Secure 
non-clinical participants specifically recalled more threatening stimuli during the free recall 
task. The authors concluded that securely attached patients were more open to processing 
threatening material than insecure patients or non-clinical participants. The insecure clinical 
group was likely to defensively exclude threatening information, due to the co-occurrence o f 
their anxiety disorder and attachment insecurity. Contrary to the authors' expectations, both 
the dismissing and preoccupied individuals recalled threatening words to a lesser extent than 
the secure individuals. The authors suggest that both "react defensively at this level o f 
information processing...contrary to the A . A . I . , on which they are discriminated on the basis 
of their overt verbal strategy" (p. 234). 
Thus, while the consensus o f opinion is that A . A . I , classification has a specific 
impact on recall only for attachment-related material, no study has yet investigated how 
attachment state of mind relates to recall of attachment versus non-attachment material in 
1 4 In the Stroop task paradigm longer response times indicate interference with processing of information. 
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contexts other than the A . A . I . . In addition, links between A . A . I , and autobiographical recall 
have only been addressed in terms o f basic memory measures such as latency o f recall. 
Study Two therefore sought to investigate how A . A . I , classification related to individuals' 
reports o f the phenomenological properties o f the memories recalled. 
The third aim o f Study Two was to explore in greater depth whether attachment-
related differences in autobiographical recall are indeed best characterised in terms o f a pre-
emptive defence strategy (Fraley et al., 2000). I f this is the case, one would hypothesise that 
there would be no attachment-related differences in individuals" report o f their emotional 
reaction while recalling memory associated with attachment experiences. To investigate this 
hypothesis, participants in Study Two were asked to rate emotional intensity o f the memory 
during recall in addition to rating the memories on the properties detailed in Study One. 
Participants were also asked to rate memories in terms o f how much the memory recalled 
said about themselves to explore whether attachment state o f mind relates to one's explicit 
belief that early experienced have shaped oneself and are enlightening in terms o f 
understanding one's adult personality. 
The final aim of Study Two was to control for potential confounds in any observed 
relations between attachment state o f mind and autobiographical recall. Specifically, we 
explored whether previous experience o f traumatic events and concurrent depressive 
symptoms related to individuals' recall of attachment-related and non-attachment material. 
As mentioned in chapter 1 it has been repeatedly established that depression (in terms o f a 
depressed mood or clinical depression) are associated with an inability to recall specific 
autobiographical memories in response to emotion-related cue words (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986; Dagleish, Williams, Golden et al., 2007; Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999; 
Kuyken & Dagleish, 1995). Assessing participants' previous experience of trauma was 
important to control for the possibility that such experiences might have a direct impact on 
an individual's defence strategies for recalling emotional material. The attachment literature 
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tends to assume that the impact of traumatic events results in an unresolved state o f mind 
with regard to such experiences, but as Bernier and Meins (in press) have discussed, there is 
little empirical data to support this assumption. Bemier and Meins therefore called for future 
research to include separate measures o f actual experience o f trauma in addition to assessing 
trauma in the context o f narrative markers indicating lack o f resolution about such events 
during the A . A . I . . Study Two therefore included a separate measure on individuals' previous 
experience o f trauma. 
In summary, Study Two investigated relations between attachment state o f mind as 
assessed using the A . A . I , and individuals' (a) free recall o f early memories, and (b) recall o f 
memories in response to attachment-related and non-attachment cue words in order to 
explore in greater detail whether attachment-related differences in autobiographical recall 
are best characterised in terms o f pre-emptive or post-emptive defence strategies. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 65 (39 women) adults with a mean age o f 21.6 years (range = 18-
52 years). Participants were recruited over a two-year period in five o f Durham University's 
colleges by means o f e-mails and flyers. Psychology students were excluded on the grounds 
that they could be familiar with the measures used. The vast majority o f participants (92%) 
were undergraduates, with 5% post-graduate students and 3% graduates who were not in 
post-graduate education. In order to guarantee accurate coding o f the A . A . I , and fluency 
during memory recall, only native English speakers were accepted. Three participants were 
not British but native English speakers (of American, Greek and Malaysian nationality), and 
4 were bi-lingual having one non-English speaking parent. 
Recruitment took place in two phases. Initial contact took place via e-mail, after 
potential participants received an information sheet briefly describing the study (see 
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Appendix 8) and a consent form. Potential participants were asked to write to the main 
investigator i f they were wil l ing to be included in the study. Eighty percent of subjects who 
received the information sheet participated in the study. One participant was excluded from 
the study for high levels o f distress during a preliminary encounter. O f the 65 participants 
who completed the study, one refused to complete the childhood trauma questionnaire. 
4.2.2 Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the University Ethics Committee in 
2000. Each participant provided informed consent (see Appendix 9). Participants were 
informed that they could withdraw from the study at any time, and were told at the outset 
that they may find taking part distressing and were not obliged to disclose personal 
information. The nature o f the study led to contacts being made with the University 
Counselling Service for potential referrals. Two participants were accompanied to the 
counselling service during the study. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were interviewed individually in a private room at their college or in the 
Psychology Department. The order o f the tasks was the same for all participants, first, as 
recommended (Main, Goldwyn, & Hesse, 2002), the Adult Attachment Interview was 
administered in the first testing session, followed by the Earliest Memory Task. In the 
second session, participants completed the Cued Childhood Autobiographical Memories 
Task. The depression and childhood trauma assessments were administered in the final 
session. 
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4.2.3.1 Adult Attachment Assessment 
Adult attachment status was assessed using the Adult Attachment Interview ( A . A . I . : 
George et al., 1984). The A . A . l . is a semi-structured clinical interview developed in order to 
assess attachment representations in adults, in terms o f the individual's current 'state o f 
mind' with respect to attachment. In the A . A . I . , the participant is asked to describe their 
early childhood experiences and relationships with both mother and father. The A . A . I , also 
includes questions dealing with early separations from attachment figures, feelings o f 
rejection, and lifetime experiences o f trauma and loss. As well as being asked to describe 
events, the interviewee is requested to conceptualise how their experiences and relationships 
have affected them. A . A . I , classification is based on aspects of the individual's discourse 
during the interview rather than the basic content o f the events described. 
The author administered all o f the A.A.I.s, which lasted 50 minutes on average 
(range = 30 to 90 minutes). The A.A.I.s were audio-taped, transcribed verbatim and coded 
according to the Main and Goldwyn (1998) procedure. The author completed her reliability 
training in 1999 with Professors Nino Dazzi and Deborah Jacobvitz, and is accredited as a 
rater. A second certified coder (Dr. Arnott) coded 6 1 % (40) o f the interviews, and inter-rater 
reliability across the main categories was K=0.90. The inter-rater correlations between the 
single experience and state of mind scales o f the A . A . I , are indicated in Tables 1 and 2 o f 
Appendix 16. The correlations ranged from a maximum of r=0.95 for the Derogation o f 
Attachment scale to a minimum o f r=0.60 for the Rejection o f Father Scale. Two A . A . I , 
transcripts were classified as Cannot Classify, both o f which were verified by a third reliable 
coder (Dr. Chiara Pazzagli). In cases o f disagreement, the two coders reached a consensus 
after discussion. 
The three-category (dismissing, secure, preoccupied) A . A . I , classification system has 
been shown to be stable up to a 15-month period with stability ranging from 77% to 90% 
(Bakennans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 1993; Benoit & Parker, 1994; de Haas et al., 
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1994; Sagi et al., 1994). For the overall classification, inter-rater reliability ranges from 75% 
to 100% (Allen, Hauser & Borman-Spurell, 1996; De Haas et al., 1994; Pianta, Egeland, & 
Adam, 1996). The A . A . I , has good discriminant validity with A . A . I , classification being 
unrelated to IQ, short and long term memory, and interviewer effects (Bakennans-
Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 1993; Sagi et al., 1994), as well as social desirability and 
discourse styles (Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 1993; Crowell et al., 1996). 
4.2.3.2 Memory Assessments 
Participants were asked verbally to recall two different types o f memory - their 
earliest memory and cued childhood autobiographical memory (described below) - with all 
responses being audio-taped. Immediately after recalling the earliest or cued 
autobiographical memory, the participant completed a questionnaire to rate the 
phenomenological characteristics of the memory. The questionnaire consisted of 8 items, 
based on the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson et al., 1988) regarding 
the subjective experience related to the memory recalled as well as questions adapted from 
Pillemer (1998) on the importance o f the remembered event, and on how frequently the 
event had occurred (Williams, 1996). Due to the additional memory tasks used in Study 
Two, participants were asked to recall and rate only their earliest memory, rather than 
recalling as many early memories as possible within a set period o f time as was the case in 
Study One. Study Two thus cannot address how attachment state o f mind relates to the 
volume of early memories freely recalled, but only links between attachment and (a) the 
emotional valence o f the earliest memory, and (b) the reported phenomenological 
characteristics o f the earliest memory. 
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4.2.3.3 Earliest Memory 
Participants were asked to recall their earliest memory. They were asked to talk 
about a specific even they remember experiencing rather than recall an event that they had 
been told about by others or had seen in a photograph. Once the earliest memory had been 
recalled, the participant rated the memory using the 8-item adapted MCQ. The memory was 
rated on the following dimensions: 
1. Rehearsal: "How often have you remembered this event?" (0 = never before; 
6 = many times before). 
2. Importance: " I believe my feelings would be" (0 = not at all intense; 6 = very 
intense). 
3. Vividness: "How vivid is your memory?" (0 = not at all; 6 = very vivid). 
4. Emotional intensity at encoding: "How intense were your feelings at the 
time?" (0 = not at all intense; 6 = very intense). 
5. Valence of emotion: "Were your feelings at the time negative or positive?" (0 
= very negative; 6 = very positive). 
6. Specificity: "Is this memory about an event that only happened once (like 
being stung by a bee) or about an event that took place regularly (like going 
to pre-school every day)?" (0 = definitely a repeated event; 6 = definitely 
happened only once). 
7. Emotional intensity at recall: "How intense were your feelings when you 
were remembering this event today?" (0 = not at all intense; 6 = very 
intense). 
8. Self-relevance: "How much does this memory reveal or say about you?" (0 = 
not much; 6 = a lot). 
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Two participants did not complete the MCQ for their earliest memory. The ratings o f 
the valence o f the earliest memory were used to classify participants dichotomously 
according to whether the memory was negative (i.e. a score o f 0, 1 or 2) or neutral/positive. 
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4.2.3.4 Cued Childhood Autobiographical Memories 
The Cued Childhood Autobiographical Memory Task was an adaptation o f Crovitz's 
(1973) free-association procedure. It is assumed that upon hearing a cue word, the 
participant recalls memories associated with the cue (Brown & Schopflocher, 1998). The 
cue words were selected from various previous studies (Hacque & Conway, 2001; 
Robinson, 1976; Semin & Smith, 1999; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams, Ellis, 
Tyres, Healy, Rose, & MacLeod, 1996) in order to favour childhood recollections. The aim 
was to identify words that would cue attachment-related memories and cues unrelated to 
attachment material. The selection o f the final list of cue words was also made in order to 
balance attachment and non-attachment cues for emotional tone and level o f concreteness 
given that these aspects o f cue word have been found to relate to participants' recall (Paivio, 
1968; Semin & Smith, 1999). In addition, Robinson (1976) found in a college sample that 
individuals tend to have longer latencies o f retrieval when the cue words consists o f affect 
words rather than activities or nouns describing objects. For this reason attachment cue 
words were chosen to reflect both words and activities. 
The 21 words chosen as cues were: happy, absence, toy, separation, flower, helpless, 
hug, home, occasion, safe, grief, kitchen, family, bad, calm, bed-time story, milk, rejection, 
friendly, grass, bath. These words were rated dichotomously as attachment-related or non-
attachment by two experienced attachment researchers (Prof. Alessandra De Coro and Dr. 
Chiara Pazzagli) who were blind to the study's hypotheses. They rated the following eight 
words as attachment-relevant: separation, helpless, hug, safe, grief, family, bed-time story, 
and rejection, with an inter-rater agreement o f K = 0.61 
The instructions for administering the Cued Autobiographical Memory task were 
taken from the Autobiographical Memory Test ( A M T ; Williams & Broadbent, 2000). 
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Participants were informed that they would be asked to recall a memory in response to 21 
separate cue words. As in the A M T , participants were told that the memory recalled must be 
specific (i.e., related to a 24 hour period at most). In the present study, participants were 
also requested to recall only memories that occurred up to age 12 in order to avoid potential 
confounds relating to attachment-related cues accessing memories from earlier lifetime 
periods than those o f the non-attachment cues. As indicated by Brown (1993), participants 
were asked to indicate verbally once they had recalled a memory to evaluate retrieval times 
accurately. Participants were given a maximum of 60 seconds to retrieve an associated 
memory, and i f a memory could not be recalled the next cue word was presented. The 
precise instructions were as follows: 
" I wi l l read you a word and ask you to recall a memory you have of an event that 
you experienced. I would like you to recall a childhood memory, so up to let's say age 12. 
The memory should be specific: that means it should last a second, a minute, an hour and no 
longer than at most a day. Try to think o f an event in your past that the cue word reminds 
you of. So i f I say the word "good" for example, it would not be OK to say " I always 
enjoyed good parties", it would be OK to say " I had a good time at Jane's party", because 
that's a specific event. It is important to try to retrieve a different memory for each word. I 
wi l l be stop-watching how long it takes for a memory to come to mind. As soon as you have 
the memory please tell me, by raising your hand. Should nothing come to mind, we' l l wait 
60 seconds and then go on to the next word. I f a memory comes to mind that you don't feel 
like telling me, just tell me that a memory has come to mind, and I w i l l give you a piece o f 
paper on which you wi l l write a few keywords so that you w i l l remember what it was, 
without telling me. Afterwards I wi l l ask you some questions about each memory except for 
the ones you don't feel like telling me about." 
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To familiarise participants with the task and to ensure that instructions had been 
understood, three practice trials were carried out, using the following cue words: helpful, 
cake and angry. Each cue word was read to the participant, the time stop-watched and the 
participant was asked to indicate when the memory had been recalled and to recount it 
verbally. The investigator wrote down the memory which was also audio-taped. To avoid 
participant fatigue, after a set o f 6 cue words, each memory was recalled with the aid o f the 
investigator's notes, and participant and investigator filled out the 8-item MCQ 
questionnaire for each o f the memories. This process continued until participants had 
recalled and rated memories in response to each o f the 21 cue words. The order o f 
presentation o f the cue words was randomised across the participants. 
Participants received scores for the total number o f memories recalled in response to 
the attachment-related and non-attachment cue words. In addition, the number o f memories 
recalled in response to the negative attachment-related words (separation, helpless, grief, 
rejection) were calculated. Participants also received an average score for the latency o f 
recall of the memories in response to the following cue words: (a) attachment-related, (b) 
negative attachment-related, and (c) non-attachment. Finally, average scores were 
calculated for each o f the 8 scales for the attachment-related, negative attachment-related 
and non-attachment cued memories. 
4.2.3.5 Depressive Symptoms 
Participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI ; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelsohn, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), which contains 21 items, each rated on a 0-3 scale. 
Participants are requested to complete the questionnaire to indicate their mood in the past 2 
weeks. Possible scores range from 0 to 63, with higher scores indicating greater levels o f 
depression. Participants received an overall score for the B D I . Thirteen participants were 
102 
clinically depressed as indicated by scores above the cut-off score o f 15 for non-clinical 
samples as indicated by Beck and Steer, (1987) all o f whom had been previously diagnosed 
and were in treatment. 
4.2.3.6 Previous Experience of Trauma 
The Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ; Bernstein & Fink, 1997), is a 28 item 
self-report measure which was administered to screen for abusive experiences and neglect 
during childhood. Participants were asked to rate retrospectively, on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from "never true" to "very often true", how much a certain experience occurred 
during childhood. Ratings are given on 5 sub-scales, each consisting o f 5 items, and on a 3-
item "minimisation" or denial scale to control attempts to minimise abusive experiences. 
Reliability, in terms of the internal consistency o f the scales range from a=.63 to .92. and 
the test-retest reliability is good (a=80). A total childhood trauma score (the sum of the 5 
subscale scores) was used in the present study, to create one variable and improve the 
reliability o f the measure as in previous studies (see for e.g., Waldinger, Schulz, Barsky & 
Ahern, 2006.) 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses 
To maximise power, the 12 participants who received a primary A . A . I , classification 
of unresolved were allocated to their secondary classification group, giving a total overall 
sample o f 28 (43%; 17 women) secure-autonomous, 23 (32%; 13 women) dismissing, 12 
(18%; 8 women) preoccupied, and 2 (3%; 1 woman) cannot classify. Given that an 
unresolved primary classification is arrived at on the basis o f the individual's discourse only 
about specific events relating to loss or trauma, using the secondary classifications for these 
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individuals means that all participants were grouped according to the discourse pattern 
shown throughout the interview as a whole (for further discussion o f this issue see Lyons-
Ruth, Yellin, Melnick, & Atwood, 2005). The cannot classify transcripts were given 
primary classifications o f CC/U/E2/Ds2 and CC/U/E3/Ds2. 
The three-category distribution was similar to those reported in comparable samples 
of young adults (Allen, 1993; Kobak & Sceery, 1988; Main, van IJzendoorn, & Hesse, 
1993). Three-way A . A . I , classification was unrelated to gender, yj{2) = 0.34, n.s. 
The sample's (N=64) mean score on the CTQ was 35.4 (SD=12.7; range=24-101) 
and the mean BDI score was 9.9 (SD=9.2; range=0-42). The mean scores, standard 
deviations and ranges for each attachment category are indicated in Table 4.1. No 
significant differences in BDI or CTQ scores were found between the main attachment 
categories (/ 2 (2) =47.8, n.s.: x 2(2) = 42.6, n.s. ). 
Table 4.1: Descriptives for B D I and CTQ scores as a function of Attachment (N=64) 
BDI CTQ 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Dismissing 8.43 8.40 0-24 33.61 8.22 24-57 
Secure 8.39 6.14 0-24 32.61 6.02 25-48 
Preoccupied 12.75 12.36 1-42 36.00 9.08 27-62 
A l l variables assessing the phenomenological properties o f the memories were 
normally distributed. 
4.3.2 Relations between A.A.I. Classification and Earliest Memory 
The relation between attachment state o f mind and the valence o f the earliest 
memory was investigated using %2. O f the 22 dismissing participants who reported on the 
valence o f their first memory, 2 reported that the memory was negative, compared with 5 o f 
the 28 secure-autonomous participants, and 3 o f the 12 preoccupied participants. Three-way 
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A.A.I, classification was not related to the valence o f the earliest memory. x 2(2) = 1.59. n.s., 
w = 0.16. Dismissing group individuals did not differ from those in the combined secure 
and preoccupied groups in the valence of the earliest memory, x2(\) = 1.34, n.s., w = 0.15. 
Mean scores on the ratings o f the phenomenological properties o f the earliest 
memory are shown in Table 4.1 with respect to main three-way A.A.I, classification. 
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Predictors of participants' ratings of the properties o f the earliest memory were explored in a 
series o f step-wise hierarchical regression analyses. We chose regression analysis in order to 
investigate whether depression and previous experience o f trauma were independent 
predictors o f any o f the memory measures, and also to establish whether any effect o f A . A . I , 
classification was independent o f these factors as well as gender. In each regression, gender 
was entered at the first step, scores on the BDI and CTQ abuse/neglect scale entered at the 
second step, with A . A . I , classification entered at the final step. The results o f these 
regressions are summarised in 4.3. As Table 4.3 shows, A . A . I , classification did not predict 
variance in any o f the ratings o f the phenomenological properties o f earliest memories. 
For ratings o f cued non-attachment related memories the CTQ and BDI scores predicted the 
intensity of emotion at the time of encoding. A one-way A N O V A showed a significant main 
effect o f the CTQ scores for intensity o f emotion at encoding, F(22,64)=l .96, p<0.05, r| 2 = 
.71. For the BDI scores the one-way A N O V A showed a main effect for intensity at encoding 
F(23,64)=23.95, p<0.005, i f = .71. Participants with the highest scores on the CTQ and BDI 
scored their childhood memories as being most intense at the time o f encoding. 
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4.3.3 Relations between A.A.I. Classification and Recall in Response to Attachment-
Related Cue Words 
Scores for the memories recalled in response to the attachment-related cue words are 
shown in Table 4.4 as a function o f A . A . I , classification. Predictors o f measures o f cued 
attachment-related memories were investigated in a series o f regression analyses, with 
gender entered at the first step, scores on the BD1 and CTQ abuse/neglect scale entered at 
the second step, and A . A . I , classification entered at the final step. The results o f these 
regressions are summarised in Table 4.5. 
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As Table 4.5 shows, three-way A . A . I , classification approached significance (p = 
.081) as a predictor o f total number o f attachment-related memories recalled, and accounted 
for 5% of the variance. However, a post-hoc one-way A N O V A showed no effect o f A . A . I , 
classification, F(2, 60) = 1.88, n.s., i f = .059. 
For latency of recall of memories in response to the attachment-related cues, the 
regression identified no significant predictors (see Table 4.5). 
Turning to ratings o f the phenomenological properties o f the attachment-related 
memories, as shown in Table 4.5, A . A . I , classification was a significant predictor o f scores 
on (a) vividness (accounting for 8% of the variance), (b) emotional intensity at encoding 
(accounting for 6% of the variance), and (c) emotional intensity at recall (accounting for 9% 
of the variance). A . A . I , classification also approached significance as a predictor o f scores 
on importance (accounting for 3% of the variance) and self-relevance (accounting for 5% of 
the variance). Post-hoc one-way ANOVAs showed a significant effect o f A . A . I , 
classification for vividness, F(2, 60) = 3.80, p < .05, rp = -113, and for emotional intensity 
at recall, F(2, 60) = 3.29, p < .05, r| = .106. Pair-wise comparisons showed that dismissing 
individuals rated their attachment-related memories as less vivid than those in secure and 
preoccupied groups. For emotional intensity at recall, preoccupied individuals rated their 
emotions as being more intense than individuals in the dismissing group. Post-hoc 
ANOVAs showed no effect o f A . A . I , classification on (a) importance, F(2, 60) = 1.66, n.s., 
r|" = .052, (b) emotional intensity at encoding, F(2, 60) = 2.18, n.s., rp = .067, and (c) self-
relevance, F(2, 60) = 1.59, n.s., rp = .051. 
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4.3.4. Relations between A.A.I. Classification and Recall in Response to Negative-
Attachment Cue Words 
Descriptive statistics for recall in response to the negative attachment-related cues 
are shown in Table 4.6. Predictors o f the number o f memories recalled in response to the 
negative attachment-related cues were investigated using regression analyses, the results o f 
which are summarised in Table 4.7. 
As shown in Table 4.7, three-way A . A . I , classification approached significance as a 
predictor, accounting for 5% of the variance. A post-hoc one-way A N O V A showed no 
effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 2.30, n.s., r) 2 = .071. For latency o f recall in 
response to the negative attachment-related, A . A . I , classification was the only independent 
predictor (see Table 4.7), accounting for 7% of the variance. However, a post-hoc one-way 
A N O V A showed no significant effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 2.29, n.s., r f = 
.071. 
The regressions for predictors o f the phenomenological properties o f negative 
attachment-related memories are also summarised in Table 4.7. As shown in Table 4.7, 
A . A . I , classification was a significant predictor o f (a) emotional intensity at encoding 
(accounting for 7% o f the variance), and (b) emotional intensity at recall (accounting for 7% 
o f the variance). In addition, A . A . I , classification approached significance as a predictor o f 
scores for importance (accounting for 5% o f the variance). Post-hoc one-way ANOVAs 
showed no main effect o f A . A . I , classification on scores for emotional intensity at encoding, 
F(2, 60) = 2.28, n.s., f\2 = .071, or importance, F(2, 60) = 1.88, n.s., r) 2 = .059, and a 
marginally significant effect o f A . A . I , classification on emotional intensity at recall, F(2, 
60) = 2.44, p = .096, r| 2 = .075. 
114 
CO 
•a 
'a. 
3 o o o 
3 
O 
on 
c 
c 
o 
ON 
oo 
< 
< 
CN 
CN 
Dh <N 
H 
U co. 
Q 
OQ 
CN 
C l 
CD 
-*-» 
00 < 
CU 
c 
cu /—^ 
O © 
D. IN 
00 < 
# 
oo 
CN 
CN CN 
CN — 
* * 
CN 
O CN 
IT) 
o o 
CN 
O 
* 
O 
* 
o 
o o VO CN o o 
o 
CN 
ON 
CN 
00 
o 
m o o 
ON 
o CN 
o 
CN 
o v© 
o 
o — CN o o 
o o CN o 
CN 
o 
o o 
ON 
© o CN CN — r-o r-~ oo — o 
t/3 
CU 
•c 
O 
E 
CU E 
<+-
o 
u 
cu 
E 
2 
o o 
CS 
O 
cu 
o 
Q c 
cu 
CO 
>/-> o in — o o CN o 
c<3 
t/3 
CU 
cu 
CU o c ca 
o 
J2 > £ 
t/3 
t/3 
1 ) c 
T3 > <0 
00 
c -5 
o 
cu c 
cu 
o 
'o 
cu a. 
oo 
CO 
o 
CS 
CU 
<u 
u 
>> 
't/3 c 
cu 
cu 
o c 
> 
cu 
00 
IT) 
I p 
V 
ex. 
* 
oo" o 
o 
4.3.5 Relations between A.A.I. Classification and Recall in Response to Non-
Attachment Cue Words 
Table 4.8 shows the relevant descriptive data. Table 4.9 summarises the regression 
analyses investigating predictors of participants' volume and latency of recall in response to 
the non-attachment cue words. As shown in Table 4.9, there were no independent predictors 
of (a) number o f memories recalled in response to the non-attachment cues, or (b) latency o f 
recall in response to the non-attachment cues. 
115 
T3 
<D 
'B. 3 
CJ 
O 
o 
u 
>-ft. 
o 
II II 
z 
• 
u 
•c o c c 
s u 
le
n
 
l -
3 le
n
 
o c u oo 
O 
ca —> 
< C 
o 
Z 
o 
C/3 
o 
•c a o ca 
c3 
u 60 "c3 _c 
o 'w '5 c / > 
_o e "o 
rt
en
 
5 c 
o c <u 
D_ 
U 
X. -*—' 
1-
o <+; 
t> 
i_ o 
o 
00 
c 
ca 
u 
oo 
u 
X) 
ca 
H 
c 
u 
s 
o 
c 
E 
o 
c 
u 
E 
o 
NO 
CN 
ON 
NO 
in 
o © 
CN 
NO o 
« N 
m in 
CN 
in 
NO 
CN 
<N 
°0 
m 
CN 
^9-
O 
O 
CN 
u 
"C 
o 
E 
u 
O 
1-
cj 
E 
3 
C 
O 
t— 
NO 
00 
o o 
NO 
ON 
CM 
i n 
OO 
o 
00 
o 
ON 
NO 
ON 
NO 
m 
oo 
CN 
<N 
< N 
NO 
CN 
in 
od 
i n o 
c 
o 
u 
^n 
Cs 
ON 
00 
CN 
NO 
CN 
NO 
NO 
ON 
CN 
ON 
CN 
ON 
NO 
NO 
O0 
oo 
ON 
OO 
O 
Os 
ON 
r -
CN 
oo 
p 
ON 
ci 
ca in 
u. 
ca 
u -c 
o 
u-
! a 
u-
u c 
u 
O c 
ca 
u 
CN 
r-
CN 
o 
p 
CN 
ON 
NO 
rn 
rn 
ON 
oo 
C i 
OO 
CN 
o 
en 
NO 
O 
CN 
</-> 
o 
ON 
NO 
u 
o c 
ca t 
o 
o. 
E 
c 
ca 
o 
2 
ON 
l \ 
C i 
NO 
oq 
«N-N 
ON 
oo 
ON 
'a-
NO 
oo 
CN 
m in 
en 
o 
in 
oo 
oo 
CN 
NO 
cn 
oo 
•n 
in 
C/3 
U c 
-o 
" > 
> c 
ca 
CJ 
NO 
NO 
ON 
CN 
NO 
NO 
O 
ON 
NO 
00 
cn 
ON 
OO 
ON c^i 
o o 
ON 
m 
cn 
^n 
NO 
CN 
ON 
CN 
-*-» 
'35 c 
ca c 
o 
o 
E 
W c 
ca o 
60 C •5 
o 
o c 
UJ 
-4—• 
ca 
ON 
00 
m 
m 
cn 
oo 
i n 
oo 
NO 
NO 
NO 
l*-> 
ON 
oo 
-3-
<N 
oo 
CN 
CN 
ON ON 
ON 
ON 
CN| 
NO 
oo 
NO 
ON 
c i 
ON 
NO 
cn 
CN 
NO 
C3 
NO 
CN 
00 
m 
NO 
CN 
00 
CN 
O 
'3 
u 
a 
oo c 
C3 
ca c o 
-4—' 
O 
E 
w 
c 
ca 
oo 
CN 
CN 
CN 
NO 
CN 
CN 
ca o 
u 
ca 
>^ 
-4-4 
'55 c 
— 
< < co. 
OO <1 
o 
E—1 
U 
Q 
CQ co. 
O . <N 
00 < 
o 
c 
u C O . 
3 
oo < 
fN 
fN 
NO 
O 
oo o 
* 
NO m fN — 
* 
NO fN 
fN 
NO 
O 
O 
O 
o 
* 
o 
ft n 
m — o o 
fN 
O NO 
o 
r--o o 
* * 
ON 
m 
i n NO 
— o 
NO 
o 
fN 
o 
ON 
o 
* 
ON fN „ _ vo © fN — 
O 
o o 
fN 
O 
fN 
O 
* * 
o O 
NO o NO fN 
* 
* 
# 
NO 
* * * * 
i n 
m 
o 
(/3 o 
•c 
o 
E 
u 
E o 
S_ 
U 
E 
3 
* o r-o o 
cS 
o 
* * 
00 fN 
O 
O 
o c 
cs 
1/3 
u 
u OS 
Q 
c 
CS 
t 
O 
O . •S > £ 
C/3 
1/5 
t> 
C 
-a > u 
BO 
C 
•3 o o c u 
•4—> 
c3 
>-. 
C 
* 
•it CN — o — 
CO o u 
* * 
'o 
<D 
O -
O0 
ca 
> , -*-» 
Jo 
C 
u 
o c 
ca 
> u 
i-
oo 
I p 
V 
* * * 
V 
* * 
<n 
p 
V 
* 
NO" 
o 
With respect to the phenomenological properties o f the non-attachment memories, as 
shown in Table 4.8, A . A . I , classification independently predicted scores for (a) specificity 
(accounting for 13% of the variance), and (b) vividness (accounting for 7% of the variance), 
and approached significance as a predictor o f scores for emotional intensity at recall 
(accounting for 5% of the variance). Post-hoc one-way ANOVAs showed a significant main 
effect of A . A . I , classification on scores for specificity, F(2, 60) = 4.42, p < .025, f ) 2 = .129, 
and vividness, F(2, 60) = 2.28, p < .001, r|2 = .222, but no main effect on emotional intensity 
at recall, F(2, 60) = 2.11, n.s., r f = .066. Pairwise comparisons showed that (a) dismissing 
individuals rated non-attachment memories as less specific than those in the secure and the 
preoccupied groups, and (b) dismissing individuals rated non-attachment memories as less 
vivid than those in the secure group. 
4.3.6 Gender Differences in the Phenomenological Properties of Cued 
A utobiographical Memories 
As the regressions reported in Tables 4.5. 4.7 and 4.9 show, gender independently 
predicted scores on a number o f variables. With respect to the memories recalled in response 
to attachment-related cues, gender predicted (a) importance (accounting for 9% of the 
variance), (b) emotional intensity at recall (accounting for 9% of the variance), and (c) self-
relevance (accounting for 6% of the variance). Post-hoc t tests showed the following gender 
differences for ratings o f attachment-related memories: (a) women ( M = 3.95, SD = 0.81) 
rated memories as more important than did men ( M = 3.37, SD = 0.93), t(63) = 2.67, p < 
.01, d = 0.67; (b) women (M = 3.08, SD = 0.88) rated memories as more emotionally intense 
at recall than did men ( M = 2.49, SD = 1.10), t(63) = 2.41, p < .025, d = 0.60; and (c) a non-
significant trend for women ( M = 3.42, SD = 0.89) to rate memories as more self-relevant 
than did men ( M = 3.03, SD = 0.83), t(63) = 1.79, p = .079, d = 0.45. 
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For ratings o f memories recalled in response to the non-attachment cues, gender 
predicted (a) importance (accounting for 19% of the variance), (b) emotional intensity at 
encoding (accounting for 12% o f the variance), (c) emotional intensity at recall (accounting 
for 11% of the variance), and (d) self-relevance (accounting for 12% of the variance). Post-
hoc t tests showed the fol lowing gender differences for ratings o f non-attachment memories: 
(a) women (M = 3.31, SD = 0.90) rated memories as more important than did men (M = 
2.46, SD = 0.96), t(63) = 3.65, p < .001, d = 0.91; (b) women ( M = 3.57, SD = 0.76) rated 
memories as more emotionally intense at encoding than did men ( M = 3.07, SD = 0.77), 
t(63) = 2.57, p < .025, d = 0.65; (c) women (M = 2.81, SD = 1.01) rated memories as more 
emotionally intense at recall than did men ( M = 2.10, SD = 1.09), t(63) = 2.72, p < .01, d = 
0.68; and (d) women (M = 2.92, SD = 0.91) rated memories as more self-relevant than did 
men ( M = 2.34, SD = 0.87), t(63) = 2.50, p < .025, d = 0.65. 
4.3.7 Differences in the Reported Characteristics of Attachment-Related Versus Non-
Attachment Memories 
A.A.I.-related differences between the characteristics o f memories recalled in 
response to the attachment-related and non-attachment cues were investigated in a series o f 
3 attachment ( A . A . I , classification) x 2 memory type (attachment-related, non-attachment) 
repeated measures ANOVAs. The relevant descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 4.4 and 
4.8. 
For latency o f recall, there was a main effect o f memory type, F ( l , 60) = 5.95, p < 
.025, but no effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 0.60, and no memory type x 
attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 1.75, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test showed that individuals 
were slower at recalling memories in response to attachment-related cues than to non-
attachment cues, t(64) = 3.14, p < .005. 
For frequency o f rehearsal, there was a main effect of memory type, F ( l , 60) = 
22.24, p < .001, but no effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 1.3 I , and no memory type x 
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attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.57, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test showed that attachment-
related were reported to have been more frequently rehearsed than non-attachment 
memories, t(64) = 4.40, p < .001. 
For importance, there was a main effect o f memory type, F ( l , 60) = 63.29, p < .001, 
but no effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 0.89, and no memory type x attachment 
interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.79, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test showed that attachment-related 
memories were rated as more important than non-attachment memories, t(64) = 8.23, p < 
.001. 
For vividness, there was a main effect o f memory type, F ( l , 60) = 8.52, p < .005, a 
main effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 6.83, p < .005, and a significant memory type 
x attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 3.58, p < .05. A post-hoc paired t test showed that 
attachment-related memories were rated as more important than non-attachment memories, 
t(64) = 2.13, p < .05. Figure 4.1 shows the interaction. 
Figure 4.1: Memory Type x Attachment Interaction for Vividness Ratings 
5.5 
5 
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To explore the interaction further, post-hoc paired t tests comparing vividness ratings 
for the attachment-related versus non-attachment memories for the three separate A . A . I , 
groups showed no difference for individuals in the dismissing, t(22) = 1.92, n.s., d = 0.39, 
secure, t(27) = 0.44, n.s., d = 0.06, and preoccupied, t ( l 1) = 2.62, n.s., d = 0.75. However, 
the effect size for this comparison in preoccupied individuals is medium to large (Cohen, 
1988), suggesting that preoccupied individuals tended to rate attachment-related memories 
as more vivid than non-attachment memories. 
For emotional intensity at encoding, there was a main effect o f memory type, F ( l , 
60) = 37.40, p < .001, but no effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 2.15, and no memory 
type x attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.43, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test showed that 
attachment-related memories were rated as more emotionally intense at the time o f encoding 
than non-attachment memories, t(64) = 6.40, p < .001. 
For specificity, there was a main effect o f memory type, F ( l , 60) = 7.34, p < .01, no 
effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 1.39, and a significant memory type x attachment 
interaction, F(2, 60) = 5.21, p < .01. A post-hoc paired t test showed that attachment-related 
memories were rated as more specific than non-attachment memories, t(64) = 3.13, p < .005. 
The interaction is shown in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Memory Type x Attachment Interaction for Specificity Ratings 
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To explore the interaction further, post-hoc paired t tests comparing specificity 
ratings for the attachment-related versus non-attachment memories were conducted 
separately for the three A . A . I , groups. Dismissing individuals reported attachment-related 
memories to be more specific than non-attachment memories, t(22) = 4.26, p < .001, d = 
0.83. Ratings for the specificity o f the attachment-related versus non-attachment memories 
did not differ for individuals in the secure, t(27) = 1.94, n.s., d = 0.38, and preoccupied, 
t ( l 1) = 0.57, n.s., d = 0.18, groups. 
For emotional intensity at recall, there was a main effect of memory type, F ( l , 60) = 
12.23, p < .001, and a main effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 3.16, p < .05, but no 
memory type x attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.32, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test showed 
that attachment-related memories were rated as more emotionally intense at the time of 
recall than non-attachment memories, t(64) = 3.46, p < .001. 
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Finally, for self-relevance, there was a main effect o f memory type, F ( l , 60) = 44.45, 
p < .001, but no effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 1.30, and no memory type x 
attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.12, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test showed that attachment-
related memories were rated as more emotionally intense at the time of encoding than non-
attachment memories, t(64) = 6.76, p < .001. 
4.4 Discussion 
The results o f Study Two showed that A . A . I , classification was unrelated to the 
valence o f the earliest memory and to the reported phenomenological properties o f the 
earliest memory. These findings thus replicate those o f Study One using a narrative 
assessment o f adult attachment. With respect to the findings for the cued recall procedure, 
no strong evidence emerged for differences between the A . A . I , groups in volume or latency 
of recall in response to the attachment-related cues as a whole or to the subset o f negative 
attachment cues. Although A . A . I , classification was identified as an independent predictor 
of latency o f recall in response to the negative attachment cues, a post-hoc A N O V A showed 
no significant effect o f A . A . I , classification. A . A . I , classification was unrelated to volume 
and latency o f recall in response to the non-attachment cues. However, a different pattern o f 
findings emerged with regard to A.A.I.-related differences in ratings o f the 
phenomenological properties o f the memories recalled during the cued recall procedure. 
A . A . I , classification emerged as a significant predictor o f three o f the seven 
phenomenological properties (vividness, emotional intensity at encoding, emotional 
intensity at recall) o f memories recalled in response to the attachment-related cues overall, 
and was a marginally significant predictor on two further scales (importance and self-
relevance). For all scales, dismissing individuals scored lowest, and preoccupied individuals 
scored highest, and post-hoc ANOVAs showed significant effects o f A . A . I , classification on 
vividness and emotional intensity at recall. Dismissing individuals rated their attachment-
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related memories as less vivid than individuals in both the secure and the insecure groups, 
with a significant pairwise contrast between the dismissing and preoccupied group for 
emotional intensity at recall. A similar, although somewhat weaker, pattern o f A. A. I.-related 
differences emerged for ratings o f the subset of negative attachment-related memories. 
A . A . I , classification was identified as an independent predictor o f scores for emotional 
intensity both at encoding and recall, and was a marginally significant predictor of scores for 
importance. However, post-hoc ANOVAs failed to find any main effect o f A . A . I , 
classification on any o f the scales. 
The results from ratings o f the phenomenological properties o f the memories 
recalled in response to the non-attachment cues showed that the effects o f A . A . I , 
classification on autobiographical recall were not confined to attachment-related material. 
A . A . I , classification was an independent predictor o f ratings o f the specificity and vividness 
of non-attachment memories, and was a marginally significant predictor of how these 
memories were rated for emotional intensity at recall. Post-hoc main effects o f A . A . I , 
classification were observed for both specificity and vividness, with pariwise comparisons 
showing that dismissing individuals rated these memories as less specific than their 
counterparts in both the secure and the preoccupied groups, with dismissing individuals also 
scoring lower than those in the secure group on vividness. 
Finally, latency o f recall and the reported phenomenological properties o f the 
attachment-related versus non-attachment memories were compared for each of the three 
attachment groups. Dismissing individuals rated attachment-related memories as more 
specific, important, emotionally intense at the time of encoding and self-relevant than non-
attachment memories. Individuals classified as dismissing were no slower at recalling 
attachment memories than non-attachment memories, and their scores for the two types o f 
memories did not differ in terms o f vividness, frequency o f rehearsal, and emotional 
intensity at recall. In comparing the non-attachment memories and the subset o f negative 
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attachment-related memories, dismissing individuals showed no difference only on latency 
and scores for emotional intensity at recall. For all o f the other phenomenological properties, 
the negative attachment-related memories were rated higher than those o f the non-
attachment memories. 
It is important to note that all o f the effects o f A . A . I , classification on 
autobiographical recall were independent o f gender, concurrent depression, and experience 
of trauma during childhood. Thus, the findings reported in this chapter could not be 
confounded by individuals' current psychological state or earlier traumatic experiences 
making them less wil l ing or able to recall events from their childhoods, or by gender 
differences in autobiographical recall observed in previous research (Davis, 1999; Friedman 
& Pines, 1991; Mullen, 1994; Schwartz, 1984) and in the studies reported here. 
The main aim of Study Two was to establish whether observed security-related 
differences in autobiographical recall are best characterised in terms o f pre-emptive or 
post-emptive defence strategies. Recall that the results o f Fraley and colleagues (Fraley & 
Brumbaugh, 2007; Fraley et al., 2000) as well as those o f Study One suggested that the 
deficits in recall observed in dismissing and avoidant individuals indicated that they adopted 
a pre-emptive strategy. The lack o f relation between A . A . I , classification and ratings o f the 
phenomenological properties o f the earliest memories reported here is also consistent with 
the conclusion that adult attachment impacts on the encoding o f autobiographical memories 
rather than processing involved in their recall. However, a number o f studies on earliest 
memories found that these are relatively neutral emotionally (Mullen, 1994; Howes, 
Siegel and Brown 1993). The findings o f Study 2 may therefore have been due to the type o f 
memory evoked by the participants, and the irrelevance o f the earliest memories to the 
attachment system. In fact, an exploration of the content o f the earliest memories recalled 
suggested that they were relatively trivial in content and rarely referred to attachment 
figures. 
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The findings from the cued-recall procedure which indicated that dismissing 
individuals do not differ from their secure and preoccupied counterparts with regard to 
volume or latency o f recall, but rather downplay the importance o f the memories once 
recalled also suggests that a conclusion about a pre-emptive defence may be premature. 
Dismissing individuals' ratings of their attachment-related memories as less vivid, and in 
particular the fact that they portrayed these memories as less emotionally intense during 
recall, suggest they are adopting a post-emptive defence strategy. In order to explore in 
potential attachment-related differences in defence strategy greater detail, Study Three 
investigated security-related differences in reports o f imagined events in the future. 
A significant l imit o f the study here reported is as in the studies reported in the previous 
chapter that it has largely relied on explicit self-reports when evaluating the memories . It is 
therefore questionable that it can adequately assess the unconscious mechanisms underlying 
the construct o f internal working models. In fact, no attachment-related differences were 
found on latency o f retrieval which is by definition an implicit measure o f ease o f memory 
recall and which could provide stronger bases for the results. Further studies which integrate 
implicit measures o f memory are therefore warranted. 
Finally with regards to the control variables depression and report o f childhood 
trauma the participants who indicated having had a higher number o f traumatic experiences 
during childhood and who had scores indicating clinical depression reported more 
emotionally intense experiences at the time o f encoding o f non-attachment related cued 
memories. However the participants did not differ significantly when attachment-related 
cues were used, nor on the emotional intensity at recall. A number o f investigations have 
indicated that individuals who have a history o f traumatic experiences tend to have memory 
deficits (see for example, Hunter & Andrews, 2002; Edwards, Fivush, Anda, Felliti, & 
Nordenberg, 2001). Maltreatment histories have been associated with less specific 
autobiographical memories (Kukyen & Brewin, 1995; Edwards et al., 2001). These 
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dysfluences have been attributed to deficits during both memory encoding, monitoring and retrieval 
by various authors (see for e.g., Williams & Broadbent, 1986; McNally, 1997). O f particular 
relevance may be Windman and Kruegers (1998) hypothesis that traumatised individuals may 
interpret relatively neutral information as trauma-related, and thus as more emotionally intense. 
128 
Chapter 5: Relations between Attachment 
State of Mind and 'Memories' of the Future 
5.1 Introduction 
The first aim of Study Three was to investigate security-related differences in the 
self-reported phenomenological characteristics o f events which individuals indicated as 
possibly occurring in the future. Assessing imagined future events in terms o f how easily 
events could be formulated and individuals' ratings of the phenomenological properties o f 
future events enabled us to investigate whether dismissing individuals adopt different types 
of defence strategies depending on whether or not the material is from their own childhoods. 
By asking individuals to imagine events in the future, one may be able to tap into post-
emptive defences more obviously, since although the material w i l l be influenced by past 
encoded events, the events themselves have not been encoded because they are imaginary. 
The second aim of Study Three was to investigate how autobiographical recall o f 
actual events relates to formulation o f imagined events in the future. As discussed in 
Chapter One, Tulving (1983) suggested that episodic memory not only referred to a 
hypothetical memory system, but that it was characterised by a specific type o f conscious 
awareness known as autonoetic consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness is characterised by 
the subjective experience o f existing in time (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997) by 
mediating an individual's projection into the past and future. It is postulated that episodic 
memory underlies the human ability to re-experience the past and pre-experience future 
autobiographical events. While numerous studies have been canned out investigating these 
properties regarding the past, to date, few studies have investigated the ability to pre-
experience future events (Schacter, 2007a). Recently, a study reported common 
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phenomenological properties between remembering past experiences and 'pre-experiencing' 
future events (D'Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004). In particular, positive past and future 
events received higher ratings for experiencing than negative events. These authors recently 
extended their findings, demonstrating that individuals who were more able to generate 
visual imagery also reported a greater amount o f sensorial details for both past and future 
events (D'Argembeau & van der Linden, 2006). Further, individuals who regulate emotion 
by 'suppressing' emotional expression reported fewer contextual and sensory details as well 
as emotions while remembering past events and imagining future events. 
But it may be that looking at the population as a whole masks interesting security-
related differences in relations between recall o f the past and conjecture about the future. 
For example, as discussed in Chapter Two, attachment theory holds that the internal 
working models o f individuals with dismissing and preoccupied attachment states o f mind 
wil l be used to a greater extent than those o f secure individuals in anticipating future 
experiences. The internal working models o f insecure individuals are less flexible, and thus 
these individuals are expected to be more likely than those with a secure state o f mind to use 
past events as template for future events. One could therefore hypothesise that properties o f 
past events, both in terms o f ease o f recall and the reported characteristics o f the memories, 
wi l l be correlated with those o f future events specifically in insecure individuals. Therefore 
the relations between how individuals recalled the past and imagined the future were 
investigated, as a function o f attachment security. 
In summary, Study Three investigated relations between A . A . I , classification and 
individuals' conjecture about events that could occur to them in the future in order to 
explore in greater depth the type o f defence strategy that might best characterise attachment-
related differences in autobiographical recall. Study Three also addressed how A . A . I , 
classification impacts on relations between recall o f past events and imagined events in the 
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future. Given the lack o f previous research on this topic, no directional hypotheses were 
made. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Participants were the same 65 individuals who took part in Study Two (see page 85). 
Their A . A . I , classifications and data from the cued memory procedure described in Chapter 
Four were also used in Study Three. 
5.2.2 Procedure 
Participants were seen for a further testing during which they completed the Cued 
Future Memory Task. This task was administered before participants completed the Beck 
Depression Inventory and Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (se page 85 ). The Cued Future 
Memory Task was analogous to the cued recall procedure described in Study Two (see page 
80) . As for the cued autobiographical memory task used in Study Two, cue words were 
selected from various previous studies (Hacque & Conway, 2001; Robinson, 1976; Semin & 
Smith, 1999; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams, Ellis, Tyres, Healy, Rose, & 
MacLeod, 1996). The aim was to identify words that would cue attachment-related material 
and cues unrelated to attachment themes, while balancing each cue list for emotional tone 
and level o f concreteness. 
The 10 words chosen as cues were: baby, danger, proud, mother, ambulance, 
freedom, window, forgiving, lonely, letter. These words were rated dichotomously as 
attachment-related or non-attachment by the two experienced attachment researchers (Prof. 
Alessandra De Coro and Dr. Chiara Pazzagli) who had rated the cue words for Study 2 and 
who were blind to the study's hypotheses. They rated the following words as attachment-
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related: baby, danger, mother, ambulance and lonely with an inter-rater agreement o f • = 
0.98. 
The instructions for administering the Cued Future Memory Task were taken from 
the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 2000). Participants were 
informed that they were going to be asked to imagine events that might happen to them in 
the future in response to each o f 10 separate cue words. As in the A M T , participants were 
told that the imagined event recalled should be specific (i.e., related to a 24 hour period at 
most). As in Study Two, participants were asked to indicate verbally once they had 
formulated an event so that latencies could be timed accurately. Participants were given a 
maximum o f 60 seconds to formulate a future 'memory'. I f participants did not recall a 
future event after 60 seconds, as in Study 2, the next cue word was provided. The precise 
instructions were as follows: "Please try picture a situation that is related to the following 
words and describe it with as many words as possible. Try to picture a specific situation, that 
means the event should last a second, a minute, an hour, and no longer than at most a day. It 
is important to imagine a different situation for each word. I wi l l be stop-watching how long 
it takes for an event to come to mind. As soon as you have an event, please tell me by 
raising your hand. It is important to try to retrieve a different memory for each word. 1 wi l l 
be stop-watching how long it takes for a memory to come to mind. As soon as you have the 
memory please tell me, by raising your hand. Should nothing come to mind, we' l l wait 60 
seconds and then go on to the next word." 
To familiarise participants with the task and to ensure that instructions had been 
understood, three practice trials were carried out, using the following cue words: car, 
embarrassed and grateful. Each cue word was read to the participant, the time stop-watched 
and the participant was asked to think o f a possible future event and to recount it verbally. 
The investigator wrote down the event, which was also audio-taped. 
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Each future memory was rated using an adapted MCQ (see Appendix 13) given that 
various items from the version used in Studies One and Two were inappropriate for rating 
events in the future (e.g., specificity, importance, rehearsal). The adapted MCQ retained 
items on vividness, emotional intensity, valence of emotion and self-relevance. Additional 
dimensions were also added for rating future events, providing information on how easily 
participants found it to formulate the future event and how likely it was that the event would 
actually occur in the future. The MCQ items were as follows: 
1. Vividness: "How vivid is this imagined event?"?" (0 = not at all; 6 = 
extremely vivid). 
2. Emotional valence: " I believe my feelings would be: " (0 = very negative ; 6 
= very intense). 
3. Intensity o f emotion: " I believe my feelings would be"" (0 = not at all 
intense; 6 = very intense). 
4. Self-relevance: "This imaginary event reveals or says about me"?" (0 = not 
much; 6 = a lot). 
5. Ease o f formulation: "How easy was it to imagine this event?" (0 = not at all; 
6 = very much so). 
6. Likelihood o f occurrence: "How likely is it that this event wi l l happen?" (0 = 
not at all likely; 6 = extremely likely). 
To avoid participant fatigue, after a set o f 5cue words, each memory was recalled 
with the aid o f the investigator's notes and participant and investigator filled out the MCQ 
questionnaire for each o f the memories. This process continued until participants had 
reported and rated events in response to each of the 10 cue words. The order o f presentation 
of the cue words was randomised across the participants. 
Participants received scores for the total number o f events reported in response to the 
attachment-related and non-attachment cue words. Participants also received an average 
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score for the latency o f recall o f the memories in response to the attachment-related, and 
non-attachment cues. Finally, average scores were calculated for each o f the scales for the 
attachment-related and non-attachment cued memories. 
5.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics for volume and latency o f recall and the phenomenological 
properties o f the attachment-related and non-attachment cued future memories are shown in 
Table 5.1. A l l variables were normally distributed. 
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5.3.1 Relations between A.A.I. Classification and Attachment-Related Future 
Memories 
Relations between A . A . l , classification and individuals* imagined future memories 
were explored in a series o f hierarchical step-wise regression analyses. For each regression, 
gender was added at the first step, scores on the Beck Depression Inventory and Childhood 
Trauma Questionnaire were added at the second step, and three-way A . A . l . classification 
was added at the final step. 
The results o f these regressions are summarised in Table 5.2. As shown in Table 5.2, 
A . A . l . classification was an independent predictor o f the following properties o f the 
attachment-related future memories: (a) vividness (accounting for 19% of the variance), and 
(b) self-relevance (accounting for 9% of the variance). Post-hoc one-way ANOVAs showed 
a main effect o f A . A . I . classification on vividness, F(2, 60) = 6.73, p < .001, f\2 = .183, and 
self-relevance, F(2, 60) = 3.30, p < .05, rp = 100- Pairwise comparisons showed that 
dismissing individuals reported future memories to be less vivid than preoccupied 
individuals, with a marginally significant trend (p = .07) for dismissing individuals to report 
less vivid future memories than those in the secure group. Although dismissing individuals 
scored lowest and preoccupied individuals highest on self-relevance, there were no 
significant pairwise comparisons, although the contrast between the dismissing and 
preoccupied groups approached significance (p = .072). 
Table 5.2 shows that A . A . l . classification did not predict recall o f attachment-related 
future memories in terms o f (a) the total number o f memories, (b) the latency o f recall, (c) 
emotional intensity at encoding, or (d) ease o f recall. 
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5.3.2 Relations between A.A.I. Classification Non-Attachment Future Memories 
Relations between A . A . I , classification and response to the non-attachment cues for 
future memories were investigated using step-wise hierarchical regression analyses, with 
variables entered into the regression equation as described above. The results o f these 
regression analyses are summarised in Table 5.3. As shown in Table 5.3, the only variable 
predicted by A . A . I , classification was total number o f future non-attachment memories. A 
post-hoc one-way A N O V A showed a main effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 3.65, p 
< .05, r) = .108. Pairwise contrasts showed that secure individuals imagined more future 
non-attachment events than did dismissing individuals, but no other pairwise contrasts were 
significant. 
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5.3.3 The Influence of A.A.I. Classification on Relation between Recall of 
Attachment-Related Past Events and Imagined Future Events 
A.A.I.-related differences between the characteristics o f past versus future 
attachment-related events were explored in a series o f 3 attachment ( A . A . I , classification) x 
2 memory type (past, future) repeated measures ANOVAs. The relevant descriptive 
statistics are shown Table 5.4. 
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For latency of recall, there was a main effect o f memory type, F ( l , 60) = 
16.52, p < .001, but no effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 1.18, and no memory 
type x attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.49, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test showed that 
individuals were slower at reporting future imagined events than recalling memories 
from the past, t(64) = 4.56, p < .001. 
For vividness, there was a marginally significant main effect o f memory type, 
F ( l , 60) = 2.99, p = .089, a main effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 9.12, p < 
.001, and no memory type x attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 1.46, n.s. A post-hoc 
paired t test showed that individuals rated past memories as more vivid than future 
memories, t(64) = 2.55, p < .025. 
For emotional intensity at encoding, there was a main effect of memory type, 
F ( l , 60) = 23.60, p < .001, but no effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 2.13, and 
no memory type x attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.32, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test 
showed that individuals rated future events as being more emotionally intense than 
past events, t(64) = 5.66, p < .001. 
For self-relevance, there was a main effect o f memory type, F( 1, 60) = 48.25, p 
< .001, a main effect o f A . A . I , classification, F(2, 60) = 3.14, p < .05, and no memory 
type x attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.46, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test showed that 
individuals rated future memories as more self-relevant than past memories, t(64) = 
7.82, p < . 0 0 1 . 
5.3.4 The Influence of A.A.I. Classification on Relation between Recall of 
Non-Attachment- Past Events and Imagined Future Events 
A.A.I.-related differences between the characteristics o f past versus future non-
attachment events were investigated as above using repeated measures A N O V A . 
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For latency o f recall, there was no main effect o f memory type, F ( l , 60) = 
0.01, n.s., or attachment, F(2, 60) = 1.35, n.s., and no memory type x attachment 
interaction, F(2, 60) = 1.67, n.s. 
For vividness, there was no main effect of memory type, F ( l , 60) = 0.26, n.s., 
but there was a main effect o f attachment, F(2, 60) = 3.35, p < .05, and there was a 
significant memory type x attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 3.60, p < .05. Figure 5.3 
shows the interaction, which was explored further using post-hoc paired t tests 
comparing vividness ratings for the future versus past non-attachment memories for 
the three separate A . A . I , groups. Dismissing individuals did not differ in their 
vividness ratings of future versus past memories, t(22) = 0.31, n.s., d = 0.07, and nor 
did individuals in the preoccupied group, t ( l l ) = 1.01, n.s., d = 0.43. In contrast, 
secure individuals rated past memories as more vivid than future events, t(27) = 2.63, 
p < . 0 1 , d = 0.6. 
Figure 5.1. Memory Type (past versus future) x Attachment Interaction for Vividness 
Ratings 
5.5 
past 
future 
3 
2.5 
2 
dismissing secure preoccupied 
AAI classification 
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For emotional intensity at encoding, there was a main effect o f memory type, 
F ( l , 60) = 50.66, p < .001, but no effect o f attachment, F(2, 60) = 2.28, n.s., and no 
memory type x attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.37, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test 
showed that future events were rated as more intense than past events, t(64) = 7.44, p 
< .001. 
For self-relevance, there was a main effect o f memory type, F ( l , 60) = 93.94, p 
< .001, but no effect o f attachment, F(2, 60) = 0.77, n.s., and no memory type x 
attachment interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.20, n.s. A post-hoc paired t test showed that future 
events were rated as more self-relevant than past events, t(64) = 10.77, p < .001. 
5.3.5 Relations between Ratings of Past and Future Events 
Relations between variables relating to recall o f actual autobiographical 
memories and imagined future events were investigated for secure and insecure 
(pooled dismissing and preoccupied) groups. Table 5.5. indicates the correlation 
matrix o f attachment-related cued memories for insecure individuals. As shown in 
Table 5.5., all o f the bivariate correlations between past and future events, including 
the latency o f recall, were positively correlated in insecure group individuals. Table 
5.6 shows the correlation matrix for these relations in the insecure group individuals. 
As shown in Table 5.6, only ratings o f self-relevance and retrieval latency between the 
past and future events were positively correlated in secure individuals. 
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Table 5.5 Correlation Matrix o f the Mean Phenomenological Characteristics o f 
Attachment-cued Memories for the Past and 'Memories' o f the Future for the Insecure 
Attachment Group 
Mean 
Latency 
future 
Mean Vividness 
future 
Mean 
Intensity of 
Emotion 
future 
Mean self-
relevance 
future 
Mean 
Latency past 0 . 6 3 * * 
p<0.001 
-0.30 
n.s. 
0.13 
n.s. 
-0.07 
n.s. 
Mean vividness 
past -0.22 
n.s. 
0 .37* 
p<0.05 
0.26 
n.s. 
0.04 
n.s. 
Mean intensity 
of emotion at 
encoding 
-0.19 
n.s. 
0.31 
n.s. 
0 .55* 
p<0.05 
0.26 
n.s. 
Mean intensity 
of emotion at 
recall 
-0.11 
n.s. 
0.23 
n.s. 
0 .36* 
p<0.05 
0.21 
n.s. 
Mean self 
relevance past 
-0.32 
n.s. 
0.22 
n.s. 
0.28 
n.s. 
0 .54* 
p<0.05 
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Table 5.6 Correlation Matrix o f the Mean Phenomenological Characteristics o f 
Attachment-cued Memories for the Past and 'Memories' of the Future for the 
Secure Attachment Group 
Mean Mean Mean Mean self-
Latency Vividness Intensity of relevance 
future future Emotion future 
future 
Mean 
Latency past . 5 4 * * -0.23 -0.01 -0.16 
p<0.005 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Mean vividness , 
past -0.18 -0.11 0.14 -0.09 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Mean intensity 
of emotion at 0.27 -0.30 0.15 0.01 
encoding n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Mean intensity 
of emotion at -0 .40* -0.09 -0.05 0.10 
recall p<0.05 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Mean self -0.03 -0.18 0.41* 0 . 6 2 * * 
relevance past n.s. n.s. p<0.05 p<0.001 
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5.4 Discussion 
The results o f Study Three showed that A . A . I , classification 
independently predicted vividness and self-relevance ratings of individuals' 
attachment-related future memories. Dismissing individuals' attachment-
related future memories were less vivid than those o f preoccupied and secure 
individuals. A . A . I , classification was also an independent predictor o f scores 
for the self-relevance o f attachment-related future memories, but although 
preoccupied individuals scored highest and dismissing individuals lowest on 
this factor, post-hoc tests indicated that there were no significant pairwise 
comparisons. A . A . I , classification was not related to basic ability to conjecture 
future events relating to attachment themes in terms o f overall number o f 
events produced, the latency with which individuals responded to the cue 
words, or their self-reported scores for how easy it was to formulate imagined 
events. 
For non-attachment future events, A . A . I , classification was unrelated 
to latency o f recall and all of the reported characteristics o f the memory, but 
A . A . I , independently predicted the total number o f non-attachment future 
events, with post-hoc pairwise comparisons showing the secure group 
individuals imagined more future non-attachment events than did dismissing 
individuals. 
Comparing future attachment-related imagined events with actual past 
events, for all variables, memory type affected recall regardless o f A . A . I , 
classification. Compared with future imagined attachment-related events, past 
events were recalled more quickly, were more vivid and emotionally intense, 
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but future attachment-related events were judged to be more self-relevant than 
those in the past. 
For non-attachment events, future events were rated as more 
emotionally intense and self-relevant than past events. There was an 
interaction between memory type and A . A . I , classification for vividness o f 
past versus future events. Individuals in both o f the insecure groups did not 
differ in their vividness ratings of actual versus imagined events, but secure 
individuals rated past events as more vivid than imagined future events. The 
latter finding thus replicated a recent study (D'Argembeau & van der Linden, 
2004) in which past events were rated to be more vivid and detailed than 
future imaginings. Interestingly, in both the secure and insecure groups there 
was no difference in how quickly actual non-attachment past events and future 
imagined events were generated. 
Finally, the individual phenomenological properties o f past versus 
future attachment-related events were positively correlated only in insecure 
group individuals. 
The first aim of Study Three was to investigate whether possible post-
emptive defences o f dismissing individuals could be evidenced when the 
material related to imagined future events rather than childhood memories. 
Attachment theory posits that internal working models, i.e., past dyadic 
interactions, influence how present and past significant relationships are 
interpreted, and autobiographical memory theory holds that future events are 
pre-experienced similarly to how past events are re-experienced. However, 
future imagined events have not been encoded, and it can therefore be 
assumed that pre-emptive defences wil l not be employed regarding the future. 
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The presence o f a post-emptive defensive strategy was thus suggested 
by the finding that dismissing participants did not differ in the number o f 
future events generated, nor in the latency o f recall nor in the ease with which 
memories o f the future were generated. It should be noted in fact that the 
dismissing individuals, unlike the other participants, tended to indicate that 
future events are less vivid and self-relevant than past events and that this 
effect was found for attachment-related cues only, in contrast to their ratings 
of past childhood experiences. 
A second more general aim of Study Three was to explore attachment-
related individual differences in remembering the past and imagining the 
future. Attachment theory holds that secure individuals' internal working 
models may be more complex and flexible, as discussed in Chapter One. The 
correlations found between the insecure groups' phenomenological 
characteristics o f memories o f the past and future may indicate that they 
unselectively project the past into the future, and that this invariance allows 
individuals to achieve a sense of felt security or to maintain self-coherence. In 
contrast, only retrieval latency and self-relevance correlated in the secure 
group. The association between memories and future imaginings o f the secure 
group, on the contrary, may reflect their valuing o f attachment-related issues 
in general as posited by attachment theory. These findings may have 
implications for the construct o f internal working model, supporting Main's 
(2003) view o f internal working models as constraints operating in the 
insecure groups only . 1 5 
1 5 As Main indicated, this view was first suggested by the psychoanalyst Fairbairn (1952) who posited 
that only depriving relationships with the caregiver were incorporated or internalised. 
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It should be noted that there is a theoretical and empirical convergence 
between the theory o f internal working models and the current constructive 
theories of episodic and autobiographical memory. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, these models point out the adaptive evolutionary value o f drawing upon 
and not merely replicating past experience to create mental representations o f 
future social interactions (Briine & Brune-Cohrs, 2007). D'Argembeau and 
van der Linden (2007) have recently argued that mental time travel may be 
particularly relevant to emotion regulation being linked to individuals' beliefs 
and motivations. In particular, these authors describe the function o f mental 
time travel as specifying "which situations should be approached or avoided" 
by "representing goal-related information" (p.320). This function is equivalent 
to that attributed to internal working models by attachment theory as discussed 
in Chapter 1. 
Further implications of the results o f Chapter Three for the conclusions 
of previous research regarding the types o f defence employed by the different 
attachment groups are discussed in detail in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Bowlby (1980) drew upon Tulving's 
(1972) distinction between episodic and semantic memory systems to 
conceptualise internal working models. Bowlby (1980) hypothesised that 
representations o f self and attachment figures are stored in both memory 
systems. Memories o f behaviour and o f verbal interactions are stored in the 
episodic memory system, while generalisations o f attachment experiences 
(internal working models proper) are stored in the semantic memory system. 
Bowlby (1973) linked unfavourable interactions between child and caregiver or 
traumatic experiences to the creation o f multiple models o f same aspect o f 
reality, or to a lack o f access to relevant information. Main and Goldwyn (1998) 
operationalised the semantic-episodic discrepancy in their conception o f 
insecure individuals. The dismissing stance, according to the authors, thus has 
a tendency to depict the past positively on a semantic level, without being able 
to access relevant episodic memories, and the preoccupied speaker's may 
be conceived as becoming absorbed in episodic recall, resulting in the past 
overwhelming the present context. 
Main, Kaplan and Cassidy (1985) revisited the concept o f internal 
working models, defining them as "a set o f conscious and/or unconscious rules 
for the organization o f information relevant to attachment and for obtaining or 
limiting access to that information" (pp. 66-67). This definition focused on the 
IWMs ' role in the organisation and regulation o f cognitive processing rather 
than on their representational structure. This conception is highly compatible 
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with Conway and Pleydell (2000) hypothesis that IWMs influence memory 
retrieval and give rise to the characteristic phenomenological patterns o f 
autobiographical recollection. At the same time, considering the reciprocal 
nature o f the constraints exercised by autobiographical memories and current 
goals when these are incompatible, characteristic dysfluencies in 
autobiographical recall can be evidenced. 
To address how the mode o f assessing adult attachment influences the 
pattern o f any observed security-related differences in autobiographical recall 
- the two studies reported in this thesis investigated how self-report or 
narrative-based assessments of adult attachment related to autobiographical 
recall. 
The results o f Study One, which investigated how a self-report 
measure o f adult attachment style related to (a) the number o f early memories 
recalled, (b) the valence of the early memories, and (c) the reported 
phenomenological characteristics o f the early memories, suggested that 
attachment style had little impact on freely recalled material from childhood. 
Attachment style was related only to individuals' tendency to include 
negatively valenced events in their early memories. When compared with the 
secure and preoccupied groups, dismissing individuals were less likely to 
include at least one negative memory in freely recalled events from childhood. 
For the proportion o f negative memories recalled, attachment style interacted 
with gender. Secure women recalled proportionately more negative events 
than did secure men, whereas there was a marginally significant trend in the 
opposite direction in the dismissing group. It should however be considered 
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that this marginally significant difference could be due to unequal sample 
sizes o f males and females. 
In terms o f ratings o f the phenomenological properties o f the earliest 
memories (e.g., frequency o f rehearsal, vividness, emotional intensity), 
individuals did not differ as a function o f attachment style. 
The defensive processes o f dismissing or avoidant states o f mind as 
postulated by attachment theory have been attributed to a lack o f attention and 
thus failed encoding o f attachment-related events, also defined as pre-emptive 
defence or inhibitory processes operating during the retrieval (Fraley et al., 
2000; Fraley & Brumbaugh, 2007). This distinction is also inherent to 
Bowlby's (1980) definitions o f the processes of deactivation and the formation 
o f segregated systems. The results o f Study One appeared to be in line with 
the conclusion that dismissing or avoidant style is characterised by the 
adoption o f pre-emptive defences, whereby negative emotional material is 
initially not encoded. While the dismissing individuals were less likely to 
recall negative material (suggesting that it was defended against at the 
encoding stage), the negative memories that they did recall were not rated any 
differently than those recalled by individuals in the secure and preoccupied 
groups. However, in order to be confident in concluding that dismissing 
individuals adopt a pre-emptive strategy, and to answer the first question 
posed in this thesis, Study Two addressed whether these findings could be 
replicated when adult attachment was assessed using the A . A . I . . 
Using this narrative based assessment o f attachment state o f mind, 
rather than relying on self-report measures in which individuals make a 
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conscious decision to endorse one particular attachment style, may mean that 
security-related differences in the process and properties o f recall become 
more evident. Study Two also assessed individuals' recall of autobiographical 
material in response to specific attachment-related and non-related cues as 
well as in their free recall o f their earliest memory. In addition, to address 
more specifically whether attachment influenced individuals post-emptively at 
the moment o f recall, participants were asked to rate memories for emotional 
intensity at recall, and in terms o f how much the memory said about them as a 
person. Because memory was assessed individually for each participant, it was 
also possible in Study Two to gather data on latency o f recall in response to 
the different memory tasks. 
Study Two showed few robust differences in the number o f memories 
recalled or latency o f recall as a function o f A . A . I , classification, regardless o f 
the nature o f the task (earliest memory versus cued recall) or type o f cue 
(attachment-related, negative attachment-related, non-attachment). In contrast, 
several attachment-related differences emerged on individuals' ratings o f the 
phenomenological properties o f the memories recalled in relation to the cue 
words. For the attachment-related cues, A . A . I , classification independently 
predicted scores for the vividness and emotional intensity o f the memory both 
at encoding and recall. Dismissing individuals rated attachment-related 
memories as less vivid than did individuals in the secure and preoccupied 
groups, as well as rating them as less intense at the time o f recall in 
comparison with preoccupied individuals. The results o f Study Two showed 
that these effects were not specific to attachment memories related to 
negatively valenced events, but generalised to attachment memories o f any 
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valence. A . A . I , classification was also related to the vividness and specificity 
of recall o f events in response to the non-attachment cues, with dismissing 
individuals again reporting non-attachment memories as less vivid than their 
counterparts in the secure and preoccupied groups, and less specific than 
individuals in the preoccupied group. This suggests that attachment state o f 
mind might have a more pervasive influence on recall o f material from 
childhood, rather than impacting specifically on attachment-related memories. 
Bucci's (1997) Multiple Code Theory also suggests that the lack of vividness 
and specificity when recalling memories indicates a disconnection from the 
underlying emotional experience associated with the recall o f the event. 
Similarly Conway et al., (2004) refer to a retrieval which is experience-distant. 
The results o f Study Two thus provided some answers to the second 
question posed at the outset o f this thesis: to what extent does the internal 
working model relate to assessments o f individuals' more general 
autobiographical recall? The final contribution o f Study Two was to 
investigate how memories recalled in response to the attachment-related 
versus non-attachment memories varied as a function o f A . A . I , classification, 
further addressing the second question o f this thesis. Interestingly, there was a 
main effect o f memory type all o f the measures assessing the reported 
characteristics o f the memories. Compared with non-attachment memories, 
attachment-related memories were rated as more frequently rehearsed, more 
important, more vivid, more emotionally intense both at encoding and at 
recall, more specific, and more self-relevant regardless o f individuals' A . A . I , 
classification. In addition to these main effects o f memory type, there were 
two significant attachment x memory type interactions. The first was for 
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vividness o f recall, and the second was for specificity. There was a suggestion 
of preoccupied individuals being more likely to rate attachment memories as 
more vivid than non-attachment memories, while the secure and dismissing 
groups showed no such difference. For specificity, dismissing individuals 
rated attachment-related memories as more specific than non-attachment 
memories, while individuals in the secure and preoccupied groups did not 
differ in their specificity ratings of the two types o f memory. 
Study Three addressed the final two questions raised at the beginning 
of this thesis: Do individual differences in adult attachment impact exclusively 
on recall o f emotional material or formative early experiences from one's own 
life, or is their influence more pervasive? Is there evidence to suggest that 
internal working models play a role in our ability to conjecture about the 
future as well as out ability to recall the past? In Study Three, participants 
were asked to recount events that they imagined might occur in their future in 
response to attachment-related and non-attachment cue words. Differences 
between the different A . A . I , groups in future 'memories' and relations 
between recall o f actual past events and imagined future events were then 
explored. 
In recounting future events in response to the attachment-related cues, 
A . A . I , classification independently predicted reported vividness and self-
relevance. Dismissing individuals reported future attachment-related events to 
be less vivid than those in the secure and preoccupied groups, and there was a 
trend for dismissing individuals to report future attachment-related memories 
as less self-relevant than those in the preoccupied group. However, no 
differences were seen between the attachment groups' recounting future 
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attachment-related memories with respect to the total number o f events 
generated, latency o f response and reported ease of recall. A . A . I , classification 
did not predict any of the phenomenological properties or latency o f recall of 
the non-attachment future events, although it did predict overall number o f 
events recounted. Secure group individuals generated more non-attachment 
future events than their counterparts in the dismissing group. 
Comparing recall o f the past and future events in terms o f latency and 
the reported phenomenological properties, for attachment-related memories, 
there were significant effects o f memory type for all variables. Individuals 
were slower at recounting future attachment-related events than recalling 
actual attachment-related events from the past, and rated past events as more 
vivid and emotionally intense. In contrast, it was future attachment-related 
events that were rated as being more self-relevant than actual memories from 
the past. For non-attachment future and past events, there was no effect o f 
memory type on latency o f recall or vividness, but future non-attachment 
memories were reported to be more emotionally intense and more self-relevant 
across all attachment groups. Memory type interacted with A . A . I , 
classification for vividness; individuals in the dismissing and preoccupied 
groups did not differ in their ratings o f past versus future non-attachment 
events, whereas secure individuals rated past memories as more vivid that 
imagined events in the future. 
The final finding o f Study Three was that there was much greater 
concordance between ratings o f past and future events on the specific 
phenomenological properties o f recall for insecure group individuals than for 
individuals with a secure attachment state o f mind. This finding speaks to the 
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final question posed at the outset o f the thesis in terms o f how flexibly the 
internal working models associated with the different A . A . I , classifications are 
used in terms o f providing templates for events conjectured to occur in the 
future. 
6.1 Implications of the findings reported here for previous research on 
attachment-related differences in autobiographical recall. 
The main aim o f Study Two was to establish whether observed 
security-related differences in autobiographical recall are best characterised in 
terms o f pre-emptive or post-emptive defence strategies. As previously 
described, the results o f Fraley and colleagues (Fraley & Brumbaugh, 2007; 
Fraley et al., 2000) as well as those o f Study One suggested that the deficits in 
recall observed in dismissing and avoidant individuals indicated that they 
adopted a pre-emptive strategy. The lack o f relation between A . A . I , 
classification and ratings o f the phenomenological properties o f the earliest 
memories reported here (Study One) is also consistent with the conclusion that 
adult attachment impacts on the encoding o f autobiographical memories rather 
than processing involved in their recall. However, the findings from the cued-
recall procedure in Studies Two and Three present problems for this 
conclusion since they indicate that dismissing individuals do not differ from 
their secure and preoccupied counterparts with regard to the number o f 
memories recalled or the latency o f recall, but rather tend to minimise the 
importance o f the attachment-related memories once recalled. Dismissing 
individuals' ratings of their attachment-related memories as less vivid, and in 
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particular the fact that they portrayed these memories as less emotionally 
intense during recall, suggest they are adopting a post-emptive defence 
strategy. 
In Study Three, where participants had to recount events that might 
occur in the future in response to attachment-related cues, and thus could not 
adopt a pre-emptive defence given that these were imagined events that had 
not been encoded, dismissing individuals did not differ from secure and 
preoccupied individuals in terms of number o f attachment-related future 
events recounted, latency o f response or reported ease with which events were 
generated (in support o f their adoption o f a pre-emptive defence). And yet 
they rated future attachment events as less vivid and self-relevant. Although 
the effect for self-relevance was only marginally significant, it is notable that 
dismissing individuals' tendency to regard future attachment memories as 
saying little about themselves flies in the face of the tendency observed in the 
whole group to rate future events as more self-relevant that those that had 
actually occurred in the past. These latter points are therefore more suggestive 
of post-emptive defence in dismissing individuals. 
At first sight, the cued recall findings of Studies Two and Three 
therefore appear at odds with those o f other studies concluding that dismissing 
individuals adopt a pre-emptive defence strategy with regard to negatively 
valenced or attachment-related material. However, there are three main ways 
in which the findings may be reconciled. First, it may be that it is impossible 
to compare autobiographical memory effects related to the dimensional 
measure o f attachment avoidance used by Fraley and colleagues with those 
relating to the categorical measure o f dismissing style or state o f mind. 
161 
Second, a pre-emptive strategy might only be obvious in individuals who 
consciously endorse dismissing tendencies on self-report measures o f 
attachment style (adopted in previous research and in Study One). Thus, the 
discrepancy in findings may simply result from the different ways in which 
adult attachment was assessed. There is, however, a third, more intriguing 
explanation for the different pattern o f findings. Fraley and colleagues arrived 
at the conclusion that avoidant individuals adopt a pre-emptive defence 
strategy on the basis o f the findings o f two studies, both o f which assessed 
participants' recall for material from an interview in which a woman described 
her close relationships and experiences o f loss. In contrast, in Study Two, 
participants were asked to recall experiences from their own childhoods that 
were appropriate to attachment-related cues, and in Study Three they had to 
imagine attachment events that might happen to themselves in the future. It is 
possible that dismissing individuals adopt different defence strategies 
depending on (a) whether the material focuses on their own attachment 
experiences, and (b) the lifetime period in which it was encoded. 
When cued to recall their own attachment experiences from childhood, 
dismissing individuals may adopt a post-emptive defence strategy whereby 
access to relevant memories is just as easy as it is for secure and preoccupied 
individuals, but the dismissing state o f mind results in post-emptive 
minimising o f the importance of the material. In contrast, when exposed later 
in life to material relating to the emotional attachment experiences o f other 
people, dismissing individuals adopt a pre-emptive strategy that serves to 
minimise their attentional focus. This proposed employment o f different types 
of defence strategy for personal versus others' attachment and emotional 
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experiences is consistent with the somewhat surprising findings o f Study Two 
that highlight how dismissing individuals rate attachment-related memories as 
more specific, important and emotionally intense at the time of encoding than 
non-attachment memories. Dismissing individuals also rated attachment-
related memories as saying more about themselves than non-attachment 
memories. Thus, early attachment experiences appear to be just as accessible 
and powerful for dismissing individuals as they are for secure and preoccupied 
individuals. It may be the case that adult attachment impacts on 
autobiographical recall o f attachment experiences not at the level o f how the 
experiences themselves are encoded, but in terms o f how these experiences are 
used to inform one's strategy for encoding new material relating to negative 
emotions or attachment themes. By minimising the importance o f attachment-
related memories, despite the fact that they are rated as more important than 
non-attachment memories, dismissing individuals minimise attention to these 
themes when they encounter them again. In contrast, because secure and 
preoccupied individuals value or cling to their attachment memories, they do 
not defend against emotional and attachment material in a pre-emptive manner 
in the future. 
The finding in Study Three showing that dismissing individuals also 
downplay the vividness and self-relevance o f attachment events that might 
happen to themselves in the future suggests that post-emptive defences might 
come into play more when the attachment material is focused on the self, 
rather than dealing with attachment experiences o f other people (as was the 
case in the studies by Fraley and colleagues). Unlike the recall of events from 
their own childhoods (where effects were observed for the dismissing group in 
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ratings o f both attachment and non-attachment memories), the effects o f 
dismissing style on imagined future events were specific to their ratings o f 
attachment-related material. 
The potential complexities in relation to the types of defence adopted 
by dismissing individuals highlight the fact that it may be dangerous to assume 
that pre-emptive and post-emptive defences are mutually exclusive strategies, 
and suggest that both types o f defence may come into play. It may therefore be 
frui t ful to view the employment o f pre-emptive and post-emptive defences in 
terms o f a filter or attenuation model, rather than functioning in an all or 
nothing fashion. This interpretation would also be more compatible with the 
constructivist approach to memory discussed in Chapter One, which proposes 
that encoding and retrieval are interrelated processes. 
Further, the results of the studies reported in this thesis suggest that 
how one defends against emotionally negative or attachment-related material 
depends upon whether the material is focused on oneself and pertains to early 
childhood experiences or imagined events that may occur in the future. 
Although the performance o f dismissing individuals on recall and recounting 
of attachment-related material can be framed in terms o f the adoption of post-
emptive defences, it is important to bear in mind that insecure individuals in 
general were found to show greater concordance than secure individuals in 
their rating o f future events and past experiences. This suggests that, despite 
any post-emptive strategy, dismissing individuals still have a tendency to 
predict their future on the basis o f their past. 
The results o f the studies reported here also speak to the issue o f the 
discriminant validity o f the A . A . I . . As discussed in Chapter Four, two 
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influential studies (Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 1993; Sagi et 
al., 1994) concluded that the A . A . I , had good discriminant validity on the 
basis that A . A . I , classification was unrelated to individuals' recall for non-
autobiographical material. The assessment o f attachment-related memories 
reported in Study Two provides further support o f the validity o f the A . A . I , in 
this respect. 
However, it should be considered that the previous studies assessed the 
phenomenological properties o f non-attachment memories, focusing merely on 
number o f memories recalled, age o f encoding or latency o f recall. In contrast, 
the results o f Study Two showed that A . A . I , classification was related to 
certain reported properties o f non-attachment memories (vividness and 
specificity), suggesting that the discriminant validity o f the A . A . l . may be less 
clear cut i f one assesses the process o f recall rather than merely the quantity or 
speed of recall. Future research should therefore attempt to explore this 
possibility further. 
6.2 Shortcomings and Future Directions 
Before discussing how the findings reported here may be used to 
inform future research, it is important to outline a number o f shortcomings o f 
the studies reported here. First, it may be that the null findings arose not 
because adult attachment is unrelated to the various aspects o f 
autobiographical recall considered here, but because the studies had 
insufficient power to detect significant effects. That said, the numbers o f 
participants included in the studies reported in this thesis were similar or 
greater than those involved in previous research in this area employing both 
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self-report (e.g., Edelstein, 2007; Fraley et al., 2000) and A . A . I . (Bakermans-
Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 1993; Sagi et al., 1994) measures o f 
attachment. Moreover, in the study involving the A . A . I . , the groups o f 
participants in the secure, dismissing and preoccupied groups were reasonably 
well matched with respect to size, with no great preponderance o f secure 
individuals. However, it is important to replicate these results in larger 
samples, and using dimensional measures o f attachment style, before f i rm 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the types o f defence that might best 
characterise dismissing individuals. 
Another major shortcoming of the studies reported is that it was 
assumed that the attachment-related cues actually evoked attachment-related 
memories o f the past or future. Further studies should examine the content o f 
memories recalled to confirm this hypothesis. In fact, it may be hypothesised 
that i f the dismissing state o f mind operates with pre-emptive defences, 
negative or attachment-related cue words may evoke relatively neutral 
memories. 
Further, the sample size o f this study did not allow distinctions among 
the different sub-categories of A . A . I , classifications to be drawn. For instance 
no distinction was made between the prototypic DS1 category, which is 
characterised by insistence on lack o f memory and the DS2 category. The 
latter individuals may recall memories but actively devalue their importance or 
effects. 
I f one takes the results to indicate that insecure individuals, and 
perhaps dismissing individuals in particular, adopt complex strategies to 
defend against attachment material, these findings suggest interesting avenues 
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for future research. For example, while memory research has a long tradition 
of employing neuropsychological data in informing and testing theoretical 
models (see Chapter One), attachment researchers have only just begun to 
employ sophisticated techniques such as neuroimaging to test predictions 
about relations between adult attachment and information-processing. A recent 
study has used the Adult Attachment Projective (George & West, 2001) to 
investigate how individual differences in attachment representation relate to 
brain functioning using f M R l . Bucheim et al. (2006) concluded that the Adult 
Attachment Projective (AAP) was a feasible measure to be used in a 
neuroimaging environment, and reported that only individuals classified as 
unresolved on the basis o f their responses to the AAP showed increased 
activation in the amygdala and hippocampus regions. Bucheim et al. 
interpreted this finding as evidence for unresolved attachment status being 
linked with greater emotional dysregulation. 
However, the AAP remains to be fu l ly validated as an assessment o f 
attachment state o f mind, and conducting lengthy A.A.I.s while participants 
are being scanned would not appear to be an appropriate way for investigating 
in greater depth the neural correlates o f adult attachment. A better approach 
may be to first screen participants using the A . A . I , and then investigate 
attachment-related individual differences in brain activation while they are 
conducting cued autobiographical recall tasks such as those used in Studies 
Two and Three. Such data may prove to be particularly enlightening with 
regard to the issue o f whether dismissing individuals adopt pre-emptive or 
post-emptive defences depending on the nature o f the material (negatively 
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valenced, attachment-related, etc.) and whether the memories relate to their 
own attachment experiences. 
By borrowing techniques from cognitive psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience, and being wil l ing to engage in more formal tests o f whether 
internal working models o f attachment relationships do indeed impact on 
autobiographical recall and one's ability to engage in mental time travel, 
representational attachment research may be better able to avoid continued 
criticism on the basis that its central theoretical component - the internal 
working model - is a catchall that is too vague to provide testable hypotheses 
(Dunn, 1993; Hinde, 1988; Thompson, 1998). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Study 1 
Subject Information Sheet 
Early Memory and Relationships Study 
• What is the purpose of this study? 
The aim of this study is to further our understanding o f memory for personally 
experienced events, and in particular, to investigate how childhood relationships 
influence memory. 
• What happens if I agree to take part? 
You wi l l be asked to f i l l in 2 questionnaires at the end o f the lecture and to recall 
memories from childhood 
• What are the benefits participants can expect? 
We believe that you wi l l gain some insight into how your memory works and your 
childhood experiences. 
*l* Are there any discomforts? 
We do not think you wi l l suffer discomfort by taking part in the study. 
Confidentiality 
A l l your answers are confidential, and anonymous, we do not in fact ask you to 
indicate your name. A l l names and place-names w i l l be replaced by a code number. 
The material wi l l not be used or made available for any purpose other than the research 
project. 
You are under no obligation to participate in this study. Should you decide to take part 
you w i l l be free to withdraw from the study at any time, without a reason and without 
consequences. Participation or withdrawal from the study wi l l not affect your position 
in the University in any way. 
• Will I receive any compensation? 
No. 
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• Who organised this study? 
The study is being organised by Angela Tagini at the Department o f Psychology, 
University of Durham, under the supervision o f Dr. E. Meins and Professor M . A. 
Conway. The study is funded by the same department. 
I f you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, please contact Angela: 
Tel. 0191.3343249 ; e-mail: angela.taqini@durham.ac.uk 
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Appendix 2 Study 1 
C O N S E N T F O R M 
Early Memories Study 
Please cross out as necessary 
Have you read the Subject Information Sheet? YES 
/ N O 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and 
discuss the study? YES 
/ N O 
Have you received satisfactory answers to all o f your questions? YES 
/ N O 
Have you received enough information about the study? YES 
/ N O 
Who have you spoken to? Dr/Mr/Mrs/Ms/Prof. 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study: 
* at any time and 
* without having to give a reason for withdrawing and 
* without affecting your position in the University? 
Y E S / N O 
Signed Date 
( N A M E IN BLOCK LETTERS) 
Approved by Durham University's Ethics Advisory Committee 
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Appendix 3 Study 1 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR QUESTIONNAIRE E A R L Y MEMORY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
• D your age in months, when the remembered event occurred 
P or O PUT A C I R C L E ROUND ONE OF T H E S E , EITHER P OR O TO 
INDICATE FROM WHICH P E R S P E C T I V E YOU R E M E M B E R T H E EVENT. 
P= PARTICIPANT I f you remember the event as i f you were looking out of your 
own eyes, from the perspective of a participant. You choose "P" for participant's 
perspective . 
0= O B S E R V E R If you can see yourself in the memory, you are looking at the 
memory from the perspective of an observer. You choose " 0 " for an observer's 
perspective. 
M or F PUT A C I R C L E ROUND ONE OF T H E S E , E I T H E R M OR F TO 
INDICATE HOW COMPREHENSIVE YOUR MEMORY IS. 
M= MEMORY I f your remember an event that happened at a particular time and in a 
certain place 
(e.g. being stung by a bee while playing in your garden). 
F= FRAGMENT I f you only remember a moment, without any context. It could be 
just a single image, a feeling, a sound etc. (e.g., you only remember the pain you felt 
when you were stung). 
A L L O T H E R R A T I N G S A R E ON 5-POINT S C A L E S . W R I T E O N E 
N U M B E R IN T H E B O X E S P R O V I D E D 
R E H = Rate on the 5-point scale how often you have thought and/or talked about 
the memory before: REH= 1 2 3 4 5 
I I I I I 
Never Most frequently 
IMP= Rate on the 5-point scale how personally important the recalled experience is 
to you: 
I M P = 1 2 3 4 5 
I I I I I 
Not important Most important 
C L E A R = Rate on the 5-point scale how detailed and clear your memory is: 
Clear= 1 2 3 4 5 
J I I I 
Very vague Most vivid 
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E M O = Rate on the 5-point scale the degree of emotional intensity of the 
experience: 
Emo= 1 2 3 4 5 
No emotion Most intense 
NEGPOS=Rate on the 5-point scale how negative or positive the experience was: 
NegPos= 1 2 3 4 5 
Very negative Very positive 
SOURCE=Rate on the 5-point scale about the source of your memory: 
Source= 1 2 3 4 5 
Only know about Remember it completely 
it from others onvourown 
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Appendix 4 Study 1 E A R L Y M E M O R Y Q U E S T I O N N A I R E 
Memory Description: 
D= P or O; M or F; Reh= In CIear= 10= Negl Sourc 
Memory Description: 
P or O; M or F; Reh= I n Clear 10= NegP Sourci 
Memory Description: 
P or O; M or F; Reh= Im I!lear= 0= Negpj jsource | | 
Memory Description: 
D= P or O; M or F; Reh= I n •a-ClearH 0 = NegP Sourci 
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Appendix 5 Study 1 
The Hazan and Shaver (1990) Adult Attachment Questionnaire (AAQ) 
These questions are concerned with your experiences in relationships. Take a 
moment to think about these experiences and answer the following questions 
with them in mind. 
Read each o f the three self-descriptions below (A, B, and C) and then place a 
checkmark next to the single alternative that best describes how you feel in 
romantic relationships or is nearest to the way you feel 
A. I am somewhat uncomfortable being close to others; I find it 
diff icult to trust them completely, diff icult to allow myself to depend on them. 
I am nervous when anyone gets too close, and often, others want me to be 
more intimate than I feel comfortable being. 
B. I find it relatively easy to get close to others and am comfortable 
depending on them and having them depend on me. I don't worry about being 
abandoned or about someone getting too close to me. 
C. 1 find that others are reluctant to get as close as I would like. I 
often worry that my partner doesn't really love me or won't want to stay with 
me. 1 want to get very close to my partner, and this sometimes scares people 
away. Demographic information 
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Appendix 6 Study 1 
Demographic Information 
1. Your date o f birth: 
2. Gender: male female 
3. Your birth order (only-child, first-born, second-born, etc.): 
4. Did you attend preschool? Yes No 
I f yes, at what age? Years months 
5. Mothers education: secondary school coll 
university degree other (please specify) 
Appendix 7 Study 2 Invitation to participate in the study 
You are invited to participate in a study on Memory and Relationships 
organised by Angela Tagini 
Department of Psychology, University o f Durham. 
The study w i l l take place at the Psychology Department 
(5min.walk from your College) 
You will receive £5 for each session. 
Please read enclosed information sheet for details. 
Please contact Angela i f you are considering to take part or have further questions: 
e-mail: angela.tagini@durham.ac.uk 
Tel. 0191-3343249 or leave a message on the answering machine 07890-376050 
I f you have decided to take part, please indicate the day o f the week and time that suit 
you best 
(remember that it should not take more than 90 minutes) 
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Appendix 8 Study 2 
Subject Information Sheet 
Memory and Relationships Study 
• What is the purpose of this study? 
The aim of this study is to further our understanding o f memory for personally 
experienced events, and in particular, to investigate how childhood relationships 
influence memory. 
• What happens if I agree to take part? 
We w i l l arrange a first meeting. Every session takes about 1 hour and 30 minutes and 
wi l l be audio-taped. 
During the first session you w i l l be asked to talk about your childhood and to fill out a 
questionnaire about your memories. For most students the study w i l l end here, unless 
you wish to meet the interviewer to receive feedback on the results. 
On the basis o f the first results, some students wi l l be selected to participate in the 
second part o f the study. I f you have been chosen, you wi l l be asked to have 2 further 
sessions with the interviewer, which wi l l take place later in time (depending on 
university vacations). During these sessions, you wi l l be asked to recall memories and 
to fill out several questionnaires on your childhood and on the kind o f person you are. 
• What are the benefits participants can expect? 
We believe that you w i l l gain some insight into how your memory works and your 
childhood experiences. I f you wish, once the study has been completed you can 
receive personal feedback on the results. 
• Are there any discomforts? 
We do not think you w i l l suffer discomfort by taking part in the study. Should you feel 
any distress please inform the interviewer. 
Confidentiality 
A l l your answers are confidential. Only the interviewer and her supervisors w i l l have 
access to the audio-tapes, transcripts and questionnaires, and these wi l l be locked in a 
cabinet at the Psychology Department o f the University. A l l names and place-names 
wi l l be replaced by a code number. The material wi l l not be used or made available for 
any purpose other than the research project. 
You are under no obligation to participate in this study. Should you decide to take part 
you w i l l be free to withdraw from the study at any time, without a reason and without 
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consequences. Participation or withdrawal from the study w i l l not affect your position 
in the College or University in any way 
• Will I receive any compensation? 
You wi l l receive £5 for every session. 
• Who organised this study? 
The study is being organised by Angela Tagini at the Department o f Psychology, 
University of Durham, under the supervision of Dr. E. Meins and Professor M . A. 
Conway. The study is funded by the same department. 
I f you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, please contact Angela: 
Tel. 0191.3343249; e-mail: a n g e l a . t a g i n i @ d u r h a m . a c . u k 
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Appendix 9 Study 2 
C O N S E N T F O R M 
Memory and Relationship Study 
Please cross out as necessary 
/ N O 
Have you read the Subject Information Sheet? YES 
/ N O 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and 
discuss the study? YES 
/ N O 
Have you received satisfactory answers to all o f your questions? YES 
/ N O 
Have you received enough information about the study? YES 
Who have you spoken to? Dr/Mr/Mrs/Ms/Prof. 
/ N O 
Do you agree to being audio-taped? YES 
/NO 
Do you consent to the confidential use o f the recordings 
for scientific purposes? 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study: 
YES 
/ N O 
* at any time and 
* without having to give a reason for withdrawing and 
* without affecting your position in the University or College? YES 
Signed Date 
( N A M E IN BLOCK LETTERS) 
Approved by Durham University's Ethics Advisory Committee 
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Appendix 10 Study 2 A.A.I . 
I 'm going to be interviewing you about your childhood experiences and about 
how those experiences affected your adult personality. So I 'd like to ask you 
about your early relationship with your family. We' l l focus mainly on your 
childhood, but later we ' l l also touch upon your adolescence and how things 
are now. This interview usually takes about an hour. 
1. Could you start by helping me get oriented to your early family 
situation, and where you lived and so on? If you could tell me where you 
were born, whether you moved around much, what your family did for a 
living? 
Who would you say raised you? 
Did you see much of your grandparents when you were little? 
How old were you when they died? 
How old was your m / f when your gramdm/f died? 
2. I'd like you to try to describe your relationship with your parents as a 
young child...if you could start back from as far back as you remember? 
Age 5? 
3. 14. Now I'd like you to choose 5 adjectives or words that reflect your 
relationship with your m/F starting from as far back as you can, 
remember in early childhood- say age 5 up to age 12. I know this may 
take a bit of time. T i l write the words down and then I'l l ask you why you 
chose them. 
-(1 know this can be pretty hard, just take a few more minutes) 
Ok, you said your relationship was - are there any specific memories 
or incidents that come to mind with respect to the word that illustrate 
why you chose that word? 
(-well, just take another minute to see i f anything comes to mind, well that's 
fine let's take the next one) 
(-well that's a good general description, but I 'm wondering i f there was a 
particular time that happened?) 
ask age 
5. Now I wonder if you could tell me to which parent did you feel the 
closest and why? 
Why didn't you feel that way about F/M? 
(-you have already discussed this, but I 'd like you to answer briefly anyway.) 
ask age 
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6. When you were upset as a child what would you do? 
(And what would you do when you ?) 
ask age 
When you were emotionally upset when you were little what would you do? 
Can you think o f a specific time that happened? 
ask age 
Can you remember what would happen when you were physically hurt? Again 
do any specific incidents come to mind? 
ask age 
What would happen when you were ill? 
ask age 
Were you ever held by your parents when you were upset, hurt or ill? 
7. What is the first time you remember being separated from your 
parents? 
How did you respond? 
How did your parents react? 
How old were you? 
Are there any other separations that stand out in your mind? 
8. Did you ever feel rejected as a young child? Of course looking back on 
it now, you may realise it wasn't really rejection, but what I'm trying to 
ask about here, is whether you remember ever having felt rejected in 
childhood. 
How old were you when you first felt that way? 
What did you do? 
Why do you think your parents did those things, do you think they realised 
that they were making you feel rejected? 
(-Did you ever feel pushed away or ignored?) 
8a Were you ever frightened or worried as a child? 
ask age 
9. Were your parents ever threatening with you in any way— maybe for 
discipline or even jokingly? 
(some people told me for eg. that their parents threatened to send them away 
or to leave them) 
Some people have memories o f threats or o f some kind o f behaviour that was 
abusive 
Did anything like that ever happen in your family? 
How old were you at the time? 
Did it happen very often? 
Do you feel this experience affects you now as an adult? 
Did you have any such experiences involving people outside your family? 
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(what did getting the belt mean?) 
10. In general, how do you think your overall experiences with your 
parents have affected your adult personality? 
are there any aspects to your early experiences that you feel were a setback in 
your development? 
or is there anything that might have had a negative effect on how you turned 
out? 
11. Why do you think your parents behaved as they did during your 
childhood? 
12. was there any other adult to whom you were close, like parents, as a 
child? 
13. Did you experience the loss of a parent or close loved one while you 
were a young child—a close family member? 
could you tell me about the circumstances? 
how old were you? 
as the death sudden? 
can you recall your feelings at the time? 
have your feelings changed much over time? 
did you attend the funeral? What was that like for you? 
what would you say was the effect on your M / f , household? 
Would you say this loss has affected your adult personality? 
13a. Did you loose any other important person during your childhood? 
13b. In recent years? 
14. Other than any difficult experiences you have already descried, have 
you had any other experiences which you regard as potentially 
traumatic? 
(any experience which was overwhelmingly terrifying?) 
15. Now I'd like to ask you a few more questions about your relationship 
to your parents. Were there many changes in your relationship with your 
parents after childhood? We'll talk about the present in a moment, I 
mean changes between your childhood and adulthood. 
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16. Now I'd like to ask you about that the relationship is like now. 
do you have much contact with your parents at present? 
could you tell me about any sources o f dissatisfaction in your current 
relationship to your parents? 
any sources o f special satisfaction? 
17. I'd like to move onto a different kind of question now- it is not about 
your parents. I'd like you to imagine that you have a one-year-old child. I 
wonder how would you respond, in terms of feelings, if you had to 
separate from this child? 
do you think you would ever feel worried about this child? 
(I 'd like to move onto a different kind o f question now- it is not about your 
parents. Instead it's about an aspect o f your current relationship with your 
child. How do you respond now, in terms o f feelings, when you separate from 
your child/children? 
do you ever feel worried about your child? 
(18. If you had 3 wishes for your child 20 years from now, what would 
they be? I'm thinking of the kind of future you would like to see for your 
child. I ' l l give you a minute to think about this one) 
19. Is there any particular thing which you feel you learned above all 
from your own childhood experiences? Something you might have gained 
from the kind of childhood you had? 
20. We've been focusing a lot on the past in this interview, but I'd like to 
end by looking at the future. We've just talked about what you may have 
learned from your own childhood experiences. I'd like to end by asking 
you what you hope your child might learn from his experience of being 
parented by you? 
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Appendix 11 Study 2 
Earliest Memory Questionnaire: derived from the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire, (Johnson et al., 1988) 
Earliest Memory Characteristics Questionnaire 
1. How much is this memory focused on yourself rather than other people, objects 
o f the environment, social interactions etc. 
not at all focused on myself / definitely focused on myself. 
2. The memory is about an event that only happened once rather than an event that 
took place regularly: 
definitely a repeated event / definitely happened only once 
3. How important is this memory? not at all / extremely 
important 
4. How vivid is this memory? not at all / extremely vivid 
5. M y memory involves visual detail: not at all / very much so 
6. M y memory involves sound: not at all / very much so 
7. M y memory involves smell: not at all / very much so 
8. My memory involves touch: not at all / very much so 
9. M y memory involves taste: not at all / very much so 
10. M y memory for the event is: sketchy / very detailed 
11. The order o f events is: confusing / comprehensible 
12. The story line is: simple / complex 
13. The story line is: bizarre / realistic 
14. M y memory for the location where the event takes place is: 
vague / clear-distinct 
15. The general setting is: unfamiliar/familiar 
16. The relative spatial arrangement o f objects in the memory is: 
vague / clear-distinct 
17. The relative spatial arrangement of people in the memory is: 
vague / clear-distinct 
18. M y memory for the time when the event takes place is: 
vague / distinct 
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19. The event seems: short / long 
20. The overall tone of the memory is: very negative / very positive 
21. In this event I was: definitely a spectator / definitely a participant 
22. At the time, the event seemed like it would have serious implications: 
not at all / definitely 
23. Looking back, this event did have serious implications: 
not at all / definitely 
24. I remember how I felt at the time when the event took place: 
not at all / definitely 
25. M y feelings at the time were: very negative / very positive 
26. M y feelings at the time were: not at all intense / very intense 
27. I remember what I thought at the time: not at all / very clearly 
28. Overall I remember this event: hardly / very well 
29. I remember events relating to this memory that took place in advance of this 
event: not at all / very clearly 
30. after the event: not at all / very clearly 
31. Do you have any doubt about the accuracy o f the memory for this event: 
a great deal o f doubt / no doubt whatsoever 
32. Since it happened 1 have thought about this event: not at all / many times 
33. Since it happened I have talked about this event: not at all / many times 
How many years ago did the event take place? years 
age 
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Appendix 12 Study 3 
Memory Questionnaire 
Please fill out the following questionnaire for each memory 
recalled by referring to the scale from 0 to 6. The mid point 3 
indicates uncertainty. 
1. How often have you remembered this event: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I I I I I I I 
Never before many times before 
2. How personally important is this memory to you: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I I I I I I I 
not at all important very important 
3. How vivid is your memory: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I I I I I I I 
not at all very vivid 
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4. How intense were your feelings at the time: 
5 6 
J I 
not at all intense very intense 
5. Were your feelings at the time negative or positive: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
very negative very positive 
6. Is this memory about an event that only happened once (like being stung by a 
bee) or about an event that took place regularly (like going to pre-school every 
day: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
definitely a repeated event definitely happened only once 
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7. How intense were your feelings when you were remembering this event today: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I I I I I I I 
not at all intense very intense 
8. How much does this memory reveal or say about you: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
not much a lot 
9. This imaginary event reveals or says about me: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
not much 
10. How likely is it that this event wi l l happen? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
not at all likely extremely likely 
J 
a lot 
11. How many years from now could it occur? 
Appendix 13 Study 3 
Future Questionnaire 
Please fill out the questionnaire for each imagined event by 
referring to the scale from 0 to 6. A score of 3 indicates 
uncertainty. 
How vivid is this imagined event: 
0 1 2 3 
I I I L 
not at all extremely vivid 
2. I believe my feelings would be: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I I I I I I I 
not at all intense very intense 
3. 1 believe my feelings would be: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I I I I I I I 
very negative very positive 
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4. This imaginary event reveals or says about me: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I I I I I I I 
not much a lot 
5. How easy was it to imagine this event? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
not at all very much so 
6. How likely is it that this event wi l l happen? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I I I I I I I 
not at all likely extremely likely 
How many years from now could it occur? 
7. 
8. 
10. 
Appendix 14 Study 3 
Beck's Depression Inventory (Beck and Steer, 1987) 
Choose one statement from among the group of four statements in each 
question that best describes how you have been feeling during the past few 
days. Circle the number beside your choice. 
1 0 I do not feel sad. 
1 I feel sad. 
2 I am sad all the time and 1 can't snap out of 
it. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
8 0 I don't feel 1 am any worse than anybody else. 
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or 
mistakes. 
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that 
happens. 
2 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the 
future. 
1 I feel discouraged about the future. 
2 I feel 1 have nothing to look forward to. 
3 1 feel that the future is hopeless and that 
things cannot improve. 
9 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 1 have thoughts of killing myself, but I would 
not carry them out. 
2 1 would like to kill myself. 
3 1 would kill myself i f I had the chance. 
3 0 1 do not feel like a failure. 
1 I feel I have failed more than the average 
person. 
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a 
lot of failure. 
3 1 feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
10 0 I don't cry any more than usual. 
1 I cry more now than I used to. 
2 I cry all the time now. 
3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry 
even though I want to. 
4 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I 
used to. 
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
2 I don't get any real satisfaction out of 
anything anymore. 
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
11 0 I am no more irritated by things than I ever 
am. 
1 I am slightly more irritated now than usual. 
2 I am quite annoyed or irritated a good deal of 
the time. 
3 I feel irritated all the time now. 
5 0 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
12 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
1 I am less interested in other people than I used 
to be. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
3 I have lost all of my interest in other people. 
6 0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel 1 am being punished. 
13 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions 
than before. 
3 1 can't make decisions at all anymore. 
7 0 I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
1 I am disappointed in myself. 
2 I am disgusted with myself. 
3 I hate myself. 
14 0 I don't feel that I look any worse than I used to. 
1 I am worried that I am looking old or 
unattractive. 
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my 
appearance that make me look unattractive. 
3 I believe that 1 look ugly. 
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15 0 I can work about as well as before. 
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at 
doing something. 
2 I have to push myself very hard to do 
anything. 
3 I can't do any work at all. 
19 0 I haven't lost much weight, i f any, 
lately. 
1 1 have lost more than five pounds. 
2 I have lost more than ten pounds. 
3 1 have lost more than fifteen pounds. 
(Score 0 i f you have been purposely 
trying to lose weight.) 
16 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
1 I don't sleep as well as I used to. 
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual 
and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I 
used to and cannot get back to sleep. 
20 0 I am no more worried about my 
health than usual. 
1 I am worried about physical 
problems such as aches and pains, or 
upset stomach, or constipation. 
2 I am very worried about physical 
problems, and it's hard to think of 
much else. 
3 I am so worried about my physical 
problems that I cannot think about 
anything else. 
17 0 I don't get more tired than usual. 
1 1 get tired more easily than I used to. 
2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 
3 I am too tired to do anything. 
21 0 I have not noticed any recent change 
in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I 
used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex 
now. 
3 I have lost interested in sex 
completely. 
18 0 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to 
be. 
2 My appetite is much worse now. 
3 1 have no appetite at all anymore. 
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Appendix 15 Study 3 
Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (Bernstein and Fink, 1997) 
CTfi Name: 
Age:_ 
Rpady Score 
Sex: 
1. I didn't have enough to eat ^ • 
2. I knew that there was someone to take care of me and protect me. 
3. People in my family caUed me things like °Btupid,° °lajy,° or "ugly." 
4. My parents were too drunk or high to take care of the family. 
5. There was someone in my family who helped me feel that 1 was important or special. 
6. 1 had to wear dirty clothes. 
7. I felt loved. 
8. I thought that my parents wished I had never been born. 
9. I got hit so hard by someone in my family that I had to Bee a doctor or go to the hospital. 
10. There was nothing I wanted to change about my family. 
11. People in my family hit me so hard that it left me with bruises or marks. 
12. 1 was punished with a belt, a board, a cord, or some other hard object. 
13. People in my family looked out for each other, 
14. People in my family said hurtful or insulting things to me. 
15. I believe that I was physically abused. 
16. 1 had the perfect childhood. 
17. I got bit or beaten so badly that it was noticed by someone like a teacher, neighbor, or doctor. 
18. I felt that someone in my family hated me. 
19. People in my family felt close to each other. 
20. Someone tried to touch me in a sexual way, or tried to make me touch them. 
21. Someone threatened to hurt me or tell lies about me unless I did something sexual with them. 
22. I had the beat family in the world. 
23. Someone tried to make mo do sexual things or watch sexual things. 
24. Someone molested me. 
25. I believe that I was emotionally abused. 
26. There was someone to lake me to the doctor if I needed it. 
27. 1 believe thai 1 was sexually abused. 
28. My family was a source of strength and support. 
Never 
True 
Rarely 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Often 
True 
Very Often 
True 
. "»...;•. • : • • 
• • • • • -
• • • • • 
' • y • • : 
• • • • • 
• • 
• • • • • 
•- • •• • . • 
• • • • • 
• : • • . 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • ." 
• • • • • 
• ; 
• • • • • 
• • • 
• • • • • 
• • 
• • • • • 
• 
• • • • • 
" • 
• • • • • 
• ...» • •-
• • • • • 
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